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Abstract
How much visual information can we hold in mind at once? A large body of research
has attempted to quantify the capacity of visual working memory by focusing on how
many individual objects or visual features can be actively maintained in memory.
This thesis presents a novel theoretical framework for understanding working memory
capacity, suggesting that our memory representations are complex and structured
even for simple visual displays, and formalizing such structured representations is
necessary to understand the architecture and capacity of visual working memory.
Chapter 1 reviews previous empirical research on visual working memory capacity,
and argues that an understanding of memory capacity requires moving beyond quan-
tifying how many items people can remember and instead focusing on the content
of our memory representations. Chapter 2 argues for structured memory representa-
tions by demonstrating that we encode a summary of all of the items on a display
in addition to information about particular items, and use both item and summary
information to complete working memory tasks. Chapter 3 describes a computational
model that formalizes the roles of perceptual organization and the encoding of sum-
mary statistics in visual working memory, and provides a way to quantify capacity
even in the presence of richer, more structured memory representations. This formal
framework predicts how well observers will be able to remember individual working
memory displays, rather than focusing on average performance across many displays.
Chapter 4 uses information theory to examine visual working memory through the
framework of compression, and demonstrates that introducing regularities between
items allows us to encode more colors in visual working memory. Thus, working
memory capacity needs to be understood by taking into account learned knowledge,
rather than simply focusing on the number of items to be remembered. Together,
this research suggests that visual working memory capacity is best characterized by
structured representations where prior knowledge influences how much can be stored
and displays are encoded at multiple levels of abstraction.
Thesis Supervisor: Aude Oliva
Title: Associate Professor of Cognitive Science
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Chapter 1
Structured representations in
visual working memory
1.1 A review of visual working memory capacityl
The working memory system is used to hold information actively in mind, and to
manipulate that information to perform a cognitive task (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley,
2000). While there is a long history of research on verbal working memory and working
memory for spatial locations (e.g., Baddeley, 1986), the last 15 years has seen surge in
research on visual working memory, specifically for visual feature information (Luck
& Vogel, 1997).
The study of visual working memory has largely focused on the capacity of the
system, both because limited capacity is one of the main hallmarks of working mem-
ory, and because individual differences in measures of working memory capacity are
correlated with differences in fluid intelligence, reading comprehension, and academic
achievement (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Fukuda, Vo-
gel, Mayr & Awh, 2010; Kane, Bleckly, Conway & Engle, 2001). This relationship
suggests that working memory may be a core cognitive ability that underlies, and
'Parts of this chapter were published as Brady, T.F, Konkle, T., & Alvarez, G.A. (2011). A
review of visual memory capacity: Beyond individual items and towards structured representations.
Journal of Vision.
constrains, our ability to process information across cognitive domains. Thus, un-
derstanding the capacity of working memory could provide important insight into
cognitive function more generally.
In the broader working memory literature, a significant amount of research has
focused on characterizing memory limits based on how quickly information can be
refreshed (e.g., Baddeley, 1986) or the rate at which information decays (Broadbent,
1958; Baddeley & Scott, 1971). In contrast, research on the capacity of visual work-
ing memory has focused on the number of items that can be remembered (Luck &
Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001). However, several recent advances in models of visual
working memory have been driven by a focus on the content of working memory
representations rather than how many individual items can be stored.
Here we review research that focuses on working memory representations, includ-
ing their fidelity, structure, and effects of stored knowledge. While not an exhaustive
review of the literature, these examples highlight the fact that working memory rep-
resentations have a great deal of structure beyond the level of individual items. This
structure can be characterized as a hierarchy of properties, from individual features,
to individual objects, to across-object ensemble features (spatial context and featural
context). Together, the work reviewed here illustrates how a representation-based ap-
proach has led to important advances, not just in understanding the nature of stored
representations themselves, but also in characterizing working memory capacity and
shaping models of visual working memory.
1.1.1 The fidelity of visual working memory
Recent progress in modeling visual working memory has resulted from an emphasis
on estimating the fidelity of visual working memory representations. In general, the
capacity of any memory system should be characterized both in terms of the number
of items that can be stored, and in terms of the fidelity with which each individual
item can be stored. Consider the case of a USB-drive that can store exactly 1000
images: the number of images alone is not a complete estimate of this USB-drives
storage capacity. It is also important to consider the resolution with which those
images can be stored: if each image can be stored with a very low resolution, say 16 x
16 pixels, then the drive has a lower capacity than if it can store the same number of
images with a high resolution, say 1024 x 768 pixels. In general, the true capacity of a
memory system can be estimated by multiplying the maximum number of items that
can be stored by the fidelity with which each individual item can be stored (capacity
= quantity X fidelity). For a memory system such as your USB-drive, there is only
an information limit on memory storage, so the number of files that can be stored
is limited only by the size of those files. Whether visual working memory is best
characterized as an information limited system (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Wilken
& Ma, 2004), or whether it has a pre-determined and fixed item limit (Luck & Vogel,
1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008) is an active topic of debate in the field.
Luck and Vogels (1997) landmark study on the capacity of visual working memory
spurred the surge in research on visual working memory over the past 15 years. Luck
and Vogel (1997) used a change detection task to estimate working memory capacity
for features and conjunctions of features (Figure la; see also Pashler, 1988; Phillips,
1974; Vogel, Woodman & Luck, 2001). On each trial, observers saw an array of
colored squares and were asked to remember them. The squares then disappeared for
about one second, and then reappeared with either all of the items exactly the same as
before, or with a single square having changed color to a categorically different color
(e.g., yellow to red). Observers were asked to say whether the display was exactly
the same or whether one of the squares had changed (Figure la).
Luck and Vogel (1997) found that observers were able to accurately detect changes
most of the time when there were fewer than 3 or 4 items on the display, but that
performance declined steadily as the number of items increased beyond 4. Luck and
Vogel (1997) and Cowan (2001) have shown that this pattern of performance is well
explained by a model in which a fixed number of objects (3-4) were remembered.
Thus, these results are consistent with a "slot model" of visual working memory
capacity (see also Cowan, 2005; Rouder, Morey, Cowan, Zwilling, Morey & Pratte,
2008) in which working memory can store a fixed number of items.
Importantly, this standard change detection paradigm provides little informa-
a. Change Detection
(Luck & Vogel, 1997)
b. Change Detection with
Complex Objects
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004)
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Change Detection
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(Awh, Barton & Vogel, 2007)
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Figure 1-1: Measures of visual working memory fidelity. (a) A change detection
task. Observers see the Study display, then after a blank must indicate whether the
Test display is identical to the Study display or whether a single item has changed
color. (b) Change detection with complex objects. In this display, the cube changes
to another cube (within-category change), requiring high-resolution representations
to detect. (c) Change detection with complex objects. In this display, the cube
changes to a Chinese character (across-category change), requiring only low-resolution
representations to detect. (d) A continuous color report task. Observers see the Study
display, and then at test are asked to report the exact color of a single item. This
gives a continuous measure of the fidelity of memory.
tion about how well each individual object was remembered. The change detection
paradigm indicates only that items were remembered with sufficient fidelity to dis-
tinguish an object's color from a categorically different color. How much information
do observers actually remember about each object?
Several new methods have been used to address this question (see Figure 1b, c,
d). First, the change detection task can be modified to vary the amount of infor-
mation that must be stored by varying the type of changes that can occur. For
example, changing from one shade of red to a different, similar shade of red requires
a high-resolution representation, whereas a change from red to blue can be detected
with a low-resolution representation. Using such changes that require high-resolution
representations has proved particularly fruitful for investigating memory capacity for
complex objects (Figure 1b, c). Second, estimates of memory precision can be ob-
tained by using a continuous report procedure in which observers are cued to report
the features of an item, and then adjust that item to match the remembered proper-
ties. Using this method, the fidelity of a simple feature dimension like color can be
investigated by having observers report the exact color of a single item (Figure 1d).
Fidelity of storage for complex objects
While early experiments using large changes in a change detection paradigm found
evidence for a slot model, in which memory is limited to storing a fixed number of
items, subsequent experiments with newer paradigms that focused on the precision of
memory representations have suggested an information-limited model. Specifically,
Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004) proposed that there is an information limit on working
memory, which would predict a trade off between the number of items stored and the
fidelity with which each item is stored. For example, suppose working memory could
store 8 bits of information. It would be possible to store a lot of information about
1 object (8 bits/object = 8 bits), or a small amount of information about 4 objects
(2 bits/object = 8 bits). To test this hypothesis, Alvarez and Cavanagh varied the
amount of information required to remember objects, from categorically different col-
ors (low information load), to perceptually similar 3D cubes (high information load).
The results showed that the number of objects that could be remembered with suffi-
cient fidelity to detect the changes depended systematically on the information load
per item: the more information that had to be remembered from an individual item,
the fewer the total number of items that could be stored with sufficient resolution,
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a limit to the total amount of information
stored.
This result was not due to an inability to discriminate the more complex shapes,
such as 3D cubes: observers could easily detect a change between cubes when only a
single cube was remembered, but they could not detect the same change when they
tried to remember 4 cubes. This result suggests that encoding additional items re-
duced the resolution with which each individual item could be remembered, consistent
with the idea that there is an information limit on memory. Using the same paradigm
but varying the difficulty of the memory test, Awh, Barton and Vogel (2007) found a
similar result: with only a single cube in memory, observers could easily detect small
changes in the cubes structure. However, with several cubes in memory, observers
were worse at detecting these small changes but maintained the ability to detect
larger changes (e.g., changing the cube to a completely different kind of stimulus, like
a Chinese character; Figure 1b, c). This suggests that when many cubes are stored,
less information is remembered about each cube, and this low-resolution representa-
tion is sufficient to make a coarse discrimination (3D cube vs. Chinese character),
but not a fine discrimination (3D cube vs. 3D cube). Taken together, these two
studies suggest that working memory does not store a fixed number of items with
fixed fidelity: the fidelity of items in working memory depends on a flexible resource
that is shared among items, such that a single item can be represented with high
fidelity, or several items with significantly lower fidelity (see Zosh & Feigenson, 2009
for a similar conclusion with infants).
Fidelity of simple feature dimensions
While the work of Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004) suggests a tradeoff between the
number of items stored and the resolution of storage, other research has demonstrated
this trade off directly by measuring the precision of working memory along continuous
feature dimensions (Wilken & Ma, 2004). For example, Wilken and Ma (2004) devised
a paradigm in which a set of colors appeared momentarily and then disappeared.
After a brief delay, the location of one color was cued, prompting the observer to
report the exact color of the cued item by adjusting a continuous color wheel (Figure
1d). Wilken and Ma (2004) found that the accuracy of color reports decreased as the
number of items remembered increased, suggesting that memory precision decreased
systematically as more items were stored in memory. This result would be predicted
by an information-limited system, because high precision responses contain more
information than low-precision responses. In other words, as more items are stored
and the precision of representations decreases, the amount of information stored per
item decreases.
Wilken and Mas (2004) investigations into the precision of working memory appear
to support an information-limited model. However, using the same continuous report
paradigm and finding similar data, Zhang and Luck (2008) have argued in favor of
a slot-model of working memory, in which memory stores a fixed number of items
with fixed fidelity. To support this hypothesis, they used a mathematical model to
partial errors in reported colors into two different classes: those resulting from noisy
memory representations, and those resulting from random guesses. Given a particular
distribution of errors, this modeling approach yields an estimate of the likelihood that
items were remembered, and the fidelity with which they were remembered. Zhang
and Luck (2008) found that the proportion of random guesses was low from 1 to 3
items, but that beyond 3 items the rate of random guessing increased. This result
is naturally accounted for by a slot model in which a maximum of 3 items can be
remembered.
However, Zhang and Luck (2008) also found that the fidelity of representations
decreased from 1 to 3 items (representations became less and less precise). A slot
model cannot easily account for this result without additional assumptions. To ac-
count for this pattern, Zhang and Luck proposed that working memory has 3 discrete
slots. When only one item is remembered, each memory slot stores a separate copy of
that one item, and these copies are then averaged together to yield a higher-resolution
representation. Critically, this averaging process improves the fidelity of the item rep-
resentation because each copy has error that is completely independent of the error
in other copies, so when they are averaged these sources of error cancel out. When
3 items are remembered, each item occupies a single slot, and without the benefits
of averaging multiple copies, each of the items is remembered with a lower resolution
(matching the resolution limit of a single slot).
This version of the slot model was consistent with the data, but only when the
number of slots was assumed to be 3. Thus, the decrease in memory precision with
increasing number of items stored can be accounted for by re-casting memory slots as
3 quantum units of resources that can be flexibly allocated to at most 3 different items
(a set of discrete fixed-resolution representations). This account depends critically on
the finding that memory fidelity plateaus and remains constant after 3 items, which
remains a point of active debate in the literature (e.g., Anderson, Vogel & Awh, 2011;
Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008). In particular, Bays, Catalao
and Husain (2009) have proposed that the plateau in memory fidelity beyond 3 items
(Zhang & Luck, 2008) is an artifact of an increase in swap errors in which the observer
accidentally reports the wrong item from the display. However, the extent to which
such swaps can account for this plateau is still under active investigation (Anderson,
Vogel & Awh, 2011; Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009).
Conclusion
To summarize, by focusing on the contents of visual working memory, and on the fi-
delity of representations in particular, there has been significant progress in models of
visual working memory and its capacity. At present, there is widespread agreement in
the visual working memory literature that visual working memory has an extremely
limited capacity and that it can represent 1 item with greater fidelity than 3-4 items.
This finding requires the conclusion that working memory is limited by a resource that
is shared among the representations of different items (i.e., is information-limited).
Some models claim that resource allocation is discrete and quantized into slots (An-
derson, Vogel & Awh, 2011; Awh, Barton & Vogel, 2007; Zhang & Luck, 2008), while
others claim that resource allocation is continuous (Bays & Husain, 2008; Huang,
2010; Wilken & Ma, 2004), but there is general agreement that working memory is a
flexibly-allocated resource of limited capacity.
Research on the fidelity of working memory places important constraints on both
continuous and discrete models. If working memory is slot-limited, then those slots
must be recast as a flexible resource, all of which can be allocated to a single item to
gain precision in its representation, or which can be divided separately among mul-
tiple items yielding relatively low-resolution representations of each item. If memory
capacity is information-limited, then it is necessary to explain why under some condi-
tions it appears that there is an upper bound on memory storage of 3-4 objects (e.g.
Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Awh, Barton & Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang
& Luck, 2008) and in other conditions it appears that memory is purely information-
limited, capable of storing more-and-more, increasingly noisy representations even
beyond 3-4 items (e..g, Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009; Huang,
2010).
1.1.2 The representation of features vs. objects in visual
working memory
Any estimate of memory capacity must be expressed with some unit, and what counts
as the appropriate unit depends upon how information is represented. Since George
Miller's (1956) seminal paper claiming a limit of 7 +/- 2 chunks as the capacity of
working memory, a significant amount of work has attempted to determine the units
of storage in working memory. In the domain of verbal memory, for example, de-
bate has flourished about the extent to which working memory capacity is limited
by storing a fixed number of chunks vs. time-based decay (Baddeley, 1986; Cowan
2005; Cowan & AuBuchon, 2008). In visual working memory, this debate has focused
largely on the issue of whether separate visual features (color, orientation, size) are
stored in independent buffers, each with their own capacity limitations (e.g., Mag-
nussen, Greenlee & Thomas, 1996), or whether visual working memory operates over
integrated object representations (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman & Luck,
2001; see Figure 2b).
Luck and Vogel (1997) provided the first evidence that visual working memory
representations should be thought of as object-based. In their seminal paper (Luck
& Vogel, 1997), they found that observers performance on a change detection task
was identical whether they had to remember only one feature per object (orientation
or color), two features per object (both color and orientation), or even four features
per object (color, size, orientation and shape). If memory was limited in terms of the
number of features, then remembering more features per object should have a cost.
Because there was no cost for remembering more features, Luck and Vogel concluded
that objects are the units of visual working memory. In fact, Luck and Vogel (1997)
initially provided data demonstrating that observers could remember 3-4 objects even
when those objects each contained 2 colors. In other words, observers could only re-
member 3-4 colors when each color was on a separate object, but they could remember
6-8 colors when those colors were joined into bi-color objects. However, subsequent
findings have provided a number of reasons to temper this strong, object-based view
of working memory capacity. In particular, recent evidence has suggested that, while
there is some benefit to object-based storage, objects are not always encoded in their
entirety, and multiple features within an object are encoded with a cost.
Objects are not always encoded in their entirety
A significant body of work has demonstrated that observers do not always encode
objects in their entirety. When multiple features of an object appear on distinct object
parts, observers are significantly impaired at representing the entire object (Davis &
Holmes, 2005; Delvenne & Bruyer, 2004; Delvenne & Bruyer, 2006; Xu, 2002a). For
instance, if the color feature appears on one part of an object, and the orientation
feature on another part of the object, then observers perform worse when required
to remember both features than when trying to remember either feature alone (Xu,
2002a). In addition, observers sometimes encode some features of an object but not
others, for example remembering their color but not their shape (Bays, Wu & Husain,
2011; Fougnie & Alvarez, submitted), particularly when only a subset of features is
task-relevant (e.g., Droll, Hayhoe, Triesch, & Sullivan, 2005; Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe
& Sullivan, 2003; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). Thus, working memory does not always
store integrated object representations.
Costs for encoding multiple features within an object
Furthermore, another body of work has demonstrated that encoding more than one
feature of the same object does not always come without cost. Luck and Vogel
(1997) provided evidence that observers could remember twice as many colors when
those colors were joined into bi-color objects. This result suggested that memory was
truly limited by the number of objects that could be stored, and not the number of
features. However, this result has not been replicated, and indeed there appears to
be a significant cost to remembering two colors on a single object (Olson & Jiang,
2002; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002b). In particular, Wheeler and Treismans
work (2002) suggests that memory is limited to storing a fixed number of colors (3-4)
independent of how those colors are organized into bi-color objects. This indicates
that working memory capacity is not limited only by the number of objects to-be-
remembered; instead, some limits are based on the number of values that can be
stored for a particular feature dimension (e.g., only 3-4 colors may be stored).
In addition to limits on the number of values that may be stored within a particular
feature dimension, data on the fidelity of representations suggests that even separate
visual features from the same object are not stored completely independently. In an
elegant design combining elements of the original work of Luck and Vogel (1997) with
the newer method of continuous report (Wilken & Ma, 2004), Fougnie, Asplund and
Marois (2010) examined observers representations of multi-feature objects (oriented
triangles of different colors; see Figure 2a). Their results showed that, while there
was no cost for remembering multiple features of the same object in a basic change-
detection paradigm (as in Luck and Vogel, 1997), this null result was obtained because
the paradigm was not sensitive to changes in the fidelity of the representation. In
contrast, the continuous report paradigm showed that, even within a single simple
object, remembering more features results in significant costs in the fidelity of each
feature representation. This provides strong evidence against any theory of visual
working memory capacity in which more information can be encoded about an object
without cost (e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997), but at the same time provides evidence
against the idea of entirely separate memory capacities for each feature dimension.
Benefits of object-based storage beyond separate buffers
While observers cannot completely represent 3-4 objects independently of their in-
formation load, there is a benefit to encoding multiple features from the same object
compared to the same number of features on different objects (Fougnie, Asplund and
Marois, 2010; Olson & Jiang, 2002; Quinlan & Cohen, 2011). For example, Olson
and Jiang showed that it is easier to remember the color and orientation of 2 objects
(4 features total), than the color of 2 objects and the orientation of 2 separate objects
(still 4 features total). In addition, while Fougnie, Asplund and Marois (2010) showed
that there is a cost to remembering more features within an object, they found that
there is greater cost to remembering features from different objects. Thus, while
remembering multiple features within an object led to decreased fidelity for each fea-
ture, remembering multiple features on different objects led to both decreased fidelity
and a decreased probability of successfully storing any particular feature (Fougnie,
Asplund, & Marois, 2010).
Conclusion
So what is the basic unit of representation in visual working memory? While there
are significant benefits to encoding multiple features of the same object compared to
multiple features across different objects (e.g., Fougnie, Asplund and Marois, 2010;
Olson & Jiang, 2002), visual working memory representations do not seem to be
purely object-based. Memory for multi-part objects demonstrates that the relative
location of features within an object limits how well those features can be stored (Xu,
2002a), and even within a single simple object, remembering more features results
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Figure 1-2: Possible memory representations for a visual working memory display.
(a) A display of oriented and colored items to remember. (b) Potential memory
representations for the display in (a). The units of memory do not appear to be
integrated bound objects, or completely independent feature representations. Instead,
they might be characterized as hierarchical feature-bundles, which have both object-
level and feature-level properties.
in significant costs in the fidelity of each feature representation (Fougnie, Asplund
& Marois, 2010). These results suggest that what counts as the right unit in visual
working memory is not a fully integrated object representation, or independent feature
representations. In fact, no existing model captures all of the relevant data on the
storage of objects and features in working memory.
One possibility is that the initial encoding process is object-based (or location-
based), but that the 'unit' of visual working memory is a hierarchically-structured
feature-bundle (Figure 2b): at the top level of an individual "unit" is an integrated
object representation, at the bottom level of an individual "unit" are low-level fea-
ture representations, with this hierarchy organized in a manner that parallels the
hierarchical organization of the visual system. Thus, a hierarchical feature-bundle
has the properties of independent feature stores at the lower level, and the properties
of integrated objects at a higher level. Because there is some independence between
lower-level features, it is possible to modulate the fidelity of features independently,
and even to forget features independently. On the other hand, encoding a new hi-
erarchical feature-bundle might come with an overhead cost that could explain the
object-based benefits on encoding. On this view, remembering any feature from a new
object would require instantiating a new hierarchical feature-bundle, which might be
more costly than simply encoding new features into an existing bundle.
This proposal for the structure of memory representations is consistent with the
full pattern of evidence described above, including the benefit for remembering mul-
tiple features from the same objects relative to different objects, and the cost for
remembering multiple features from the same object. Moreover, this hierarchical
working-memory theory is consistent with evidence showing a specific impairment in
object-based working memory when attention is withdrawn from items (e.g., binding
failures: Fougnie & Marois, 2009; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; although this is an area
of active debate; see Allen, Baddeley & Hitch, 2006; Baddeley, Allen, & Hitch, 2011;
Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006; Johnson, Hollingworth & Luck, 2008; Stevanovski &
Jilicoeur, 2011).
Furthermore, there is some direct evidence for separate capacities for feature-based
and object-based working memory representations, with studies showing separable
priming effects and memory capacities (Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010; Wood,
2009; Wood, 2011a). For example, observers may be capable of storing information
about visual objects using both a scene-based feature memory (perhaps of a particular
view), and also a higher-level visual memory system that is capable of storing view-
invariant, 3D object information (Wood, 2011a; Wood, 2009).
It is important to note that our proposed hierarchical feature-bundle model is
not compatible with a straightforward item-based or chunk-based model of working
memory capacity. A key part of such proposals (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al. 2004)
is that memory capacity is limited only by the number of chunks encoded, not taking
into account the information within the chunks. Consequently, these models are not
compatible with evidence showing that there are limits simultaneously at the level of
objects and the level of features (e.g., Fougnie et al. 2010). Even if a fixed number
of objects or chunks could be stored, this limit would not capture the structure and
content of the representations maintained in memory.
Thus far we have considered only the structure of individual items in working mem-
ory. Next we review research demonstrating that working memory representations
includes another level of organization that represents properties that are computed
across sets of items.
1.1.3 Interactions between items in visual working memory
In the previous two sections, we discussed the representation of individual items in
visual working memory. However, research focusing on contextual effects in memory
demonstrates that items are not stored in memory completely independent of one
another. In particular, several studies have shown that items are encoded along with
spatial context information (the spatial layout of items in the display), and with feat-
ural context information (the ensemble statistics of items the display). These results
suggest that visual working memory representations have a great deal of structure
beyond the individual item level. Therefore, even a complete model of how individ-
ual items are stored in working memory would not be sufficient to characterize the
capacity of visual working memory. Instead, the following findings regarding what
information is represented, and how representations at the group or ensemble level
affect representations at the individual item level, must be taken into account in any
complete model of working memory capacity.
Influences of spatial context
Visual working memory paradigms often require observers to remember not only the
featural properties of items (size, color, shape, identity), but also where those items
appeared in the display. In these cases, memory for the features of individual items
may be dependent on spatial working memory as well (for a review of spatial working
memory, see Awh & Jonides, 2001). The most prominent example of this spatial-
context dependence is the work of Jiang, Olson and Chun (2000), who demonstrated
that changing the spatial context of items in a display impairs change detection.
For example, when the task was to detect whether a particular item changed color,
performance was worse if the other items in the display did not reappear (Figure 3a),
or reappeared with their relative spatial locations changed. This interference suggests
that the items were not represented independently of their spatial context (see also
Vidal et al 2005; Olson & Marshuetz, 2005; and Hollingworth, 2006, for a description
of how such binding might work for real-world objects in scenes). This interaction
between spatial working memory and visual working memory may be particularly
strong when remembering complex shape, when binding shapes to colors, or when
binding colors to locations (Wood, 2011b), but relatively small when remembering
colors that do not need to be bound to locations (Wood, 2011b).
Influence of feature context, or "ensemble statistics"
In addition to spatial context effects on item memory, it is likely that there are
feature context effects as well. For instance, even in a display of squares with random
colors, some displays will tend to have more "warm colors" on average, whereas
others will have more "cool colors" on average, and others still will have no clear
across-item structure. This featural context, or "ensemble statistics" (Alvarez, 2011),
could influence memory for individual items (e.g., Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Chapter
2). For instance, say you remember that the colors were "warm" on average, but the
test display contains a green item (Figure 3b). In this case, it is more likely that the
green item is a new color, and it would be easier to detect this change than a change
of similar magnitude that remained within the range of colors present in the original
display.
Given that ensemble information would be useful for remembering individual
items, it is important to consider the possibility that these ensemble statistics will
influence item memory. Indeed, Brady and Alvarez (2011; Chapter 2) have provided
evidence suggesting that the representation of ensemble statistics influences the rep-
resentation of individual items. They found that observers are biased in reporting
the size of an individual item by the size of the other items in the same color set,
and by the size of all of the items on the particular display. They proposed that this
bias reflects the integration of information about the ensemble size of items in the
display with information about the size of a particular item. In fact, using an optimal
observer model, they showed that observers reports were in line with what would be
expected by combining information from both ensemble memory representations and
memory representations of individual items (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 2).
These studies leave open the question of how ensemble representations interact
b. Feature Context
Easier Harder Easier Harder
(Jiang, Olson & Chun, 2000)
Figure 1-3: Interactions between items in working memory. (a) Effects of spatial
context. It is easier to detect a change to an item when the spatial context is the
same in the original display and the test display than when the spatial context is
altered, even if the item that may have changed is cued (with a black box). Displays
adapted from the stimuli of Jiang, Olson & Chun (2000). (b) Effects of feature context
on working memory. It is easer to detect a change to an item when the new color is
outside the range of colors present in the original display, even for a change of equal
magnitude.
a. Spatial Context
with representations of individual items in working memory. The representation of
ensemble statistics could take up space in memory that would otherwise be used
to represent more information about individual items (as argued, for example, by
Feigenson 2008 and Halberda, Sires and Feigenson, 2006), or such ensemble represen-
tations could be stored entirely independently of representations of individual items
and integrated either at the time of encoding, or at the time of retrieval. For example,
ensemble representations could make use of separate resource from individual item
representations, perhaps analogous to the separable representations of real-world ob-
jects and real-world scenes (e.g., Greene & Oliva, 2009). Compatible with this view,
ensemble representations themselves appear to be hierarchical (Haberman & Whitney,
2011), since observers compute both low-level summary statistics like mean orienta-
tion, and also object-level summary statistics like mean emotion of a face (Haberman
& Whitney, 2009).
While these important questions remain for future research, the effects of ensem-
ble statistics on individual item memory suggest several intriguing conclusions. First,
it appears that visual working memory representations do not consist of independent,
individual items. Instead, working memory representations are more structured, and
include information at multiple levels of abstraction, from items, to the ensemble
statistics of sub-groups, to ensemble statistics across all items, both in spatial and
featural dimensions. Second, these levels of representation are not independent: en-
semble statistics appear to be integrated with individual item representations. Thus,
this structure must be taken into account in order to model and characterize the ca-
pacity of visual working memory. Limits on the number of features alone, the number
of objects alone, or the number of ensemble representations alone, are not sufficient
to explain the capacity of working memory.
Perceptual grouping and dependence between items
Other research has shown that items tend to be influenced by the other items in
visual working memory, although such work has not explicitly attempted to distin-
guish influences due to the storage of individual items and influences from ensemble
statistics. For example, Viswanathan, Perl, Bisscher, Kahana and Sekuler (2010;
using Gabor stimuli) and Lin and Luck (2008; using colored squares) showed im-
proved memory performance when items appear more similar to one another (see
also Johnson, Spencer, Luck, & Schner, 2009). In addition, Huang & Sekuler (2010)
have demonstrated that when reporting the remembered spatial frequency of a Gabor
patch, observers are biased to report it as more similar to a task-irrelevant stimulus
seen on the same trial. It was as if memory for the relevant item was "pulled toward"
the features of the irrelevant item.
Cases of explicit perceptual grouping make the non-independence between ob-
jects even more clear. For example, Woodman, Vecera and Luck (2003) have shown
that perceptual grouping helps determine which objects are likely to be encoded in
memory, and Xu and Chun (2007) have shown that such grouping facilitates visual
working memory, allowing more shapes to be remembered. In fact, even the original
use of the change detection paradigm varied the complexity of relatively structured
checkerboard-like stimuli as a proxy for manipulating perceptual grouping in working
memory (Phillips, 1974), and subsequent work using similar stimuli has demonstrated
that changes which affect the statistical structure of a complex checkerboard-like
stimulus are more easily detected (Victor & Conte, 2004). The extent to which such
improvements of performance are supported by low-level perceptual grouping treat-
ing multiple individual items as a single unit in memory versus the extent to which
such performance is supported by the representation of ensemble statistics of the dis-
play in addition to particular individual items is still an open question. Some work
making use of formal models has begun to attempt to distinguish these possibilities,
but the interaction between them is likely to be complex (Brady & Tenenbaum, 2010;
Chapter 3).
Perceptual Grouping vs. Chunking vs. Hierarchically Structured Memory
What is the relationship between perceptual grouping, chunking, and the hierarchi-
cally structured memory model we have described? Perceptual grouping and chunking
are both processes by which multiple elements are combined into a single higher-order
description. For example, a series of 10 evenly spaced dots could be grouped into a
single line, and the letters F, B, and I can be chunked into the familiar acronym
FBI (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al. 2004). Critically, strong versions of perceptual
grouping and chunking models posit that the resulting groups or chunks are the units
of representation: if one part of the group or chunk is remembered, all components of
the group or chunk can be retrieved. Moreover, strong versions of perceptual group-
ing and chunking models assume that the only limits on memory capacity come from
the number of chunks or groups that can be encoded (Cowan, 2001).
Such models can account for some of the results reviewed here. For example, the
influence of perceptual grouping on memory capacity (e.g., Xu & Chun, 2007) can be
explained by positing a limit on the number of groups that can be remembered, rather
than the number of individual objects (e.g., Chapter 3). However, such models cannot
directly account for the presence of memory limits at multiple levels, like the limits on
both the number of objects stored and the number of features stored (Fougnie et al.
2010). Moreover, such models assume independence across chunks or groups and thus
cannot account for the role of ensemble features in memory for individual items (Brady
& Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 2). Any model of memory capacity must account for the fact
that groups or chunks themselves have sub-structure, that this sub-structure causes
limits on capacity, and that we simultaneously represent both information about
individual items and ensemble information across items. A hierarchically structured
memory model captures these aspects of the data by proposing that information is
maintained simultaneously at multiple, interacting levels of representation, and our
final memory capacity is a result of limits at all of these levels (e.g., Chapter 2;
Chapter 3).
Conclusion
Taken together, these results provide significant evidence that individual items are not
represented independent of other items on the same display, and that visual working
memory stores information beyond the level of individual items. Put another way,
every display has multiple levels of structure, from the level of feature representations
to individual items to the level of groups or ensembles, and these levels of structure
interact. It is important to note that these levels of structure exist, and vary across
trials, even if the display consists of randomly positioned objects that have randomly
selected feature values. The visual system efficiently extracts and encodes structure
from the spatial and featural information across the visual scene, even when, in the
long run over displays, there may not be any consistent regularities. This suggests
that any theory of visual working memory that specifies only the representation of
individual items or groups cannot be a complete model of visual working memory.
1.1.4 The effects of stored knowledge on visual working mem-
ory
Most visual working memory research requires observers to remember meaningless,
unrelated items, such as randomly selected colors or shapes. This is done to minimize
the role of stored knowledge, and to isolate working memory limitations from long-
term memory. However, in the real-world, working memory does not operate over
meaningless, unrelated items. Observers have stored knowledge about most items
in the real world, and this stored knowledge constrains what features and objects
we expect to see, and where we expect to see them. The role of such stored knowl-
edge in modulating visual working memory representations has been controversial.
In the broader working memory literature, there is clear evidence of the use of stored
knowledge to increase the number of items remembered in working memory (Erics-
son, Chase & Faloon, 1980; Cowan, Chen & Rouder, 2004). For example, the original
experiments on chunking were clear examples of using stored knowledge to recode
stimuli into a new format to increase capacity (Miller, 1956) and such results have
since been addressed in most models of working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 2000). How-
ever, in visual working memory, there has been less work towards understanding how
stored knowledge modulates memory representations and the number of items that
can be stored in memory.
Biases from stored knowledge
One uncontroversial effect of long-term memory on working memory is that there
are biases in working memory resulting from prototypes or previous experience. For
example, Huang and Sekuler (2010) have shown that when reporting the spatial
frequency of a gabor patch, observers are influenced by stimuli seen on previous
trials, tending to report a frequency that is pulled toward previously seen stimuli
(see Spencer & Hund, 2002 for an example from spatial memory). Such biases can
be understood as optimal behavior in the presence of noisy memory representations.
For example, Huttenlocher et al. (2000) found that observers memory for the size
of simple shapes is influenced by previous experience with those shapes; observers
reported sizes are again attracted to the sizes they have previously seen. Huttenlocher
et al. (2000) model this as graceful errors resulting from a Bayesian updating process
- if you are not quite sure what youve seen, it makes sense to incorporate what you
expected to see into your judgment of what you did see. In fact, such biases are even
observed with real-world stimuli, for example, memory for the size of a real-world
object is influenced by our prior expectations about its size (Hemmer & Steyvers,
2009; Konkle & Oliva, 2007). Thus, visual working memory representations do seem
to incorporate information from both episodic long-term memory and from stored
knowledge.
Stored knowledge effects on memory capacity
While these biases in visual working memory representations are systematic and im-
portant, they do not address the question of whether long-term knowledge can be used
to store more items in visual working memory. This question has received consider-
able scrutiny, and in general it has been difficult to find strong evidence of benefits of
stored knowledge on working memory capacity. For example, Pashler (1988) found
little evidence for familiarity modulating change detection performance. However,
other methods have shown promise for the use of long-term knowledge to modulate
visual working memory representations. For example, Olsson and Poom (2005) used
stimuli that were difficult to categorize or link to previous long-term representations,
and found a significantly reduced memory capacity, and observers seem to perform
better at working memory tasks with upright faces (Curby & Gauthier, 2007; Scolari,
Vogel & Awh, 2008), familiar objects (see Experiment 2, Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004),
and objects of expertise (Curby et al 2009) than other stimulus classes. In addi-
tion, childrens capacity for simple colored shapes seems to grow significantly over the
course of childhood (Cowan et al., 2005), possibly indicative of their growing visual
knowledge base. Further, infants are able to use learned conceptual information to
remember more items in a working memory task (Feigenson & Halberda, 2008).
However, several attempts to modulate working memory capacity directly using
learning to create new long-term memories showed little effect of learning on working
memory. For example, a series of studies has investigated the effects of associative
learning on visual working memory capacity (Olson & Jiang, 2004; Olson, Jiang &
Moore, 2005), and did not find clear evidence for the use of such learned information
to increase working memory storage. For example, one study found evidence that
learning did not increase the amount of information remembered, but that it improved
memory performance by redirecting attention to the items that were subsequently
tested (Olson, Jiang & Moore, 2005). Similarly, studies directly training observers on
novel stimuli have found almost no effect of long-term familiarity on change detection
performance (e.g., Chen, Eng & Jiang, 2006).
In contrast to this earlier work, Brady, Konkle and Alvarez (2009; Chapter 4)
have recently shown clear effects of learned knowledge on working memory. In their
paradigm, observers were shown standard working memory stimuli in which they
had to remember the color of multiple objects (Figure 4a). However, unbeknownst
to the observers, some colors often appeared near each other in the display (e.g.,
red tended to appear next to blue). Observers were able to implicitly learn these
regularities, and were also able to use this knowledge to encode the learned items
more efficiently in working memory, representing nearly twice as many colors ( 5-6)
as a group who was shown the same displays without any regularities (Figure 4b).
This suggests that statistical learning enabled observers to form compressed, efficient
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Figure 1-4: Effects of learned knowledge on visual working memory. (a) Example
memory display modeled after Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez (2009; Chapter 4). The
task was to remember all 8 colors. Memory was probed with a cued-recall test: a
single location was cued, and the observer indicated which color appeared at the cued
location. (b) Number of colors remembered over time in Brady, Konkle & Alvarez
(2009; Chapter 4). One group of observers saw certain color pairs more often than
others (e.g., yellow and green might occur next to each other 80% of the time),
whereas the other group saw completely random color pairs. For the group that saw
repeated color pairs, the number of color remembered increased across blocks, nearly
doubling the number remembered by the random group by the end of the session.
representations of familiar color pairs. Furthermore, using an information-theoretic
model, Brady, Konkle and Alvarez (2009; Chapter 4) found that observers' memory
for colors was compatible with a model in which observers have a fixed capacity in
terms of information (bits), providing a possible avenue for formalizing this kind of
learning and compression.
It is possible that Brady et al. (2009; Chapter 4) found evidence for the use of
stored knowledge in working memory coding because their paradigm teaches associ-
ations between items, rather than attempting to make the item's themselves more
familiar. For instance, seeing the same set of colors for hundreds of trials might not
improve the encoding of colors or shapes, because the visual coding model used to
encode colors and shapes has been built over a lifetime of visual experience that can-
not not be overcome in the time-course of a single experimental session. However,
a. Example display
arbitrary pairings of arbitrary features are unlikely to compete with previously ex-
isting associations, and might therefore lead to faster updating of the coding model
used to encode information into working memory. Another important aspect of the
Brady et al. (2009; Chapter 4) study is that the items that co-occurred were always
perceptually grouped. It is possible that compression only occurs when the correlated
items are perceptually grouped (although learning clearly functions without explicit
perceptual grouping, e.g., Orbn, Fiser, Aslin & Lengyel, 2008).
Conclusion
Observers have stored knowledge about most items in the real world, and this stored
knowledge constrains what features and objects we expect to see, and where we
expect to see them. There is significant evidence that the representation of items
in working memory is dependent on this stored knowledge. Thus, items for which
we have expertise, like faces, are represented with more fidelity (Curby & Gauthier,
2007; Scolari, Vogel & Awh, 2008), and more individual colors can be represented after
statistical regularities between those colors are learned (Brady et al. 2009; Chapter 4).
In addition, the representation of individual items are biased by past experience (e.g.,
Huang and Sekuler, 2010; Huttenlocher et al. 2000). Taken together, these results
suggest that the representation of even simple items in working memory depends
upon our past experience with those items and our stored visual knowledge.
1.1.5 Visual working memory review conclusion
A great deal of research on visual working memory has focused on how to characterize
the capacity of the system. We have argued that in order to characterize working
memory capacity, it is important to take into account both the number of individual
items remembered, and the fidelity with which each individual item is remembered.
Moreover, it is necessary to specify what the units of working memory storage are,
how multiple units in memory interact, and how stored knowledge affects the rep-
resentation of information in memory. In general we believe theories and models
of working memory must be expanded to include memory representations that go
beyond the representation of individual items and include hierarchically-structured
representations, both at the individual item level (hierarchical feature-bundles), and
across individual items. There is considerable evidence that working memory rep-
resentations are not based on independent items, that working memory also stores
ensembles that summarize the spatial and featural information across the display, and
further, that there are interactions between working memory and stored knowledge
even in simple displays.
Moving beyond individual items towards structured representations certainly com-
plicates any attempt to estimate working memory capacity. The answer to how many
items can you hold in visual working memory depends on what kind of items you are
trying to remember, how precisely they must be remembered, how they are presented
on the display, and your history with those items. Even representations of simple
items have structure at multiple levels. Thus, models that wish to accurately account
for the full breadth of data and memory phenomena must make use of structured
representations, especially as we move beyond colored dot objects probed by their
locations towards items with more featural dimensions or towards real-world objects
in scenes.
1.2 Thesis outline
Visual working memory has often been treated as a system with simple, discrete
objects as the unit of storage (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2005). While many
useful models have been built in this framework, and these models have the benefit
of being simple and formal (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck,
2008), such models ultimately depend on the idea that observers' remember discrete
items in working memory and that counting how much such items can be remembered
is a sufficient measure of capacity.
The claim of this thesis is that such models of visual working memory capacity
seriously underestimate the complexity of our memory representations, and thus mis-
characterize the nature of our representations even for simple stimuli. In particular,
in this thesis I propose that working memory representations are based on exist-
ing knowledge and depend critically on both perceptual organization and summary
statistics, and thus these factors must be taken into account to accurately character-
ize our memory representations. I thus aim to investigate working memory capacity
from a constructive memory perspective (in the spirit of Bartlett, 1932), rather than
quantifying how many independent items can be stored.
The thesis begins with a demonstration that observers represent working memory
displays hierarchically - encoding a summary of the display in addition to item-level
information (Chapter 2); that they form such hierarchical representations even in
standard working memory displays (Chapter 3); and that formal models of work-
ing memory can be constructed that allow us to quantify memory capacity in terms
of such structured representations (Chapter 3). In addition, I demonstrate that ob-
servers take advantage of prior knowledge when representing a display, encoding items
more efficiently if they have learned that items are related to each other (Chapter
4), and show that this learning can be formalized using information theory (Chapter
4). Ultimately, the thesis provides empirical evidence that observers use structured
knowledge to represent displays in working memory, and provides a set of computa-
tional models to formalize these structured memory representations.
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Chapter 2
Hierarchical encoding in visual
working memory: ensemble
statistics bias memory for
individual items'
Influential models of visual working memory treat each item to be stored as an inde-
pendent unit and assume there are no interactions between items. However, real-world
displays have structure, providing higher-order constraints on the items to be remem-
bered. Even displays with simple colored circles contain statistics, like the mean circle
size, that can be computed by observers to provide an overall summary of the dis-
play. In this chapter we examine the influence of such an ensemble statistic on visual
working memory. We find evidence that the remembered size of each individual item
is biased toward the mean size of the set of items in the same color, and the mean size
of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory is constructive,
encoding the display at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating across these
levels rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item independently.
'Parts of this chapter were published as Brady, T.F, & Alvarez, G.A. (2011). Hierarchical encod-
ing in visual working memory: ensemble statistics bias memory for individual items. Psychological
Science.
2.1 Introduction
Observers can quickly and accurately compute ensemble statistics about a display,
like the mean size of the items (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003), the mean
facial expression (Haberman & Whitney, 2007), the mean orientation (Parkes, Lund,
Angelucci, Solomon, & Morgan, 2001), the mean location (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008),
and even higher-level spatial layout statistics (Alvarez & Oliva, 2009). However, little
work has explored why observers compute these statistics, and in particular, whether
the encoding of these higher-order statistics might play a role in how we represent
the individual items from such displays in memory.
Nearly all studies of visual working memory use displays consisting of simple
stimuli in which the items are chosen randomly. These displays are, as best as possible,
prevented from having any overarching structure or gist. Thus, influential models of
visual working memory tend to treat each item as an independent unit and assume
that items do not influence one another's representation (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004;
Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al. 2009; Wilken &
Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008; although see Lin & Luck, 2009 and Johnson, Spencer,
Luck and Schner, 2009).
We propose that, contrary to the assumptions of previous models of visual working
memory, ensemble statistics allow observers to encode such working memory displays
more efficiently: paralleling how people encode real scenes (Lampinen, Copeland,
Neuschatz, 2001; Oliva, 2005), observers might encode the 'gist' of simple working
memory displays (ensemble statistics like mean size) in addition to information about
specific items (their individual information). Such hierarchical encoding would allow
observers to represent information about every item in the display simultaneously,
significantly improving the fidelity of their memory representations compared to en-
coding only 3-4 individual items.
To test this hypothesis, we use the ensemble statistic of mean size and the grouping
principle of common color, which are known to be automatically and effortlessly
computed and could act as a form of higher-order structure in our displays (Chong &
Treisman, 2005). Our results demonstrate a form of hierarchical encoding in visual
working memory: the remembered size of individual items is biased towards the
mean size of items of the same color and the mean size of all items in the display.
This suggests that, contrary to existing models of visual working memory, items are
not recalled as independent units, but instead their reported size is constructed by
combining information about the specific dot with information about the set of dots
at multiple levels of abstraction.
2.2 Experiment 1: Ensemble statistics bias size
memory
We examined whether the ensemble statistics of a display would bias memory for
individual items in a task where observers attempted to remember the size of multiple
colored circles. We hypothesized that on displays with both small red dots and large
blue dots, observers would tend to report the size of a particular dot as larger when
it was blue than when it was red. This kind of size bias would suggest that observers
had taken into account the size of the set of items.
2.2.1 Method
Observers
21 observers were recruited and run using Amazon Mechanical Turk. All were from
the U.S., gave informed consent, and were paid 40 cents for approximately 3 minutes
of their time.
Procedure
Observers were each presented with the same 30 displays consisting of three red, three
blue and three green circles of varying size (see Figure 2-1) and told to remember
the size of all of the red and blue circles, but to ignore the green circles. The green
distractor items were present in the display because we believed they would encourage
Figure 2-1: An example pair of matched displays from Experiment 1. Observers had
to remember the size of the red and blue dots and ignore the green dots. After each
trial they were tested on the size of a single dot using a recall procedure. The left
display and right display make up a matched pair in which the same items are present,
but the tested item (second from the left on the bottom) swaps color with another
item (bottom left item). Note that the size of the dots is not to scale in order to more
clearly show the display properties.
observers to encode the items by color, rather than selecting all of the items into
memory at once (Huang, Treisman, Pashler, 2007; Halberda, Sires, Feigenson, 2006).
The order of the 30 displays was randomized across observers. Each display appeared
for 1.5 seconds, followed by a 1 second blank, after which a single randomly-sized circle
reappeared in black at the location that a red or blue dot had occupied. Observers
had to slide the mouse up or down to resize this new black circle to the size of the
red or blue dot they had previously seen, and then click to lock in their answer and
start the next trial.
Stimuli
The 9 circles appeared in a 600x400 pixel window delineated by a gray box, with
each circle at a random location within an invisible 6 x 4 grid, with +/- 10 pixel
jitter added to their locations to prevent co-linearities. Observers' monitor size and
resolution was not controlled. However, all observers attested to the fact that the
entire display was visible on their monitor. Moreover, the critical comparisons are
within-subject, and individual differences in absolute size of the display are factored
out by focusing on within-subject comparisons between conditions.
Circle sizes were drawn from a separate normal distribution for each color, each
with a mean diameter chosen uniformly on each trial from the interval [15px, 95px]
and with standard deviation equal to 1/8th their mean. Thus, on a given trial, the
three red dots could be sampled from around 35 pixels, the blue dots from 80 pixels
and the green dots from 20 pixels. However, which color set was largest and smallest
was chosen randomly on each trial; thus, on the next trial it could be the green dots
that were largest and the blue dots smallest.
To allow a direct test of the hypothesized bias toward the mean of the same-
colored items, the displays were generated in matched pairs. First, 15 displays were
generated as described; then another 15 were created by swapping the color of the
to-be-tested item with a dot of the other non-distractor color (either red or blue).
These 30 displays were then randomly interleaved, with the constraint that paired
displays could not appear one after the other. This resulted in 15 pairs of displays,
each matched in the size of all of the circles present, with a difference only in the
color of the circle that would later be tested. By comparing reported size when the
tested item was one color with the reported size when it was another color, we were
able to directly test the hypothesis that observers memory for size is biased toward
the mean size of all items in the test items color set.
2.2.2 Results
Overall accuracy
We first assessed whether observers were able to accurately perform the size memory
task by comparing their performance to an empirical measure of chance (empirical
chance: 30.5px, SEM: 0.78px, obtained by randomly pairing a given observers' re-
sponses with the correct answer from different trials). Observers performance was
significantly better than this measure of chance, with an error of 16.4px on average
(SEM: 1.7px; difference from chance, p< 10--).
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Figure 2-2: (A) Schematic illustration of calculating bias from a pair of matched
displays. In this example, the blue dots were larger than the red dots on average. We
then measured whether observers reported different sizes for the tested dot when it was
red versus when it was blue (the dot was in fact the same size in both presentations).
Which color was larger was counterbalanced across trials in the actual experiment,
but bias was always calculated by dividing the size reported for the larger color by
size reported for the smaller color. (B) The bias from Experiments 1 (color-relevant),
2A (color-irrelevant) and 2B (color-irrelevant). Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM.
Bias from same-colored dots
To address our main hypothesis, we examined whether observers tended to be biased
toward the size of the same-colored dots. To do so, we divided the matched pairs
based on which of the pair contained smaller same-colored dots on average and which
contained larger same-colored dots on average. We then calculated the ratio between
the size observers reported in these two cases. If observers were not biased, the ratio
between the size observers reported on matched displays with larger versus smaller
dots should be 1.0; they should be equally likely to report a larger or smaller size,
since the tested item is the same size in each case. However, if observers are biased
toward the mean size of the same colored dots, this ratio should be greater than 1.0
(see Figure 2-2).
Observers reported a size on average 1.11 times greater (SEM: +/-0.03) on the
half of the displays with larger same-colored dots. This ratio was significantly greater
than 1.0 (t(20)=4.17; p=0.0004). In addition, the direction of the effect was highly
consistent across observers, with 19 of the 21 observers having a ratio above 1.0.
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The maximum possible bias was 1.6, since the same-colored dots were on average 1.6
times larger in these displays than their matched counterparts. Thus the observers
reported a size 18% of the way between the correct size and the mean size of the same
colored dots. This effect was a result of memory and not a perceptual bias, since in
a version of the experiment with a pre-cue indicating which item would be tested,
observers (N=22) reported the size accurately (error 6.4px, SEM 0.5px) and with no
bias toward the mean size of the same-colored circles (bias: 1.00, S.EM. 0.01).
Model: Optimal Integration Across Different Levels of Abstraction
One interpretation of the data is that observers represent the display at multiple levels
of abstraction and integrate across these levels when retrieving the size of the tested
dot or when initially encoding its size. To more directly test this idea, we formalized
how observers might represent a display hierarchically using a probabilistic model (for
similar models, see Huttenlocher et al. 2000; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009). The model
had three levels of abstraction, representing particular dots; all dots of a given color;
and all dots on the entire display. In the model, observers encode a noisy sample of the
size of each individual dot, and the size of each dot is itself considered a noisy sample
from the expected size of the dots of that color, which is itself considered a sample
of the expected size of the dots on a given display. Then we ask what observers'
ought to report as their best guess about the size of the tested dot (assuming normal
distributions at each level).
The intuition this model represents is fairly straightforward: if the red dots on
a particular display are all quite large, but you encode a fairly small size for one of
the red dots, it is more likely to have been a large dot you accidentally encoded as
too small than a small dot you accidentally encoded as too large. Thus, in general
the model suggests that the optimal way to minimize errors in your responses is
to be biased slightly (either when encoding the dots or when retrieving their size)
toward the mean of both the set of dots of the same color and the overall mean of the
display. Model predictions, along with an alternative representation of the behavioral
data from Experiment 1 are represented in Figure 2-3 (for model implementation see
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Figure 2-3: (A) Data from Exp. 1, averaged across observers so that each display is
a single point. Matched pairs are represented as blue x's for the display in which the
same-color dots were larger and red circles for the display in which the same-color
dots were smaller. (B) Predictions on the same data from a model that integrates
information from multiple levels of abstraction (with SD=25 pixels). Note that in
both the observers' data and the model predictions the slope of the line is less than
x=y, indicating a bias toward making all dots less extreme in size then they really
were, and also note that the blue x's are above the red circles on average, indicating
a bias toward the size of the same-color dots.
Chapter Appendix).
The model has a single free parameter, which indicates how noisy the encoding
of a given dot is (the standard deviation of the normal distribution from which the
encoded size is sampled) and thus how biased toward the means observers' ought
be. We set this to 25px in the current experiment by examining the histogram of
observers' responses across all of the displays rather than maximizing the fit to the
data. While not strictly independent of the data being fit, this method of choosing
the parameter is not based on the measures we use to assess the model.
In general the model provides a strong fit to the data on two different metrics:
(1) the model predicts the difference between the correct answer and reported answer
for each display, ignoring the paired structure of the displays (r=0.89, p<0.0001);
(2) the model predicts the difference in reported size between particular matched
displays (r=0.82, p<0.001). Thus, the model predicts a large amount of the variance
even when comparing the matched displays, in which the tested dot is actually the
same size for both displays. Any model of working memory which treat items as
independent cannot predict a systematic differences on these trials (for example, most
slot and resource models, including the mathematical model presented by Zhang &
Luck, 2008).
2.2.3 Discussion
We find that observers are biased by the ensemble statistics of the display when
representing items in visual working memory. On displays with several different color
circles, observers are biased in reporting the size of a given circle by the size of the
other circles of that color. This effect is not accounted for by perceptual biases or
location noise/swapping, is not a result of observers sometimes guessing based on
the mean size of the set of colors (see Chapter Appendix), and is compatible with a
simple Bayesian model in which observers integrate information at multiple levels of
abstraction to form a final hypothesis about the size of the tested item.
2.3 Experiment 2: Attention to colors is required
In Experiment 1, the color of the items was a task-relevant attribute. In fact, because
observers have difficulty attending to more than a single color at a time (Huang,
Treisman, Pashler, 2007), observers likely had to separately encode the sizes of the
red and blue dots in Experiment 1, perhaps increasing the saliency of the groupings
by color. This may be a crucial part of why observers use the mean size of the colors
in guiding their memory retrieval. Thus, in Experiment 2A and 2B we removed the
green dots from the displays and asked observers to simply remember the sizes of
all of the dots. This allowed us to address how automatic the biases we observed
in Experiment 1 are; e.g., the extent to which they depend on attentional selection
and strategy. In addition, Experiments 2A and 2B provide a control experiment that
rules out potential low-level factors that could influence Experiment 1.
2.3.1 Method
25 new observers completed Experiment 2A and a different 20 observers completed
Experiment 2B.
The methods and particular 30 displays used were exactly the same as Experi-
ment 1 except that the green dots used as distractor items were not present on the
display. The methods of Experiment 2A were otherwise identical to Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2B, the dots were shown for only 350ms rather than 1.5 seconds in
order to decrease observers performance to the same level as Experiment 1.
2.3.2 Results
Experiment 2A: Overall accuracy
Observers performance in Experiment 2A was very good, with an error of 10.2px on
average (SEM: 0.60px). This was significantly less than our empirical measure of
chance, (p< 10-19; empirical chance: 29px, SEM: 0.28) and significantly less than the
error of subjects in Experiment 1 (t(44)=3.73, p<0.001).
Experiment 2A: No bias from same-colored dots
Observers in Experiment 2A displayed no bias as a function of color (M=0.99, SEM:
0.01; not significantly different than 1.0; t(24)=-0.86, p=0.3 9 ). This is compatible
with the idea that observers do not display a bias when color is not task-relevant.
However, observers in this task had significantly lower error rates than the ob-
servers in Experiment 1. Thus, it is possible that observers did not display a bias
because they were able to encode all of the dots accurately as individuals. To ini-
tially examine this, we selected only the 50% lowest accuracy observers from Exp.
2A and compared them to the 50% highest accuracy observers from Exp. 1. The
error rates reverse (Exp.1=10px, Exp 2A=13px), yet the bias remains present only
in Exp. 1 (Exp. 1=1.07, Exp. 2A=1.00). This provides preliminary evidence that
the difference in accuracy does not drive the difference in bias.
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Figure 2-4: (A) Data from Exp. 2B (B) Predictions on the same data from the model
(with SD=25 pixels). Note that in both the observers' data and the model predictions
the slope of the line is less than x=y, indicating a bias toward making all dots less
extreme in size then they really were, and also note that the blue x's are not above
the red circles on average, indicating no bias toward the size of the same-color dots.
Experiment 2B: Overall accuracy and bias
Experiment 2B experimentally addressed the concern that the lack of bias for ob-
servers in Experiment 2A was driven by their high performance level. In Experiment
2B display time was reduced from 1.5 seconds to 350 milliseconds to increase the
error rate while maintaining the task-irrelevance of color. Observers in Experiment
2B had an error rate of 15.9px on average (SEM: 2.25px). This was significantly less
than our empirical measure of chance, (p< 10-9; empirical chance: 31.3px, SEM:
1.13px) but was no longer significantly less than the error of subjects in Experiment
1 (t(39)=-0.17, p=0.86). Thus, Exp. 1 and Exp. 2B were equated on error rate.
However, when color was task-irrelevant in Exp. 2B, there was still no bias from the
mean of the same-colored items (M=1.00, SEM: 0.01).
Optimal Integration Model
The same model used in Experiment 1 can be applied to the current data, but with
only two levels (no grouping by color): information about the particular dot, and
information about all the dots in the display. This model once again provides a
strong fit to the experimental data (see Figure 2-4). Since the model does not use color
information, it predicts exactly the same performance for both of the matched trials.
This is in line with observers a bias of 1.00 in the experimental data. Furthermore,
the model predicts the overall bias toward the mean size of the display, correlating
with the errors people make across all trials with r=0.53 (p=0.002).
2.3.3 Discussion
In Experiment 2 we find that observers do not display a bias toward the mean size
of the same-colored dots when color is not task-relevant, even when the experiments
are equated on difficulty. However, observers are still biased toward the mean of
the overall display. This is compatible with a Bayesian model in which observers
treat all items as coming from a single group, rather than breaking into separate
groups by color. Furthermore, the results of this experiment help rule out possible
confounds of Experiment 1, such as the possibility that location noise causes swapping
of items in memory, since the displays used in Experiments 2A and 2B are exactly the
same as those used in Experiment 1 except for absence of irrelevant green dots. We
have also run Experiments 1 and 2 as separate conditions in a single within-subject
experiment, and replicate the finding of a bias only on displays with green dots present
(see Chapter Appendix).
2.4 General Discussion
We find that observers are biased by the ensemble statistics of the display when
representing items in visual working memory. When asked to report the size of an
individual dot, observers tend to report it as larger if the other items in the same
color are large and smaller if the other items in the same color are small. These
biases are reliable across observers and predicted by a simple Bayesian model that
encodes a display at multiple levels of abstraction. Taken together, these findings
suggest that items in visual working memory are not represented independently, and,
more broadly, that visual working memory is susceptible to the very same hallmarks
of constructive memory that are typical of long-term memory (Bartlett, 1932).
2.4.1 Representation of Ensemble Statistics
It is well established that the visual system can efficiently compute ensemble statistics
(e.g., Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Alvarez & Oliva, 2009) and does so even
when not required to do so by the task, causing, for example, a false belief that the
mean of the set was present when asked to remember individual items (Haberman
& Whitney, 2009; Fockert & Wolfenstein, 2009). However, less work has explored
why the visual system represents ensemble statistics. One benefit of ensemble rep-
resentations is that they can be highly accurate, even when the local measurements
constituting them are very noisy (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008, 2009). Another possible
benefit of ensemble representations is that they can be used to identify outliers in a
display (Rosenholtz & Alvarez, 2007), which can potentially be used to guide atten-
tion to items that cannot be incorporated in the summary for the rest of the group
(Brady & Tenenbaum, 2010, Chapter 3; Haberman & Whitney, 2009). The current
work suggests a new use of ensemble statistics: such statistics can increase the ac-
curacy with which items are stored in visual working memory, reducing uncertainty
about the size of individual items by optimally combining item-level information with
ensemble statistics at multiple levels of abstraction.
It is interesting that in the current experiments observers only used the mean
size of the colors to reconstruct the display when color was task-relevant, despite the
fact that using the mean size of the colors would improve memory for the individual
items in all conditions. This could suggest that the units over which such ensemble
statistics are computed is limited by selective attention (e.g., Chong & Treisman,
2005b). In a different setting, Turk-Browne, Junge and Scholl (2005) suggest that
statistical learning, a form of learning about sequential dependencies, may happen
automatically but the particular sets over which the statistics are computed may be
controlled by selective attention. This is compatible with what we find in the current
experiments: when observers did not attend to the colored sets as separate units
separate summary statistics may not have been computed for the two colored sets
(alternatively, they may have been encoded, but not used in reconstructing the dot
sizes). However, when color was attended, the ensemble statistics for each color seem
to have been computed in parallel, as found by Chong and Treisman (2005a).
2.4.2 Dependence Between Items in Visual Working Mem-
ory
The current results represent a case of non-independence between items in visual
working memory: we find that items are represented not just individually but also
as a group or ensemble. While not directly addressing such hierarchical effects, non-
independence between items in visual working memory has been observed previously.
For example, Huang and Sekular (2010) find that observers tend to be biased in re-
porting the spatial frequency of Gabors, tending to report frequencies as though they
have been pulled toward previously presented Gabor patches. In addition, Jiang, Ol-
son and Chun (2000) have shown that the spatial context of the other items improves
change detection performance even when only a single item changes (see also Vidal
et al. 2005). This suggests that an item is not represented independent of its spatial
context in working memory.
Similarly, work by Brady and Tenenbaum (2010; Chapter 3), Sanocki, Sellers,
Mittelstadt & Sulman (2010) and Victor and Conte (2004) shows that observers can
take advantage of perceptual regularities in working memory displays to remember
more individual items from those displays. Brady and Tenenbaum (2010; Chapter
3) investigate checkerboard-like displays and conceptualize their findings as a kind
of hierarchical encoding, in which the gist of the display is encoded in addition to
specific information about a small number of items that are least consistent with the
gist. This is compatible with the model we present for the simpler displays of the
current experiment, in which observers seem to encode ensemble information as well
as information about specific items.
This dependence between items in memory is not predicted or explained by in-
fluential models of visual working memory. Current theories model visual working
memory as a flexible resource, in which memory resources are quantized into slots
(Zhang & Luck, 2008) or continuously divisible (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays
& Hussain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). According to these models, fewer items can
be remembered with higher precision because they receive more memory resources.
However, these models assume that items are stored independently, and therefore
cannot account for the dependence between items in memory observed in the current
study. Expanding these models to account for the current results will require a spec-
ification of whether abstract levels of representation compete for the same resources
as item-level representations (e.g., Feigenson, 2008), or whether there are essentially
separate resources for ensemble representations and item-level representations (e.g.,
Brady & Tenenbaum, 2010; Chapter 3).
2.4.3 Long-Term Memory Induced Dependency in Visual Work-
ing Memory
In addition to dependencies between items and hierarchical encoding of a particular
display, there is a significant amount of previous work showing the representation
of items in visual working memory depends on long-term memory information (e.g.,
Brady, Konkle & Alvarez, 2009). For instance, Konkle and Oliva (2007) and Hemmer
and Steyvers (2009), have shown biases in the remembered size of an object after a
short delay based on knowledge of the size of that object in the real world. Hemmer
and Steyvers (2009) provide a model of this as Bayesian inference in a constructive
memory framework, similar to the model we propose for the online representation
of a display in the current experiments. Convergence on similar models for using
ensemble information from the current display and integrating information from long-
term memory suggests a promising future direction for understanding the use of
higher-order information in memory.
2.4.4 Conclusion
We find that observers are biased by the ensemble statistics of the display when rep-
resenting items in visual working memory. Rather than storing items independently,
observers seem to construct the size of an individual item using information from mul-
tiple levels of abstraction. Thus, despite the active maintenance processes involved
in visual working memory, it appears to be susceptible to the very same hallmarks of
constructive memory that are typical of retrieval from long-term memory and scene
recognition (Bartlett, 1932; Lampinen, Copeland, Neuschatz, 2001). Cognitive and
neural models of visual working memory need to be expanded to account for such
constructive, hierarchical encoding processes.
2.5 Chapter Appendix
2.5.1 Replication and a Within-Subject Experiment
Running the experiment on the internet allowed for variation in the visual angle of
the dots and meant that each observer saw only 30 trials . Thus, we ran a control
experiment in the lab with 6 observers using the same paradigm. Observers saw 400
trials each (200 matched pairs). These observers in the lab showed the same effects
as observers tested on Mechanical Turk. They had a mean error of 20.2 pixels and
a bias of 1.04, significantly greater than 1.0 (t(5)=3.47, p=0.02). The maximum
possible bias was 1.37, since the same-colored dots were on average 1.37 times larger
in the larger of the matched trials than the smaller. Thus the observers run in the
lab reported a size 11% of the way between the correct size and the mean of the same
colored dots.
In addition to replicating the experiments in the lab, we also replicated our main
results on Mechanical Turk. In particular, to bolster the evidence for our effect we
have run both a within-subject experiment (N=17) and replicated both the between-
subject experiments (N=16 and N=26, respectively; all conducted on Mechanical
Turk). In the within-subject experiment, we combined Exp. 1 with Exp. 2A within
observers (thus observers performed 60 trials, 30 with green dots and 30 without
green dots present). We found a bias of 1.11 (SEM 0.02) in the trials with green
dots and a bias of 1.02 (SEM 0.02) for trials without green dots, a significantly larger
bias on green dot trials within-subjects (t(16)=2.90, p=0.01). In addition, the bias
was significant in the green-dot displays (t(16)=4.40, p=0.0004) but not the displays
without green dots (t(16)=0.82, p=0.42).
In the between-subject replication of Experiment 1 with a different set of displays
and different observers, the average bias was 1.09 (N=16), with SEM 0.03. The
difference from no bias (1.0) was significant: t(15)=2.29; p=0.037. In the replication
of Experiment 2B with a different set of displays and observers, the average bias was
1.00 (N=26; SEM 0.016), not significantly different than 1.00.
2.5.2 Perceptual Effects
Is the bias from same-colored items a result of memory or a perceptual effect caused
by crowding or grouping principles in our display? To determine this, we ran a study
that was identical to Experiment 1 except that 500ms before the onset of the dots, a
single black 'X' appeared at the location of the dot that would later be tested. We
instructed observers that this cue indicated which item would be tested (it was 100%
valid). If observers have to encode only a single item from the display and know
in advance which item will be tested, this should eliminate any bias resulting from
memory processes. However, if the locus of our effect is perceptual observers should
still be biased toward the size of the same-colored dots. Observers (N=22) reported
the size accurately (error 6.4px, SEM 0.5px) and with no bias toward the mean size
of the same-colored circles (bias: 1.00, S.E.M. 0.01). This suggests the bias was a
result of memory processes, not a perceptual effect from our display.
2.5.3 Potential Reports of the Incorrect Item
Using a similar paradigm but with continuous report of color rather than size, Bays,
Catalao and Husain (2009) report that observers sometimes accidentally report the
color of the wrong item, perhaps because of noise in their representation of the items'
locations. Such location noise would not, in general, affect our conclusion that there
is a bias toward the mean of the same colored dots. In particular, if swapping was
simply a result of location noise, then since our matched displays contain the exact
same size dots in the exact same locations, no difference could arise between them.
However, it is possible that observers would be more likely to swap with items in
the same color as the target item, and that this could account for the bias we find.
If this were the case, we might expect a mixture of correct reports and reports of
the incorrect items in our data, resulting in a multimodal distribution. To address
this concern, we examined whether the location of the same-colored dots affected the
bias we observed, and, additionally, used a mixture model similar to that reported
by Bays, Catalao and Husain (2009) to directly examine the possibility of swapping
with same-colored items.
To examine the effect of the location of the same-colored dots, we divided the
matched pairs by the mean distance of the same-colored dots to the tested dot's
location. On those display pairs in which the same-colored dots were much closer in
location for one of the matched displays than the other, we might expect a larger
bias. Instead, the correlation between the size of the bias and how differently located
they were in the two display pairs was not significant, and in fact trended negative
(r=-0.27, p=0.33) the opposite of the direction predicted from a swapping account.
As a second measure of the potential of swapping, this time ignoring the location
of the items, we used a mixture model to estimate the percentage of swaps directly
from the data, effectively examining its bimodality (Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009).
The mixture model attempted to parse the observers' responses into those most likely
to have been noisy reports of the correct item, those most likely to have been random
guesses, and those most likely to have been swaps . Excluding all responses except
those the model considered twice as likely to be noisy reports of the correct item
than swaps or guesses still resulted in a substantial bias toward the mean size of the
same colored items (M=1.05, SEM:0.016, difference from 1.0: t(20)=3.20, p=0.004).
Note that this is an extremely conservative measure, since it effectively counts only
responses that are closer to the size of the tested dot than the size of any other dot.
Taken together, we believe these analyses help rule out explanations of our data in
terms of location noise and reporting the size of the wrong item.
2.5.4 Comparison to an Across-Trial Guessing Model
Rather than performing an integration across different levels of representation on each
trial, as proposed in our Bayesian integration model, it is possible that our results
could arise from a model in which on some trials observers remember the dot and on
other trials the observers' guess based on the dots color. For example, on trials in
which the participant retains information about the size of the probed dot, it might
be reproduced without bias. On other trials, in which the participant retains no size
information about the probed dot, the participant might tend to guess something
around the mean of the size of the dots the same color as the probed dot. We will
refer to this model as the across-trial guessing model.
While such a model requires observers encode the display at multiple levels of
abstraction and integrate across these levels by choosing which kind of information
to use in generating a particular response, it is significantly different than the within-
trial Bayesian integration model we propose. We believe the evidence from the current
experiments heavily supports the within-trial integration model.
First, the across-trial guessing model requires there to be a large number of trials
where observers know the color of the tested dot but have no information at all
about this dot's size. Both the original work of Luck & Vogel (1997) and important
work by Brockmole and colleagues (Logie et al. 2009; Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006)
demonstrates that not only is there a benefit to encoding all of the features of a single
object, but that observers do so on nearly all trials and represent the objects as bound
units. A model which requires observers to frequently know only a single feature of
an object is thus theoretically unlikely and in conflict with existing data on binding
in visual working memory.
Second, as reported above in the section on modeling location noise and potential
item swaps, we can examine trials which are unlikely to have been guess trials by
looking at only responses that are closer in size to the size of the correct dot than to
the size of any of the other dots (including those of the same color). This still results
in a substantial bias toward the mean size of the same-colored dots (see results in
location noise section). This is contrary to what you would expect from the across-
trial guessing model, which posits a bias arising only from trials where observers do
not know the size of the tested dot.
Finally, using model comparison techniques, we can directly compare the distri-
butions predicted by the two models. The within-trial Bayesian integration model
assumes the distribution of sizes observers' report for a particular dot has a peak
that is shifted toward the mean size of dots of the same color, whereas the across-
trial guessing model proposes a mixture between correct responses and responses that
are drawn from a distribution around the mean size of the same-colored dots.
The Bayesian model has only a single parameter, the standard deviation of ob-
servers' encoding error (this parameter decides both how noisy the distribution is and
how much the specific item information is integrated with the ensemble size informa-
tion). The across-trial guessing model has two parameters, the standard deviation
of observers' encoding error and the percentage of trials in which observers report
from a distribution around the same-colored mean rather than the correct dot (the
guessing rate). In addition, we can choose to make the guessing distribution a normal
distribution with the true standard deviation of the dots within the same color, or
increase the variance based on the expected sampling error.
For each subject, we performed a leave-one-trial-out cross-validation to find the
maximum likelihood parameters for each model. Then we computed the log-likelihood
of the observer's response on the left out trial using those parameters. Averaging
across all possible left out trials gives us the log-likelihood of each of the two models
for each observer. Finally, we can compare these log-likelihoods using AIC (Akaike
Information Criterion; Akaike, 1974) . This gives us an AIC score for each model
for each observer (lower AIC values indicate a better model fit). We find that across
observers, the AIC for the Bayesian model consistently indicates a better fit than the
AIC for the across-trial guessing model. This is true both if we assume the guessing
distribution is simply a normal with the mean and standard deviation of the true size
of the dots of the same color (Bayesian model AIC = 10.8, SEM 0.2, Discrete-guessing
model AIC = 13.8, SEM 0.8, t(20)= -3.95, p<0.001) or if we increase this standard
deviation by adding in the variance from sampling each dot's size (Discrete-guessing
model AIC = 12.7, SEM 0.18, t(20)= -26.8, p< 10-16). In fact, using AIC the within-
trial Bayesian integration model is preferred in every single observer. Moreover, it is
preferred on average even if we do not use AIC to adjust for the greater flexibility of
the across-trial guessing model (the log-likelihood of the within-trial integration model
is significantly higher than the version of the across-trial guessing model adjusted for
measurement error, t(20)=2.23, p=0.038). Thus, in spite of the greater flexibility of
the across-trial guessing model, it does not fit the data as well as the within-trial
Bayesian integration model.
2.5.5 Optimal Observer Model
To more directly test the idea that observers' represent the display at multiple levels
of abstraction and integrate across these levels when retrieving the size of the tested
dot, we formalized this theory in a probabilistic model. In the model, observers are
assumed to get a single noisy sample from each of the 9 dots on the screen (sampled
from a normal distribution centered around the size of the dot and with a standard
deviation of 25px). Then, the observer attempts to infer the size of each of the dots
on the screen using these samples. A nave, non-hierarchical model simply treats each
of the dots independently and thus report the size of each dot as the size that was
sampled for that dot. As an alternative, we present a hierarchical Bayesian model
that pools information from all of the dots to best estimate the size of any given
individual dot. It does so by representing the display at two additional levels of
abstraction and partially pooling information at each of these levels: (1) all dots of
the same color; (2) all dots on the display. By assuming that dots of the same color
and all the dots on a display are sampled from some underlying distribution and
therefore provide mutual information about each other, such a model arrives at a
more accurate estimate of the size of each dot. Such models are standard in Bayesian
statistics (Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin, 2003) and have been previously applied to
similar problems in cognitive science (Huttenlocher et al. 2000; Hemmer & Steyvers,
2009).
Formally, we assume that observers' treat the dots of a given color as sampled from
a normal distribution with unknown mean and unknown variance, and additionally
treat these distributions' means as coming from an overall normal distribution that
pools information across all of the colors. We put uniform priors over the reasonable
range of possible sizes (0-200 pixels) on the parameters of these normal distributions.
The exact model is represented in WINBUGS as follows. Note that the normal
distribution in WINBUGS is parameterized by a mean and a precision, rather than
a mean and standard deviation; nevertheless we put a uniform prior on standard
deviation, which is a more standard model (Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin, 2003).
WinBUGS code for the model in Experiment 1:
1 model
2 % C = number of colors
3 % L = number of dots of each color.
4 % We observe 'sample '.
5 {
6 overallMean ~ dunif (0 ,100)
7 overallMeanSt d ~ dunif (0, ,100)
8 overallMeanPrec <- 1/(overallMeanStd*overallMeanStd)
9
10 overallStd ~ dunif(0,100)
11 overallStdStd ~ dunif(0,100)
12 overallStdPrec <- 1/(overallStdStd*overallStdStd)
13
14 stdev <- 25
15 precision <- 1/(stdev*stdev)
16
17 for (i in 1:C)
18 {
19 groupMean [ i] ~ dnorm( over allMean , overallMeanPrec)
20 groupStd [i] ~ dnorm(overallStd , overallStdPrec)
groupPrec[i] <- 1/(groupStd[i]*groupStd[i])
}
for (i in 1:C)
{
for (j in 1:L)
{
dotMean [i j
sample [ i , j
~ dnorm(groupMean[ i], groupPrec [i])
~ dnorm(dotMean [ i ,j] precision)
WinBUGS code for the model in Experiment 2:
model
overallMean ~ dunif(0,200)
overallMeanStd ~ dunif (0 ,100)
overallMeanPrec <- 1/(overallMeanStd*overallMeanStd)
stdev <- 10
precision <- 1/(stdev*stdev)
for (i in 1:L)
{
dotMean [ i]
sample [ i]
dnorm(overallMean
dnorm(dotMean[ i,
overallMeanPrec)
precision)
70
Chapter 3
A probabilistic model of visual
working memory: Incorporating
higher-order regularities into
working memory capacity
- 1estimates.
When remembering a real-world scene, people encode both detailed information about
specific objects and higher-order information like the overall gist of the scene. How-
ever, formal models of change detection, like those used to estimate visual work-
ing memory capacity, assume observers encode only a simple memory representation
which includes no higher-order structure and treats items independently from each
other. In this chapter, we present a probabilistic model of change detection that
attempts to bridge this gap by formalizing the role of perceptual organization and
allowing for richer, more structured memory representations. Using either standard
visual working memory displays or displays in which the dots are purposefully ar-
'Parts of this chapter were published as Brady, T.F, & Tenenbaum, J.B. (2010). Encoding higher-
order structure in visual working memory: A probabilistic model. Proceedings of the Cognitive
Science Society.
ranged in patterns, we find that models which take into account perceptual grouping
between items and the encoding of higher-order summary information are necessary
to account for human change detection performance. We conclude that even in sim-
ple visual working memory displays, items are not represented independently. Thus,
models of visual working memory need to be expanded to take into account this non-
independence between items before we can make useful predictions about observers'
memory capacity, even in simple displays.
3.1 Introduction
Working memory capacity constrains cognitive abilities in a wide variety of domains
(Baddeley, 2000), and individual differences in this capacity predict differences in fluid
intelligence, reading comprehension and academic achievement (Alloway & Alloway,
2010; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr & Awh, 2010). The ar-
chitecture and limits of the working memory system have therefore been extensively
studied, and many models have been developed to help explain the limits on our
capacity to hold information actively in mind (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Miyake & Shah,
1999). In the domain of visual working memory, these models have grown particu-
larly sophisticated and have been formalized in an attempt to derive measures of the
capacity of the working memory system (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays, Catalao &
Husain, 2009; Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Wilken & Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck,
2008). However, these models focus on how observers encode independent objects
from extremely simple displays of segmented geometric shapes.
By contrast to these simple displays, memory for real-world stimuli depends
greatly on the background knowledge and principles of perceptual organization our
visual system brings to bear on a particular stimulus. For example, when trying to
remember real-world scenes, people encode both the gist and detailed information
about some specific objects (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2003; Oliva, 2005). More-
over, they use the gist to guide their choice of which specific objects to remember
(Friedman, 1979; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000), and when later trying to recall
the details of the scene, they are influenced by this gist, tending to remember objects
that are consistent with the scene but were not in fact present (Brewer & Treyens,
1981; Lampinen, Copeland & Neuschatz, 2001; Miller & Gazzaniga 1998).
In fact, even in simple displays, perceptual organization and background knowl-
edge play a significant role in visual working memory. For example, what counts
as a single object may not be straightforward, since even the segmentation of the
display depends on our background knowledge about how often the items co-occur.
For instance, after learning that pairs of colors often appear together, observers can
encode nearly twice as many colors from the same displays (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez,
2009; see Chapter 4). Displays where objects group together into perceptual units
also result in better visual working memory performance, as though each unit in the
group was encoded more easily (Woodman, Vecera & Luck, 2003; Xu & Chun, 2007;
Xu, 2006). Furthermore, observers are better able to recognize changes to displays if
those changes alter some statistical summary of the display; for example, if a display
is changed from mostly black squares to mostly white squares, observers notice this
change more easily than a matched change that does not alter the global statistics
(Victor & Conte, 2004; see also Alvarez & Oliva, 2009).
There is thus significant behavioral evidence that even in simple visual working
memory displays, items are not treated independently (for a review, see Brady, Konkle
& Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 1). However, existing formal models of the architecture
and capacity of visual working memory do not take into account the presence of
such higher-order structure and prior knowledge. Instead, they most often depend on
calculating how many individual items observers remember if the items were treated
independently.
3.1.1 Existing models of capacity estimates
The most common paradigm for examining visual working memory capacity is a
change detection task (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988). In a typical change
detection task, observers are presented with a study display consisting of some number
N of colored squares (see Figure 3-1). The display then disappears, and a short time
untl samelditterent response
Figure 3-1: Methods of a change detection task (as used in Experiments 1 and 2).
Observers are first briefly presented with a display (the study display), and then after
a blank are presented with another display where either the items are exactly the
same or one item has changed color (the test display). They must say whether the
two displays were the same or different.
later another display reappears that is either identical to the study display or in which
a single square has changed color. Observers must decide whether this test display is
identical to the study display or there has been a change. Observers are told that at
most a single item will change color.
The standard way of reporting performance in such a visual working memory task
is to report the "number of colors remembered", often marked by the letter 'K'. These
values are calculated using a particular model of change detection (a 'slot model'),
which supposes that the decline in observers' performance when more squares must
be remembered is caused solely by a hard limit in the number of items that can be
remembered (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 1988). Such estimates thus assume complete
independence between the items.
For example, imagine that an observer is shown a display of N colored squares
and afterwards shown a single square, and asked if it is the same or different as the
item that appeared at the same spatial location in the original display (Cowan, 2001).
According to the slot model of change detection, if the observer encoded the item in
memory, then they will get the question correct; and this will happen on 4 trials.
For example, if the observer can encode 3 items and there are 6 on the display, on
50% of the trials they will have encoded the item that is tested and will get those
50% of trials correct. Such models suppose no noise in the memory representation:
if the item is encoded it is remembered perfectly. On the other hand, if the observer
does not encode the item in memory, then the model supposes they guess randomly
(correctly choose same or different 50% of the time). Thus, the total chance of getting
a trial correct is:
K N- K
PC(%) = - * 100% + * 50%N N
By solving for 'K', we can take the percent correct at change detection for a given
observer and determine how many items they remembered out of the N present on
each trial (Cowan, 2001). Such modeling predicts reasonable values for a variety of
simple displays (e.g., Vogel, Woodman & Luck, 2001; Cowan, 2001, 2005), suggesting
observers have a roughly fixed capacity of 3-4 items, independent of a number of
factors that affect percent correct (like set size, N).
However, nearly all visual working memory papers report such values, often with-
out considering whether the model that underlies them is an accurate description
of observers working memory representation of those stimuli. Thus, even in displays
where observers perform grouping or encode summary statistics in addition to specific
items, many researchers continue to report how many items observers can remember
(K values) using the standard formula in which each item is treated as an independent
unit (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2007). This results in K values
that vary by condition, which would indicate a working memory capacity that is not
fixed In these cases, the model being used to compute capacity is almost certainly
incorrect observers may not be encoding items independently.
Other models have also been used to quantify working memory capacity (e.g.,
Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009; Wilken & Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008). However,
these models also operate without taking into account the presence of higher-order
structure and prior knowledge, as they model displays that are sampled uniformly,
limiting any overarching structure or gist. It is thus difficult to make claims about
observers capacities using such models. Due to the nature of the models (e.g. multi-
nomial processing tree models like Cowan's K), it is also extremely difficult to expand
existing models to account for summary representations, or representations of items
which are not independent of one another.
3.1.2 Change detection as Bayesian inference
In this paper we reformulate change detection as probabilistic inference in a genera-
tive model. We first formalize how observers encode an initial study display, and then
we model the change detection task as an inference from the information about the
test display and the information in memory to a decision about whether a change oc-
curred. Modeling change detection in this Bayesian framework allows us to use more
complex and structured knowledge in our memory encoding model (e.g., Tenenbaum,
Griffiths & Kemp, 2006), allowing us to make predictions about memory capacity
under circumstances where items are non-independent or summary statistics are en-
coded in addition to specific items.
We begin by modeling a simple change detection task, as shown in Figure 3-1 and
described above. To create a model of this change detection task, we first specify how
observers' encode the study display. For the simplest case, in order to most closely
match the models used to quantify K-values in standard displays (Cowan, 2001), we
assume that memory takes the form of a discrete number of slots, K, each of which
stores which color was present on the display in a particular location (using seven
categorically distinct colors: black, white, red, green, blue, yellow and purple). Also
in line with standard slot models, we initially assume that observers choose which K
of the N dots to encode at random. To model the change detection task, we then
formalize how observers make a decision about whether there was a change when the
test display is presented.
When observers must decide if there has been a change, they have access to all
of the items in the test display and to the items they encoded in memory from the
study display. Using the information that at most a single item can change color
between the two displays, we model the observer as performing an optimal inference
to arrive at a judgment for whether the display has changed. In other words, the
observer places probabilities on how likely each possible display is to have been the
study display, and then effectively "rules out" all possible displays inconsistent with
the items in memory and all displays that have more than a single change from the
test display. They can then arrive at a probability that indicates how likely it is
that the study display was exactly the same as the test display. Interestingly, this
Bayesian model of change detection has Cowan's K as a special case (for details, see
Chapter Appendix, 3.8.1).
Importantly, however, by framing the model in terms of probabilistic inference we
make explicit the assumptions about the architecture of working memory the model
entails. First, we assume that observers remember information about a specific subset
K of the N items. Second, we assume that memory for these items is without noise.
Both of these assumptions are simply properties of the probability distributions we
choose and can be relaxed or generalized without changing the model architecture.
Thus, the Bayesian framework we adapt allows a much greater range of memory
architectures to be tested and made explicit.
3.1.3 The current experiments
In the current paper we use this reformulated model of change detection to examine
the use of higher-order information in visual working memory. While such higher-
order information can take many forms, we begin with two possible representations:
(1) a model that encodes both specific items and also a summary representation
(how likely neighboring items are to be the same color); and (2) a model in which
observers first use basic principles of perceptual organization to chunk the display
before encoding a fixed number of items.
To examine whether such representations can account for human memory per-
formance, we not only look at the overall level of performance achieved by using a
particular memory representation in the model, but also examine how human perfor-
mance varies from display to display. In Experiments 1A and 1B, we test our proposed
memory representations on displays where the items are purposefully arranged in pat-
terns. In Experiment 2, we generalize these results to displays of randomly chosen
colored squares (as in Luck & Vogel, 1997). We show for the first time that observers
are highly consistent in which changes they find easy or difficult to detect, even in
standard colored square displays. In addition, we show that models which have richer
representations than simple slot models provide good fits to the difficulty of individual
displays, because these more structured models representations capture which partic-
ular changes people are likely to detect. By contrast, the simpler models of change
detection typically used in calculations of visual working memory capacity (e.g., the
model underlying K-values) do not predict any reliable differences in difficulty be-
tween displays. We conclude that even in simple visual working memory displays
items are not represented independently, and that models of working memory with
richer representations are needed to understand observers' working memory capacity.
3.2 Experiments 1A and 1B: Patterned dot dis-
plays
Rather than being forced to treat each item as independent, our Bayesian model of
change detection can be modified to take into account the influences of perceptual or-
ganization, summary statistics and long-term knowledge. We thus had observers per-
form a memory task with displays where the items were arranged in spatial patterns.
Observers are known to perform better on such displays than on displays without pat-
terns (e.g., Garner, 1974; see also Hollingworth, Hyun & Zhang, 2005; Phillips, 1974;
Sebrechts & Garner, 1981). Because observers' memory representations in these dis-
plays are likely to be more complex than simple independent representations of items,
such displays provide a test case for modeling higher-order structure in visual work-
ing memory. To examine the generality of observers' memory representations, we
used two similar sets of stimuli (Exp 1A: red and blue circles; Exp iB: black and
whites squares), which vary basic visual properties of the stimuli but keep the same
high-level grouping and object structure.
3.2.1 Method
Observers
130 observers were recruited and run using Amazon Mechanical Turk (see Brady &
Alvarez, 2011 for a validation of using Mechanical Turk for visual working memory
studies). All were from the U.S., gave informed consent, and were paid 30 cents for
approximately 4 minutes of their time. 65 of the observers participated in Experiment
1A and 65 different observers in Experiment 1B.
Procedure
To examine human memory performance for patterned displays, we had observers
perform a change detection task. We showed each of our observers the exact same
set of 24 displays (see Figure 3-1). Each display was presented to each observer in
both a "same" and "different" trial, so observers completed 48 trials each. On each
trial, the study display was presented for 750ms, followed by a 10OOms blank period;
then either an identical or a changed version of this original display was presented
for 750ms in a different screen location (the test display). Observers' task was simply
to indicate, using a set of buttons labeled 'Same' and 'Different', whether the two
displays were identical or whether there had been a change. The order of the 48
trials was randomly shuffled for each subject. Observers started each trial manually
by clicking on a button labeled 'Start this trial', after which the trial began with a
500ms delay.
Stimuli
Unlike traditional displays used to assess visual working memory capacity, we used
displays where the items to be remembered were not simply colored squares in random
a. Example displays from Experiment Ia
b. Example displays from Experiment lb
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Figure 3-2: a) Example study displays from Experiment 1A b) Example study displays
from Experiment 1B. In both Experiments 1A and 1B, some displays were generated
by randomly choosing each item's color, and some were generated to explicitly contain
patterns.
locations but also exhibited some higher-order structure (as in Philips, 1974). As
stimuli we created 24 displays that consisted of 5x5 patterns in which each space
was filled in by a red or blue circle (Exp. 1A) or the same patterns were filled with
black or white squares (Exp. 1B). The patterns could be anything from completely
random to vertical or horizontal lines (see Figure 3-2). Our displays were thus simple
relative to real scenes but were complex enough that we expected existing models,
which encode independent items, would fail to predict what observers remember about
these displays. 8 of the 24 displays were generated by randomly choosing the color of
each dot. The other 16 were generated to explicitly contain patterns (For details of
how we generated the patterned displays, see Chapter Appendix, 3.8.2).
The displays each subtended 150x150 pixels inside a 400pixel by 180pixel black
(Exp 1A) or gray (Exp 1B) box. On each trial, the pre-change display appeared
on the left of the box, followed by the (potentially) changed version of the display
appearing on the right side of the box. Observers' monitor size and resolution was
not controlled. However, all observers attested to the fact that the entire stimulus
presentation box was visible on their monitor.
3.2.2 Results
For each display we computed a d', measuring how difficult it was to detect the change
in that particular display (averaged across observers). The stimuli in Experiments 1A
were exactly the same as those in 1B, except that the patterns were constructed out
of red and blue dots in Experiment 1A and black and white squares in Experiment
1B. As expected, performance in Experiments 1A and 1B was highly similar: the
correlation in the display-by-display d' was r=0.91 between the two experiments. As
a result, we collapsed performance across both experiments for the remaining analyses,
though the results remain qualitatively the same when considering either experiment
alone.
On average, human observers d' was 2.18 (S.E. 0.06), suggesting that observers
were quite good at detecting changes on these displays. Since the displays each
contain 25 dots, this d' corresponds to a K value of 17.8 dots if the items are assumed
to be represented independently and with no summary information encoded (Pashler,
1988).
In addition, observers were highly consistent in which displays they found most
difficult to detect changes in (see Figure 3-3). We performed split-half analyses,
computing the average d' for each display using the data from a randomly-selected
half of our observers, and then comparing this to data from the other half of the
observers. The same displays were difficult for both groups (r=0.75, averaged over
200 random splits of the observers). Computing d' separately for each display and
each observer is impossible as each observer saw each displays only once. Thus, to
compute standard errors on a display-by-display basis we used bootstrapping. This
provides a visualization of the display-by-display consistency (Figure 3-3). Some
displays, like those on the left of Figure 3-3, are consistently hard for observers.
Others, like those on the right of Figure 3-3, are consistently easy for observers to
detect changes in.
43-
Figure 3-3: Consistency in which displays are most difficult in Exp 1A. The x-axis
contains each of the 24 display pairs, rank ordered by difficulty (lowest d' on the left,
highest on the right; for visualization purposes, only a subset of pairs are shown on
the x-axis). The top display in each pair is the study display; the bottom is the test
display with a single item changed. The dashed gray line corresponds to the mean
d' across all displays. The error bars correspond to across-subject standard error
bars. The consistent differences in d' between displays indicate some displays are
more difficult than other displays.
3.2.3 Conclusion
In Experiments 1A and 1B, we assessed observers' visual working memory capacity
for structured displays of red and blue dots or black and white squares. We found
multiple aspects of human performance in this task which conflict with the predictions
of standard models of visual working memory.
First, we find that observers perform much better in detecting changes to these
displays than existing working memory models would predict. Under existing mod-
els, in which items are assumed to be represented independently with no summary
information encoded, observers d' in this task would correspond to memory for nearly
18 dots (Pashler, 1998). This is nearly 5 times the number usually found in simpler
displays (Cowan, 2001), and thus presents a direct challenge to existing formal models
of change detection and visual working memory capacity.
Furthermore, observers are reliable in which changes they find hard or easy to de-
tect. This consistent difference between displays cannot be explained under a model
in which observers treat the items independently. Previous formal models of change
detection treat all of the displays as equivalent, since all displays change only a single
item's color and all contain an equal number of items. They thus make no predic-
tions regarding differences in difficulty across displays, or regarding which particular
changes will be hard or easy to detect.
To account for the high level of performance overall and the consistent differences
in performance between displays, it is necessary to posit a more complex memory rep-
resentation or encoding strategy. We next consider two alternative models for what
information observers might be encoding: a model in which observers encode both
an overall summary of the display (e.g., "it looked like it contained vertical lines")
in addition to information about particular items, and a model in which observers
'chunk' information by perceptually grouping dots of the same color into single units
in working memory. These models formalize particular hypotheses about what rep-
resentations observers encode from these displays. They thus allow us to examine
whether observers performance is compatible with a fixed working memory capacity
in terms of some format of representation other than a fixed number of independent
items.
3.3 Summary-based encoding model
In real-world scenes, observers encode not only information about specific objects but
also information about the gist of the scene (e.g., Lampinen, Copeland, Neuschatz,
2001). In addition to this semantic information, observers encode diffuse visual sum-
mary information in the form of low-level ensemble statistics, which they make use of
even in simple displays of gabors or circles (Alvarez & Oliva, 2009; Brady & Alvarez,
2011). For example, in a landmark series of studies on summary statistics of sets,
Ariely (2001) demonstrated that observers extract the mean size of items from a dis-
play, and, moreover, store it in memory even when they have little to no information
about the size of the individual items on the display (Ariely, 2001; see Alvarez, 2011;
Haberman & Whitney, 2011 for reviews). Observers seem to store not only summary
information like mean size but also spatial summary information, like the amount of
horizontal and vertical information on the top and bottom of the display (Alvarez
& Oliva, 2009) and even high-level summary information like the mean gender and
emotion of faces (Haberman & Whitney, 2007). Furthermore, observers integrate
this summary information with their representation of particular items: for example,
Brady and Alvarez (2011) have shown that observers use the mean size of items on a
display to modulate their representation of particular items from that display.
To examine whether such summary representations could underlie performance
on our patterned displays, we built a model that formalized such a summary-based
encoding strategy. We posited that observers might encode both a spatial summary
of the display and particular 'outlier' items that did not match this summary. Our
modeling proceeded in two stages, mirroring the two stages of the change detection
task: view and encode the study display, then view the test display and decide if a
change occurred.
More specifically, in the summary-based encoding model we propose that observers
use the information in the study display to do two things: first, they infer what
summary best describes the display; then, using this summary, they select the subset
of the dots that are the biggest outliers (e.g., least well captured by the summary)
and encode these items specifically into an item-based memory. As a simplifying
assumption, we use a summary representation based on Markov Random Fields which
consists of just two parameters: one representing how likely a dot in this display
is to be the same or different than its horizontal neighbors and one representing
how likely a dot is to be the same or different than its vertical neighbors. This
summary representation allows the model to encode how spatially-smooth a display
is both horizontally and vertically, thus allowing it to represent summaries that are
approximately equivalent to "vertical lines", " checkerboard", "large smooth regions",
etc.
After a short viewing, the study display disappears and the observer is left with
only what they encoded about it in memory. Then a test display appears and the
observer must decide, based on what they have encoded in memory, whether this
display is exactly the same as the first display. Thus, at the time of the test display
(the change detection stage), the observer has access to the test display and both
the item-level and summary information from the study display that they encoded
in memory. Using the constraint that at most one item will have changed, it is then
possible to use Bayesian inference to put a probability on how likely it is that a
given test display is the same as the study display and, using these probabilities, to
calculate the likelihood that the display changed.
For example, an observer might encode that a particular display is relatively
smooth (horizontal neighbors are similar to each other, and vertical neighbors are
also similar to each other), but that the two items in the top right corner violate this
assumption, and are red and blue respectively. Then, when this observer sees the test
display, they might recognize that while both items they specifically encoded into an
item memory are the same color they used to be, the display does not seem as smooth
as it initially was: there are some dots that are not like their horizontal or vertical
neighbors. This would lead the observer to believe there was a change, despite not
having specifically noticed what items changed.
Importantly, when this model encodes no higher-order structure it recaptures the
standard slot-based model of change detection. However, when the displays do have
higher-order regularities that can be captured by the models' summary representation,
the model can use this information to both select appropriate individual items to
remember and to infer properties of the display that are not specifically encoded. For
a formal model specification, see Chapter Appendix, 3.8.3.
3.3.1 Modeling results and fit to human performance
In Experiment 1, we obtained data from a large number of human observers detecting
particular changes in a set of 24 displays. For each display observers saw, we can use
the summary-based encoding model to estimate how hard or easy it is for the model
to detect the change in that display. The model provides an estimate, for a given
change detection trial, of how likely it is that there was a change on that particular
trial. By computing this probability for both a 'same' trial and a 'change' trial, we
can derive a d' measure for each display in the model.
The model achieves the same overall performance as observers (d'=2.18) with a
'K' value of only 4, thus encoding only 4 specific dots in addition to the display's
summary (model d'=1.2, 1.8, 2.05, 2.25 at K=1, 2, 3, 4). This is because the model
does not represent each dot independently: instead, it represents both higher-order
information as well as information about specific dots.
Furthermore, the model correctly predicts which display observers will find easy
and which displays observers will find difficult. Thus, the correlation between the
model's d' for detecting changes in individual displays and the human performance
on these displays is quite high (r=0.72, p<0.00001 with K=4; averaging observers'
results across Exp 1A and 1B, see Figure 3-4). Importantly, this model has no free
parameters other than how many specific items to remember, K, which we set to K=4
based on the model's overall performance, not its ability to predict display-by-display
difficulty. Thus, the model's simple summary representation captures which changes
people are likely to detect and which they are likely to miss.
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Figure 3-4: The fit of the summary-based encoding model with K=4 to the observers'
data for Experiments 1A (blue x's) and 1B (red circles). Each point is the d' for a
particular display. Example of both a hard and easy pair of displays is shown.
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3.3.2 Necessity of the summary representation
The summary-based encoding model posits that observers encode a summary repre-
sentation of the display and use this summary to choose outlier items to encode into
a specific item memory. However, it is possible that a single one of these processes
might account for the model's fit to human data. For example, it is possible that
simply choosing outlier items using a summary representation, but not encoding the
actual summary representation into memory is sufficient to capture human perfor-
mance. Alternatively, it is possible that simply encoding a summary representation
but not using this representation to encode outlier items is sufficient to explain human
performance.
To address this and examine the necessity of each component of the model's
representation, we 'lesioned' the model by looking at model predictions without one
or the other of these components.
Choosing outlier items but not remembering the summary representation
Is remembering the summary representation helping us to accurately model human
performance, or can we predict human performance equally well by using the sum-
mary to choose outliers to encode into memory but then discarding the summary
representation itself? To examine this, we looked at the fit of a model that did
not have access to the summary representation at the time of change detection, and
detected changes solely based on the specific objects encoded.
We find that such a model does not fit human performance as well as the full
summary-based encoding model. Firstly, to achieve human levels of performance such
a model must encode as many objects as a model which encodes objects completely
at random (human levels of performance at K=18; d'=0.47, 0.92, 1.30, 1.69, 2.27
at K=4, 8, 12, 16, 20). Furthermore, this model does not accurately predict which
specific changes will be noticed, either at K=4 (r=0.30, p=0.15) or at K=18 (r=0.39,
p=0.06), accounting for at most 28% of the amount of the variance that is accounted
for by the full model.
One reason this model does not fit human performance as well as the full model
is that it fails to recognize changes that introduce irregular items: e.g., if the initial
display is quite smooth and has no outliers, this model simply encodes items at
random. Then, if the 'change' display has an obvious outlier item the model cannot
detect it. To recognize this kind of change requires knowing what the summary of
the initial display was.
Thus, if we remove the memory representation of the summary from the model,
it provides a significantly worse fit to human performance.
Remembering a summary representation but choosing items at random
It is also possible to examine a model that encodes both a summary of the display
and specific items, but does not choose which items to specifically encode by selecting
outliers from the summary. Rather than preferentially encoding unlikely items, such
a model chooses the items to encode at random.
We find that such a model does not fit human performance as well as the full
summary-based encoding model. To achieve human levels of performance such a
model must encode as many objects as a model which encodes objects completely
at random (human levels of performance at K=20; d'=0.26, 0.54, 0.91, 1.39, 2.06
at K=4, 8, 12, 16, 20). Furthermore, it does not do a good job predicting which
specific changes will be noticed, either at K=4 (r=0.09, p=0.68) or at K=20 (r=0.40,
p=0.05), accounting for at most 31% of the amount of the variance that is accounted
for by the full model. One reason this model fails to fit human performance is that
it fails to recognize changes that remove irregular items: e.g., if the initial display is
quite smooth but has a single outlier, it will be encoded as a relatively smooth display.
Then, if the 'change' display removes the outlier item the model cannot detect it. To
recognize this kind of change requires maximizing your information about the first
display by encoding specific items that are not well captured by the summary.
Thus, if remove the model's ability to encode outlier items, it also provides a
significantly worse fit to human performance.
3.3.3 Conclusion
Typically, we are forced to assume that observers are representing independent objects
from a display in order to calculate observers' capacity. By using a Bayesian model
that allows for more structured memory representations, we can calculate observers'
memory capacity under the assumption that observers remember not just independent
items, but also a summary of the display. This model provides a reasonable estimate
of the number of items observers are remembering, suggesting only 4 specific items
in addition to the summary representation must be maintained to match human
performance. The model thus aligns with both previous work from visual working
memory suggesting a capacity of 3-4 simple items (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001)
and also with data from the literature on real-world scenes and simple dot displays
which suggests a hierarchical representation with both gist and item information
(Lamplin et al. 2001; Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 2).
Furthermore, because the summary-based model does not treat each item inde-
pendently, and chooses which items to encode by making strategic decisions based on
the display's summary, this model correctly predicts the difficulty of detecting par-
ticular changes. By contrast, a model which assumes we encode each item in these
displays as a separate unit and choose which to encode at random can predict none of
the display-by-display variance. This model thus represents a significant step forward
for formal models of change detection and visual working memory capacity.
3.4 Chunk-based encoding model
Rather than encoding both a summary of the display and specific items, it is possible
that observers might use a chunk-based representation. For example, a large number
of working memory models assume a fixed number of items can be encoded into
working memory (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997). To account for apparently
disparate capacities for different kinds of information, such models generally appeal
to the idea of chunking, first explicated by George Miller (Miller, 1956). For example,
Miller reports on work which found that observers could remember 8 decimal digits
and approximately 9 binary digits. By teaching observers to recode the binary digits
into decimal (e.g., taking subsequent binary digits like 0011 and recoding them as '3'),
he was able to increase capacities up to nearly 40 binary digits. However, observers
remembered these 40 digits using a strategy that required them to remember only
7-8 'items' (recoded decimal digits). Ericsson, Chase and Faloon (1980) famously
reported a similar case where a particular observer was able to increase his digit span
from 7 to 79 digits by recoding information about the digits into running times from
various races he was familiar with, effectively converting the 79 digits into a small
number of already-existing codes in long-term memory. More recently, Cowan et al.
(2004) have found that by teaching observers associations between randomly chosen
words in a cued-recall task, observers can be made to effectively treat a group of
two formerly unrelated words as a single 'chunk' in working memory, and that such
chunking seems to maintain a fixed capacity in number of chunks even after learning.
In the domain of visual working memory, little work has explicitly examined chunk-
ing or what rules apply to grouping of items in visual working memory. In part, this
is because visual working memory representations seem to be based on representing
objects and features, and so it may not be possible to recode them into alternative
formats to increase capacity without using verbal working memory. However, some
work has focused on how learning associations impacts which items are encoded into
memory (Olson & Jiang, 2004; Olson, Jiang & Moore, 2005) and which items are
represented as a single chunk (Orbn, Fiser, Aslin & Lengyel, 2008). Furthermore, it
has been shown that learned associations can even result in greater numbers of indi-
vidual items being encoded into memory (Brady, Konkle & Alvarez, 2009). However,
almost no work has formalized the rules behind which items are perceptually grouped
and count as a single 'unit' in a slot-model of visual working memory (although see
Woodman, Vecera & Luck, 2003; Xu & Chun, 2007; and Xu, 2006 for examples of
perceptual grouping influencing capacity estimates in visual working memory).
A simple hypothesis is that the basic Gestalt rules of perceptual grouping, in
this case grouping by similarity (Wertheimer, 1938; Koffka, 1935), will determine the
perceptual units that are treated as single units in visual working memory. Indeed,
a. Example display b. Possible ways of chunking this display
Figure 3-5: (a) An example display, (b) Several possible ways of chunking this display.
These are 12 independent samples from our probabilistic chunking model with the
smoothness parameter set to 4. Each color represents a particular 'chunk'.
some work has attempted to examine how observers might group adjacent items of
similar luminance together in order to remember more dots in displays much like the
displays we use in the current task (Halberda et al submitted; see also Hollingworth,
Hyun & Zhang, 2005). However, little formal work has been done examining how
well such a model accounts for human change detection, and no work has examined
whether such a model predicts which displays will be easy or difficult to detect changes
in.
To model such a chunking process, we added two components to our basic change
detection model. First, rather than encoding K single objects, we encode up to K
regions of a display. Second, to select these regions we use two factors, corresponding
to the Gestalt principles of proximity and similarity: (1) a spatial smoothness term
that encourages the model to put only adjacent items into the same chunk; (2) a
likelihood term that forces the model to put only items of the same color into the
same chunk. We thus probabilistically segment the display into M regions, and then
select which K of these M regions to encode by preferentially encoding larger regions
(where chance of encoding is proportional to region size; e.g., we are twice as likely to
encode a region of 4 dots as a region of 2 dots). This allows us to examine how likely
an observer that encoded a display in this way would be to detect particular changes
for different values of K (see Figure 3-5 for a sample of possible region-segmentations
for a particular display).
In this model, we examine the possibility that observers use the information in
the first display to form K regions of the display following the principles of proximity
and similarity, and then encode the shape and color of these K regions into memory.
Then, the second display appears and the observer must decide, based on what they
have encoded in memory, whether this display is exactly the same as the first display.
They do so by independently judging the likelihood of each dot in the second display,
given the chunks they have encoded in memory. This model has a single free parame-
ter, a smoothness parameter which affects how likely adjacent items of the same color
are to end up in the same chunk. For values >0, this parameter prefers larger chunks
to smaller chunks, since it prefers neighboring items to have the same chunk-label.
The model is relatively insensitive to the value of this parameter for values >= 1.0.
For all simulations, we set this value to 4.0 because this provided a model that created
different segmentations of the display fairly often, while still making those segmen-
tations consist of relatively larger chunks. For full model specification, see Chapter
Appendix, 3.8.4.
3.4.1 Modeling results and fit to human performance
The chunk-based model provides an estimate, for a given change detection trial, of
how likely it is that there was a change on that particular trial. By computing
this probability for both the 'same' trial and a 'change' trials that observers saw in
Experiment 1, we can derive a d' for each display in the model.
The model achieves the same performance as people (d'=2.18) with a K value
of only 4, thus encoding only four chunks of dots (model d'=0.44, 0.93, 1.49, 2.08,
2.69 at K=1, 2, 3, 4, 5). This is because the model does not represent each dot
independently: instead, it represents grouped sets of dots as single chunks.
Furthermore, because the chunk-based model does not treat each item inde-
pendently, the model makes predictions about the difficulty of detecting particu-
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Figure 3-6: The fit of the chunk-based encoding model with K=4 (Smoothness=4) to
the observers' data for Experiments 1A (blue x's) and 1B (red circles). Each point is
the d' for a particular display.
lar changes. In fact, the correlation between the model's difficulty with individual
displays and the human performance on these displays was relatively high (r=0.58,
p=0.003; see Figure 3-6).
At K=4, we can examine the effect of different values of the smoothness parameter
on this correlation rather than simply setting this parameter to 4. We find that this
correlation is relatively robust to the smoothness preference, with r=0.35, r=0.45,
r=0.45, r=0.58, r=0.58 for values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (with smoothness - 5, the model
always segments the display into the largest possible chunks). Thus, the model's
simple summary representation captures which changes people are likely to detect
and which they are likely to miss independently of the settings of the chunk-size free
parameter.
3.4.2 Conclusion
The chunk-based model provides a reasonable estimate of the number of items ob-
servers are remembering, suggesting only 4 chunks need be remembered to match
human performance. The model thus provides evidence that fits with previous work
from visual working memory suggesting a capacity of 3-4 simple items (Luck & Vo-
gel, 1997; Cowan, 2001), with the addition of a basic perceptual organization process
that creates chunks before the items are encoded into memory. Furthermore, because
the chunk-based model does not treat each item independently, this model makes
predictions about the difficulty of detecting particular changes. These predictions
coincide well with observers difficulty in detecting particular changes in particular
displays. Together with the summary-based encoding model, this chunk-based model
thus provides a possible representation that might underly human change detection
performance in more structured displays.
3.5 Combining the summary-based and chunk-based
models
Both the chunking model and summary-based encoding model capture a significant
amount of variance, explaining something about which displays observers find difficult
to detect changes in. Do they explain the same variance? Or do both models provide
insight into what kinds of representations observers use to represent these displays?
To assess this question, we examined whether combining these two models resulted
in a better fit to the data than either model alone.
The summary-based encoding model and chunk-based model's display-by-display
d' predictions are almost totally uncorrelated with each other (r=0.03), despite both
doing a reasonable job predicting which displays people will find difficult. We thus
averaged the predictions of the two models and looked at whether this provides a
better fit to human performance than either model alone. We find that the average of
the two models together results in an impressive fit to human performance (r=0.90,
p<0.00001; see Figure 3-7). In fact, the two models together account for 81% of
the variance in observers' d-prime across displays without any free parameters set to
maximize this correlation. This is compatible with the idea that observers' represen-
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Figure 3-7: The fit of combined model with K=4 in both models to the observers'
data for Experiments 1A (blue x's) and 1B (red circles). Each point is the d' for a
particular display. Combining the predictions of the summary-based and chunking
models results in a better fit to the human data than either model alone.
tations might sometimes be more chunk-based and sometimes be more hierarchical,
perhaps depending on their explicit strategy or perhaps because different displays
lend themselves to different styles of encoding.
Rather than simply averaging the model's predictions, we can also introduce a
parameter that weights the two models unequally. A linear model producing the best
fit weights for the predictions of the summary-based and chunk-based models yields
a best fit of r=0.92, with weights of 0.67 for the summary-based encoding model
and 0.45 for the chunk-based encoding model (intercept: -0.13). While weighting the
summary-based encoding model more produces a better fit, such a model does not
significantly enhance our ability to fit observers' display-by-display difficulty.
3.5.1 Conclusion
We examined whether a Bayesian change detection model with more structured mem-
ory representations can provide a window into observers' memory capacity. We find
that both a summary-based encoding model that encodes specific items and also a
summary representation, and a chunking-based model in which observers first use
basic principles of perceptual organization to chunk the display before encoding a
fixed number of items provide possible accounts for how observers encode patterned
displays. These models can match human levels of accuracy while encoding only 3-4
items or chunks, and moreover, provide a good fit to display-by-display difficulty, ac-
curately predicting which changes observers will find most difficult. Furthermore, the
two models seem to capture independent variance, indicating that perhaps observers
use both kinds of representations when detecting changes in patterned displays. Taken
together, the two models account for 81% of the variance in observers' d-prime across
displays. By contrast, the simpler models of change detection typically used in calcu-
lations of visual working memory capacity do not predict any reliable differences in
difficulty between displays because they treat each item independently. These models
thus represent a significant step forward for formal models of change detection and
visual working memory capacity.
3.6 Experiment 2: Randomly colored displays
Using a Bayesian model of change detection together with more structured memory
representations allows us to examine observers' working memory capacity in displays
with explicit patterns. Can these models also predict which displays are hard or
easy on displays without explicit patterns, as in most typical visual working memory
experiments (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997)? If so, what are the implications for standard
K values and for simple models of working memory capacity based on these values?
While most working memory experiments generate displays by randomly choosing
colors and placing those color at random spatial locations, this does not mean that
there are no regularities present in any given display. In fact, any particular work-
ing memory display tends to have significant structure and regularities present even
though on average the displays are totally random.
Variance in observers encoding or storage in particular displays can have a signif-
icant influence on models of memory capacity. For example, Zhang and Luck (2008)
Figure 3-8: Example displays from Experiment 2. These displays were generated
randomly by sampling with replacement from a set of 7 colors, as in Luck & Vogel
(1997).
used a continuous report task (based on Wilken & Ma, 2004) in which observers are
briefly shown a number of colored dots and then asked to report the color of one of
these dots by indicating what color it had been on a color wheel. They then modeled
observers' responses to partial out observers' errors into two different kinds (noisy
representations and random guesses), arriving at an estimate of the number of colors
observers remember, on average, across all of the displays. They found evidence that
supported the idea that observers either remember the correct answer or completely
forget it, and used this to argue for a model of working memory model in which
observers can encode at most three items at a time (a quantized resource model).
Importantly, however, by fitting their model only to the results across all displays
rather than taking into account display-by-display variability, they failed to model
factors that influence the overall capacity estimate, but average out when looking at
many different displays. For example, Bays, Catalao and Husain (2009) showed that
many of observers' 'random guesses' are actually reports of an incorrect item from the
tested display. Reports of the incorrect item tend to average out when looking at all
displays, but for each individual display make a large difference in how many items we
should assume observers' were remembering. Once these incorrect reports are taken
into account, Bays, Catalao and Husain (2009) find that the model of Zhang and Luck
(2008) no longer provides a good fit to the data. This suggests that display-by-display
factors can sometimes significantly influence the degree to which a particular model
of working memory is supported, despite a good fit to the average across all displays.
In the current experiment, we sought to examine whether display-by-display vari-
ance in encoding particular working memory displays could be formalized using our
Bayesian model of observers' memory representations. We applied the same models
used in the patterned displays in Experiment 1 the summary-based encoding model
and chunk-based model to displays like those used in typical visual working memory
experiments. We find evidence that observers use such structured representations
when encoding these displays, and are able to predict which particular displays ob-
servers will find easy or difficult to detect changes in. This indicates that simple
models of working memory which encode a small number of independent objects
at random do not match the representation observers' use even in relatively simple
working memory displays.
3.6.1 Methods
Observers
100 observers were recruited and run using Amazon Mechanical Turk. All were from
the U.S., gave informed consent, and were paid 30 cents for approximately 4 minutes
of their time.
Procedure and Stimuli
We randomly generated 24 pairs of displays by selecting 8 colors with replacement
from a set of 7 possible colors (as in Luck & Vogel, 1997) and placing them randomly
on a 5 x 4 invisible grid (see Figure 3-8). While it is standard to jitter the items in
such displays to avoid co-linearities, to facilitate modeling and comparison with the
previous experiments we allowed the items to be perfectly aligned.
The displays each subtended 320x240 pixels, with the individual colored squares
subtending 30x30 pixels. On each trial, the pre-change display appeared on the left,
followed by the (potentially) changed version of the display appearing on the right.
Observers' monitor size and resolution was not controlled. However, all observers
attested to the fact that the entire stimulus presentation box was visible on their
monitor.
The methods were otherwise the same as Experiment 1.
3.6.2 Results
For each display we computed a d', measuring how difficult it was to detect the
change in that display (averaged across observers). The mean d' was 1.5 across the
displays, corresponding to a K value of 4.0 if we assume all of the items are represented
independently (Pashler, 1988).
However, as in Experiment 1, observers were consistent in which displays they
found easy or difficult (see Figure 3-9). For example, if we compute the average d' for
each display using the data from half of our observers and then do the same for the
other half of the observers, we find that to a large degree the same displays were dif-
ficult for both groups (r=0.68, averaged over 200 random splits of the observers). By
bootstrapping to estimate standard errors on observers' d-prime for each individual
display we can visualize this consistency (Figure 3-9). Some displays, like those on
the left of Figure 3-9, are consistently hard for observers. Others, like those on the
right of Figure 3-9, are consistently easy for observers to detect changes in. Contrary
to the assumption of standard working memory models, observers do not appear to
treat items independently even on randomly generated displays like those typically
used in working memory experiments.
Model fits
We next fit the summary-based encoding model and the chunk-based model to these
data to examine whether these models capture information about observers repre-
sentations in these displays. We find that the summary-based model provides a
good fit to the data, and in addition correlates with observers' display-by-display
difficulty (see Figure 3-10). The summary-based encoding model equals human per-
formance (d'=1.5) at K=4 (d'=1.47 at K=4), and at this K value correlates with
display-by-display difficulty well (r=0.60; p=0.003). Furthermore, this correlation is
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Figure 3-9: Consistency in which displays are most difficult in Exp 2. The x-axis
contains each of the 24 display pairs, rank ordered by difficulty (lowest d' on the left,
highest on the right; for visualization purposes, only a subset of pairs are shown on
the x-axis). The dashed gray line corresponds to the mean d' across all displays. The
error bars correspond to across-subject standard error bars. The consistent differences
in d' between displays indicate some displays are more difficult than other displays.
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Figure 3-10: (a) Fit of the summary-based model with K=4. The blue xs represent
the data from Experiment 2, using randomly generated displays as in typical visual
working memory experiments (fit: r=0.60). The black circles represent data from the
control experiment where displays were generated to purposefully contain patterns
(fit: r=0.55). (b) Fit of the chunk-based model with K=4. The blue xs represent
the data from Experiment 2, using randomly generated displays as in typical visual
working memory experiments (fit: r=0.32). The black circles represent data from the
control experiment where displays were generated to purposefully contain patterns
(fit: r=0.28).
not driven by the outliers: the Spearman rank-order correlation is also high (r=0.53,
p=0.009 ) and if we exclude displays where the model predicts an excessively high
d, the correlation remains high despite the decreased range (excluding displays with
model d>3, r=0.61). The chunk-based model does not provide as good a fit, equaling
human performance at K=4 (d'=0.88 at K=3, d'=1.32 at K=4, d'=1.81 at K=5)
but only marginally correlating with display-by-display difficulty (r=0.33 at K=3,
r=0.32 at K=4, r=0.41 at K=5). In addition, combining the chunking model with
the summary-based model does not significantly improve the summary-based model,
with the average of the two models giving a slightly worse fit than the summary-based
model alone (with K=4 for both models, r=0.56).
Generating the displays used in Experiment 2 completely at random means that
few displays contained significant enough pattern information to allow for chunking
or summary information to play a large role. This allowed us to quantify exactly how
well our model representations explained data from truly random displays, as used
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in most working memory studies (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997). However, while we find
that even with a sample of just 24 displays some displays are easier than others and
this is well-explained by our summary-based model, the limited range in d' prevents
any strong conclusions about the particular memory representations observers make
use of in displays of colored squares (for example, do observers' representations truly
resemble the summary-based model more than the chunk-based model?). We thus ran
another experiment (N=100 observers that did not participate in Experiments 1 or 2)
using 24 new displays we generated to purposefully contain patterns2 . Within these
new displays, we found that the summary-based model once again provided a strong
fit to the data (r=0.55) whereas the chunk-based model provided a considerably worse
fit (r=0.32). In addition, when combining the displays from this control experiment
with the displays from Experiment 2, we find that the summary-based model provides
a better fit (r=0.64) than the chunk-based model (r=0.50) and averaging the two
models does not improve the fit of the summary-based model significantly (r=0.66).
This suggests that the summary-based model's representation provides a better
fit to how observers encode these working memory displays than the chunk-based
model does. This could be because the distance between the items prevents low-level
perceptual grouping from occurring (Kubovy, Holcombe & Wagemans, 1998).
3.6.3 Conclusion
Even in standard working memory displays, observers are consistent in which displays
they detect changes in and which displays they do not detect changes in. This suggests
that the assumption of independence between items does not hold even in these
relatively simple displays of segmented shapes. Thus, we need models that take into
account basic perceptual grouping and higher-order summary representations in order
to understand the architecture of visual working memory even when our displays are
impoverished relative to real scenes.
2We generated the displays by creating displays at random and retaining only displays where
either the chunk-based model or the summary-based predicted the display would have a d' greater
than 2.
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Interestingly, even in displays chosen to minimize the presence of patterns, our
summary-based model's representation captures which changes people are likely to
detect and which they are likely to miss. By contrast, a model which assumes we
encode each item in these displays as a separate unit and choose which to encode
at random can predict none of the display-by-display variance. This suggests that
observers' representation are more structured than standard models based on inde-
pendent items would suggest, even in simple working memory displays.
3.7 General Discussion
We presented a formal model of change detection which relies upon Bayesian inference
to make predictions about visual working memory architecture and capacity. This
model allows us to take into account the presence of higher-order regularities, while
making quantitative predictions about the difficulty of particular working memory
displays.
In Experiment 1, we found that observers are able to successfully detect changes
to displays containing spatial patterns with much greater accuracy than would be
expected if they were remembering only 3-4 individual items from these displays.
Furthermore, we found that observers are highly reliable in which particular changes
they find easiest and hardest to detect. We posited two memory representations that
might underlie observers performance on these displays: a summary-based represen-
tation, where observers encode both a spatial summary of the display (items tend to
be the same color as their horizontal neighbors) and outlier items; and a chunk-based
representation, where observers group individual items into chunks before encoding
them into memory. Using our change detection model, we demonstrated that both
observers' high performance and a significant amount of the variance in display-by-
display difficulty can be predicted by a model that uses either of these representations.
Furthermore, we showed that a model that combines both forms of representation ex-
plains nearly all of the variance in change detection performance in patterned displays.
In Experiment 2, we examined the memory representations that underlie stan-
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dard working memory displays composed of colored squares with no explicit spatial
patterns. We again found significant consistency in display-by-display difficulty, sug-
gesting that even in simple displays observers are not treating items independently.
In addition, our summary-based encoding model successfully predicted which changes
observers found hard or easy to detect.
We thus show that it is necessary to model both more structured memory rep-
resentations as well as observers encoding strategies to successfully understand what
information observers represent in visual working memory. We provide a framework
for such modeling Bayesian inference in a model of change detection and show that
it can allow us to understand the format of observers memory representations. In-
terestingly, our models converge with the standard visual working memory literature
on an estimate of 3-4 individual objects remembered, even in the patterned displays
where simpler formal models massively underestimate observers performance.
3.7.1 Predicting display-by-display difficulty
Because each individual item in a typical working memory display is randomly colored
and located at a random spatial position, formal models of working memory have
tended to treat the displays themselves as interchangeable. Thus, existing models of
visual working memory have focused on average memory performance across many
different displays. For example, the standard "slot" model used to calculate K values
takes into account only the number of items present and the number of items that
change between study and test, ignoring any display-by-display variance in which
items are likely to be encoded and how well the items group or how well they can
be summarized in ensemble representations. Even modeling efforts that do not focus
on slots have tended to examine only performance across all displays (for example,
Wilken and Mas (2004) signal detection model where the performance decrement with
increasing numbers of items encoded results only from internal noise and noise in the
decision process).
However, even when the items themselves are chosen randomly, each display may
not itself be random: instead, any given display may contain significant structure.
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Furthermore, by focusing on average performance across displays, existing models
have necessarily assumed that each individual item is treated independently in visual
working memory. In the current work we find that this assumption of independence
between items may not hold even in simple displays, but perhaps more importantly,
requiring independence between items leaves little room to scale up formal models
of working memory to displays where items are clearly not random, as in real-world
scenes or even the patterned displays in Experiment 1.
There are two examples of work that fit a formal model which takes into account
information about each individual display in working memory, although neither ex-
amines model fits for each particular display as we do in the current work. In the
first, Bays, Catalao and Husain (2009) showed that taking into account information
about particular displays may be critical to distinguishing between slot models and
resource models in continuous report tasks (Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009; Zhang
& Luck, 2008). Zhang and Luck (2008) found evidence that observers seem to fre-
quently randomly guess what color an item was, perhaps suggesting a limit on how
many items can be encoded. However, Bays, Catalao and Husain (2009), using data
taking which takes into account display-by-display differences, have argued that many
of these random guesses are actually reports of an incorrect item from the study dis-
play. Reports of the incorrect item tend to average out when looking at all displays,
but for each individual display make a large difference in how many items we should
assume observers' were remembering. Bays et al. (2009) argue that once these trial-
by-trial variations are taken into account, the data support a resource model rather
than a slot model of working memory (although see Anderson et al. 2011).
The second example of fitting a working memory model to each individual display
is work done by Brady, Konkle and Alvarez (2009; Chapter 4) on how statistical
learning impacts visual working memory. By creating displays where the items were
not randomly chosen (particular colors appear in a pair together more often than
chance), they showed that observers can successfully encode more individual col-
ors as they learn regularities in working memory displays. Furthermore, using an
information-theoretic model to predict how "compressible" each display was based
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on how predictable the pairings of colors are, Brady et al. (2009) were able to explain
how well observers would remember particular displays. For example, displays that
have a large number of highly predictable color pairs were remembered better than
displays with less predictable pairs.
In the current work, we introduce the encoding of summary statistics and per-
ceptual grouping as possible factors in observers memory representations. Since the
influence of these factors differs on each display, we are able to separately predict
the difficulty of each individual visual working memory display. We thus collected
data from large numbers of observers performing the same change detection task on
exactly the same displays. This allowed us to examine how well our model predicted
performance for each individual display for the first time. This display-by-display
approach could potentially open up a new avenue of research for understanding the
representations used in visual working memory, because it allows clear visualizations
of what factors influence memory within single displays.
3.7.2 The use of ensemble statistics for summary-based en-
coding
In our summary-based encoding model, we suggested that observers might store two
distinct kinds of memory representations: a set of individual objects, plus summary
statistics which encode an overall gist of the display. We found evidence that such
summary-based encoding can explain human change detection in both patterned dis-
plays and in simple displays. In addition, we found evidence that a crucial role of
summary-based encoding is to guide attention to outlier items.
Our model of summary-based encoding links to both a rich literature on how we
encode real-world scenes (e.g., encoding both scene information and specific objects:
Hollingworth, 2006; Oliva, 2005) and to an emerging literature on the representation
of visual information using ensemble statistics (e.g., encoding mean size of a set of
items or the distribution of orientations on a display: Alvarez, 2011; Haberman &
Whitney, 2011). When representing a scene observers encode not only specific objects
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but also semantic information about a scenes category as well as its affordances and
other global scene properties (e.g., Greene & Oliva, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b). Observers
also represent some scene-based summary statistics that are encoded visually rather
than semantically. For example, Alvarez and Oliva (2009) have shown that observers
are sensitive to some global patterns of orientation but not others, possibly based on
how meaningful such patterns are in the statistics of natural scenes (Oliva & Torralba,
2001). This visual ensemble information seems to be linked to the way we process
texture (Haberman & Whitney, 2011).
There is also existing evidence that the representation of such scene and ensemble
information influences our encoding of specific objects. In real-world scenes, much of
the influence of such gist representations on the representation of individual objects
seems to be semantic. For example, observers are better at remembering the spatial
position of an object when tested in the context of a scene (Mandler & Johnson,
1976; Hollingworth, 2007), and this effect is stronger when the scene information
is meaningful and coherent (Mandler & Johnson, 1976; Mandler & Parker, 1976).
In addition, gist representations based on semantic information seem to drive the
encoding of outlier objects. Thus objects are more likely to be both fixated and
encoded into memory if they are semantically inconsistent with the background scene
(e.g., Friedman, 1979; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000, 2003).
Visual information from scenes also influences our encoding of objects. Thus,
observers encoding real-world scenes not only preferentially encode semantic outliers
but also visual outliers ("salient" objects) (Wright, 2005; Fine & Minnery, 2009, J
Neuro; although see Stirk & Underwood, 2007). In addition, when computing ensem-
ble visual representations in simpler displays observers discount outlier objects from
these representations (Haberman & Whitney, 2010), and combine their representa-
tions of the ensemble statistics with their representation of individual items (Brady
& Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 2).
Taken together, this suggests that observers representations of both real-world
scenes and simpler displays consists of not only information about particular objects
but also scene-based information and ensemble visual information. Furthermore, this
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summary information is used to influence the choice of particular objects to encode
and ultimately influences the representation of those objects.
In the current work, we formalized a simplified version of such a summary-based
encoding model. Rather than representing semantic information, we use displays that
lack semantic information and used a summary representation based on Markov Ran-
dom Fields (Geman & Geman, 1984). This summary representation represents only
local spatial continuity properties of the display (e.g., the similarity between items
that are horizontal and vertical neighbors). Interestingly, however, a very similar rep-
resentation seems to capture observers impression of the subjective randomness of an
image patch (Schreiber & Griffiths, 2007), a concept similar to Garners (1974) notion
of pattern goodness. Pattern goodness is an idea that has been difficult to formal-
ize but qualitatively seems to capture which images are hard and easy to remember
(Garner, 1974).
Nevertheless, our summary representation is likely too impoverished to be a fully
accurate model of the summaries encoded in human memory, even for such simple
displays. For example, if letters or shapes appeared in the dot patterns in our displays,
observers would likely recall those patterns well by summarizing them with a gist-like
representation. Our model cannot capture such representations. Additional visual
summary information is also likely present but not being modeled: for example, if
we changed the shape of one of the items in Experiment 1 from a red circle to a red
square observers would almost certainly notice despite the large number of individual
items on the display (e.g., see Brady, Konkle & Alvarez, 2011; Chapter 1). However,
we believe that our model nevertheless represents a step forward in understanding
how people make use of such summary information during change detection. Despite
the relative simplicity of the summary representation, the model seems to capture a
large amount of variance in how well observers remember not only patterned displays
but also simple visual working memory displays.
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3.7.3 Chunking
In our chunk-based encoding model, we suggested that observers might make use of
the Gestalt principle of similarity to form perceptual units out of the individual items
in our displays and encode these units into memory as chunks. We found evidence that
such chunk-based encoding can explain part of human change detection in patterned
displays.
This idea that memory might encode chunks rather than individual objects relates
to two existing literatures. One is the literature on semantic, knowledge-based chunk
formation. For example, a large amount of work has been done to understand how
form chunks based on knowledge, both behaviorally (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973;
Cowan et al. 2004; Brady et al 2009; Gobet et al. 2001) and with computational
models of what it means to form such chunks, how all-or-nothing chunk formation
is and what learning processes observers undergo (e.g., Brady et al 2009; Gobet
et al. 2001). The other literature on chunk formation is based on more low-level
visual properties, as examined under the headings of perceptual grouping and pattern
goodness (e.g., Wertheimer, 1938; Koffka, 1935; Garner, 1974). In the current work
we use non-semantic stimuli and do not repeat stimuli to allow for learning, and
thus it is likely we are tapping a form of chunk formation that is based on grouping
properties of low-level vision rather than based on high-level knowledge.
Some previous work has focused on how to formalize this kind of perceptual group-
ing (Kubovy & Van den Berg, 2008; Rosenholtz, Twarog, Schinkel-Bielefeld, & Wat-
tenberg, 2009). For example, Kubovy and Van den Berg (2008) have proposed a
probabilistic model of perceptual grouping with additive effects of item similarity
and proximity on the likelihood of two objects being seen as a group. In the current
experiments, our items differ only in color, and thus we make use of a straightforward
model of grouping items into chunks, where items that are adjacent and same-colored
are likely but not guaranteed to be grouped into a single unit. This grouping model
is similar in spirit to that of Kubovy and Van den Berg (2008), and in our displays
seems to explain a significant portion of the variance in observers memory perfor-
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mance. This provides some evidence that perceptual grouping may occur before
observers encode items into memory, allowing observers to encode perceptual chunks
rather than individual items per se.
Similar models of perceptual grouping have been proposed to explain why ob-
servers are better than expected at empty-cell localization tasks using patterned
stimuli much like ours (Hollingworth, Hyun & Zhang, 2005) and why some displays
are remembered more easily than others in same/different tasks (Howe and Jung,
1986; Halberda et al. submitted) . However, this previous work did not attempt
to formalize such a model of perceptual grouping. This is important because in the
current experiments we find that summary-based encoding provides another possible
explanation for the benefits observed in patterned displays, and in fact may provide
a more general solution since it helps explain performance in simpler displays better
than perceptual grouping. Thus, we believe it is an important open question the ex-
tent to which summary-based encoding rather than perceptual grouping could explain
improved performance for patterned displays in previous experiments (Hollingworth,
Hyun & Zhang, 2005; Howe & Jung, 1986; Halberda et al., submitted).
3.7.4 Fidelity in visual working memory
In line with the previous literature on working memory, the current modeling effort
largely treats working memory capacity as a fixed resource in which up to K items
may be encoded with little noise. While expanding on what counts as an item (in the
chunk-based model) or suggesting a hierarchical encoding strategy (in the summary-
based model), nevertheless we do not investigate in detail the fidelity stored in the
representations or the extent to which encoding is all-or-none (e.g., slot-like) versus
a more continuous resource.
There are several important caveats to the simplistic idea of all-or-none slots that
we use throughout the current modeling effort. The first is that for complex objects,
observers are able to represent objects with greater detail when they are encoding
only a single object or only a few objects than when they are encoding many such
objects (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Awh et al 2007). In fact, the newest evidence
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suggests this is true even of memory for color (Zhang & Luck, 2008). For example,
Zhang and Luck (2008) find that observers have more noise in their color reports
when remembering 3 colors than when remembering only a single color. It has been
proposed this is due to either a continuous resource constraint with an upper-bound
on the number of objects it may be split between (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004), a
continuous resource with no upper bound (Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays, Catalao &
Husain, 2009), a continuous resource that must be divided up between a fixed number
of slots (Awh et al. 2007), or because observers store multiple copies of an object
in each of their slots when there are fewer than the maximum number of objects
(Zhang & Luck, 2008). In either case, the simplistic model in which several items are
perfectly encoded needs to be relaxed to incorporate these data.
Furthermore, in real-world displays which contain many real objects in a scene,
observers continually encode more objects from the display the more time they are
given (Hollingworth, 2004; Melcher, 2001, 2006). In fact, even on displays with
objects that are not in a coherent scene, if those objects are semantically rich real-
world objects, observers remember more detailed representations for a larger number
of objects as they are given more time to encode the objects (Brady, Konkle, Oliva
& Alvarez, 2009; Melcher, 2001).
Despite these complications, in the current modeling we focus on expanding a
basic all-or-none slot model to the case of dealing with higher-order regularities and
perceptual organization. We use such a model as our basic architecture of working
memory because of its inherent simplicity and because it provides a reasonable fit to
the kind of change detection task where the items to be remembered are simple and
the changes made in the change detection task are large, as in the current studies (e.g.,
categorical changes in color, Luck & Vogel, 1997). Future work will be required to
explore how perceptual grouping and summary-based encoding interact with memory
fidelity.
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3.7.5 Conclusion
Memory representations of real-world scenes are complex and structured: observers
encode both scene-based semantic and visual information as well as specific objects,
and the objects they encode are chosen based on the scene-based information. By
contrast, formal models of working memory have typically dealt with only simple
memory representations that assume items are treated independently and no sum-
mary information is encoded.
In the current work we presented a formal model of change detection that uses
Bayesian inference to make predictions about visual working memory architecture and
capacity. This model allowed us to take into account the presence of summary infor-
mation and perceptual organization, while making quantitative predictions about the
difficulty of particular working memory displays. We found evidence that observers
make use of more structured memory representations not only in displays that ex-
plicitly contain patterns, but also in randomly-generated displays typically used in
working memory experiments. Furthermore, we provided a framework to model these
structured representations Bayesian inference in a model of change detection and
showed that it can allow us to understand how observers make use of both summary
information and perceptual grouping.
By treating change detection as inference in a generative model, we make contact
with the rich literature on a Bayesian view of low-level vision (Knill & Richards, 1996;
Yuille & Kersten, 2006) and higher-level cognition (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006;
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). Furthermore, by using probabilistic models
we obtain the ability to use more complex and structured knowledge in our memory
encoding model, rather than treating each item as an independent unit (e.g., Kemp
& Tenenbaum, 2008; Tenenbaum, Griffiths & Kemp, 2006). Our model is thus ex-
tensible in ways that show promise for building a more complete model of visual
working memory: within the same Bayesian framework, it is possible to integrate
existing models of low-level visual factors with existing models of higher-level concep-
tual information (e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008), both of which will be necessary
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to ultimately predict performance in working memory tasks with real-world scenes.
3.8 Chapter Appendix
3.8.1 Basic Change Detection Model Details
Walkthrough
We wish to model a simple change detection task of the form frequently used in
visual working memory (see Figure 3-11). Observers are presented with a display
(the study display) consisting of 8 colored squares. The display then disappears, and
a short time later another display reappears (the test display) that is either identical
to the study display or in which a single square has changed color. Observers must
decide whether the test display is identical to the study display or there has been a
change. Observers are told that at most a single item will change color.
To create a model of this change detection task, we first specify how observers'
encode the study display. For the simplest case, in order to most closely match the
models used to quantify "K-values" in standard displays (Cowan, 2001), we assume
that memory takes the form of a discrete number of slots, K, each of which stores
which color was present on the display in a particular location (using seven colors:
black, white, red, green, blue, yellow and purple). Also in line with standard slot
models, we initially assume that observers choose which K of the N dots to encode
at random. To model the change detection task, we then formalize how observers
make a decision about whether there was a change when the test display is presented.
When observers must decide if there has been a change, observers have access to the
test display and to the items they encoded in memory from the study display. Using
the information that at most a single item can change color, we model the observer
as performing an optimal inference to arrive at a judgment for whether the display
has changed.
For this simple model, this inference is straightforward. When an observer is
looking at a particular test display, there are 49 (1 + 8*6) possibilities for what
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might have been the study display: There is the possibility that the study display
was exactly the same as the test display (1 +), plus the possiblility the study display
had any one of the eight items as a different color then in the test display (since there
are 6 other colors for each of the 8 items, this gives 8*6). Assuming 50% of trials are
'change' and 50% 'no-change', and thus observers use 50% as the prior probability of
a change, this means that after observing the test display, observers start with the
belief that there is a 50% chance that the study display was the same as the test
display, and a 1/(8*6), or 1.04% chance that the study display was any particular one
of the possible changed displays.
To arrive at the final inference, this information must then be updated based on
the K colors encoded in memory from the study display. Using the colors of these K
items, observers can rule out (e.g., assign 0 likelihood) any of the hypothesized study
displays that have a color that differs from their memory. For example, if an observer
remembers a particular item was blue in the study display, and it remains blue in the
test display, this observer can rule out all 6 possible changes in color for that item,
and thus reduce the possible changed displays from 48 to 42.
After ruling out the displays that are incompatible with their memory represen-
tation, observers can then calculate the final posterior probability of a change: this is
the percentage of the remaining probability that is part of the 8*6 "change" displays
as opposed to the 1 "no-change" display. Note that if one of the remembered items
differs from the second display, this will rule out 'no change' and observers will be
sure there was a change (all remaining probability will be on the "change" displays).
If none of the remembered items differ from the test display, then observers will be
more likely to say no change, and how likely they will be to say no change will depend
on how many of the possible study displays can be ruled out based on the items they
remember. The larger the value of K, the more possible study displays will be ruled
out and the more sure observers will become that there was no change (see Figure
3-11).
If we cue which item to check for a change (e.g., by putting only a single square
up when we show the test display and asking whether only this item is the same
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Figure 3-11: Results of probabilistic change detection model on detecting a single
change in a display with 8 colored squares as a function of the number of items
remembered. As more items are encoded, the model gets a larger percentage of
displays correct.
or different), then our Bayesian change detection model becomes even simpler. In
the full Bayesian change detection model, if we do not encode an item and that item
changes, the likelihood we say 'change' is a function of our capacity K. As K increases,
we get greater implicit evidence for 'no-change', since the more items we encode the
less likely it is that we would have failed to encode the item that changed.
However, if we are cued to which item may have changed, then we need only
weigh the probability the color is the same as the first display (50% prior) against the
probability it used to be one of the 6 other colors (50% * 1/6 = 8.3% chance of each
other color). If we encoded the item in memory, which happens on K/N out of each
N trials because we randomly sample which items to encode, then we get the trial
correct. If we don't encode the item in memory, then there is a 50% chance it is same
and 50% chance it is different, given our prior probability about whether there was
a change (regardless of how many items we encoded). Thus, the chance of getting a
trial correct reduces to:
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(A) Encoding (B) Detection
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Figure 3-12: Graphical model notation for the basic multinomial change-detection
model at (A) encoding and (B) detection. Shaded nodes are observed. The red arrows
correspond to observers' memory encoding strategy; the black arrows correspond to
constraints of the task (e.g., at most 1 dot will change between display 1 (D') and
display 2 (D2 )).
P.C.(%) = *1+ N K * 0.50N N
This is the same as the formula used to calculate Cowan's K (Cowan, 2001). Thus,
the Bayesian model of change detection has Cowan's K as a special case where the
item that may have changed is cued.
Formalization
Formally, in this model with no higher-order information, we treat each of the N items
on the study display as a multinomial random variable D (i from 1, 2,... N), where
the set of possible values of each D' is 1, 2, ..., 7, representing the seven possible
colors. We choose whether to remember each object from the display by sampling K
specific objects from the display without replacement. S denotes the set of K specific
objects encoded: S = S1, ..., SK. For each item encoded in S, we store a multinomial
distribution with 100% of the mass on the color of that item in the display (D').
Nothing is stored about all other items.
At detection, observers have access to the information encoded in S and also the
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items on the test display (D 2 ). This test display is generated by taking the study
display (D') and either modifying no colors (C=0, prior probability 0.5) or modifying
a single color at random (C=1, prior probability 0.5). Observers must infer, using S
and D 2 , whether a change was made (the value of C). To do so, they must use S
and D2 to put a probability distribution on all possible values of D' (e.g., calculate
p(D1D2 , S). In other words, to know if there was a change, observers must know
what the second display and the information in memory suggests about the first
display. In this case, p(D1 ID2) is independent of p(D'jS), and so p(D'ID2 , S) can be
calculated as simply p(D'1D 2) * p(D' IS).
Because of the constraint that at most one item will change between D' and D2 ,
the value of D2 rules out all but a small number of possible displays for consideration
as the possible study display, D1 . In other words, p(D'1D2 ) puts non-zero probability
on only 1 + N*6 of the N' possible study displays. These correspond to the study
display that is exactly the same as the test display (1 +), plus the study displays that
correspond to any one of the N items changing from the color they are in the test
display to one of the 6 other colors (N*6).
The value of S rules out a number of displays proportional to the number of items
encoded in S (K items). p(D'jS) assigns zero probability to all displays where an
item D! is a different color than Si, for all K items encoded in S. All other displays
are given equal likelihood.
Taken together with an equal prior probability of all possible displays D', these
two distributions, p(D D 2 ) and p(D'IS), provide the posterior function for p(D 1 ).
As the final step in the inference, this posterior over possible first displays must be
converted to a posterior on whether there was a change in the display (C). This is
based on the prior probability of a change (0.5) and whether D' is equal to D 2 (e.g.,
whether there is a change between the two displays). Thus:
p(C = 11D 2,S) = 0.5 * p(D 1 - D21 D2, S)0.5p(D 1 D2 1D2, S) + 0.5p(D 1 # D2 |D2 , 5)
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3.8.2 Patterned Display Generation
To generate the patterned displays used in Experiment 1A and 1B, we sampled a set of
16 displays from a Markov Random Field (MRF) smoothness model like those used in
our summary-based encoding model and our chunking model (see Chapter Appendix,
Sections 3.8.3 and 3.8.4). Using an MRF with separate parameters for horizontal and
vertical smoothness, we used Gibbs sampling to generate a set of four displays from
each of 4 possible parameter settings. These parameters encompassed a wide range
of possible patterns, with horizontal/vertical smoothness set to all combinations of
+/- 1 [e.g., (1, 1), (-1, -1), (1, -1), (1, -1)]. This gave us 16 displays with noticeable
spatial patterns.
In addition, we generated 8 displays by randomly and independently choosing
each dots color (50%/50%). In Experiment 1A, these 24 displays consisted of red and
blue dots. In Experiment 1B they were exactly the same displays, but composed of
black and white squares instead.
3.8.3 Summary-Based Encoding Model Details
Encoding
The graphical model representation of the encoding model (shown in Figure A3)
specifies how the stimuli are initially encoded into memory. We observe the study
display (D1), and we use this to both infer the higher-order structure that may have
generated this display (G) and to choose the specific set of K items to remember from
this display (S).
In the model, any given summary representation must specify which displays are
probable and which are improbable under that summary. Unfortunately, even in
simple displays like ours with only 2 color choices and 25 dots, there are 225 possible
displays. This makes creating a set of possible summary representations by hand and
specifying the likelihood each summary gives to each of the 225 displays infeasible.
Thus, as a simplifying assumption we chose to define the summary representation
using Markov Random Fields, which allow us to specify a probability distribution
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(A) Encoding (B) Detection
00
Figure 3-13: Graphical model notation for the summary-based encoding model at (A)
encoding and (B) detection. Shaded nodes are observed. The red arrows correspond
to observers' memory encoding strategy; the black arrows correspond to constraints
of the task (e.g., at most 1 dot will change between the study display (D 1) and test
display (D 2 )). The blue arrows correspond to our model of how a display is generated;
in this case, how the summary or gist of a display relates to the particular items in
that display.
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over all images by simply defining a small number of parameters about how items
tend to differ from their immediate neighbors. Such models have been used extensively
in computer vision (Geman & Geman, 1984; Li, 1995). We use only two summary
parameters, which specify how often items are the same or different color than their
horizontal neighbors (Gh) and how often items are the same or different color than
their vertical neighbors (G,). Thus, one particular summary representation (Gh =
1, GV = -1) might specify that horizontal neighbors tend to be alike but vertical
neighbors tend to differ (e.g., the display looks like it has horizontal stripes in it).
This summary representation would give high likelihood to displays that have many
similar horizontal neighbors and few similar vertical neighbors.
We treat each item in these change detection displays as a random variable D',
where the set of possible values of each D' is -1 (color 1) or 1 (color 2). To define the
distribution over possible displays given the gist parameters, P(D IG), we assume that
the color of each dot is independent of the color of all other dots when conditioned
on its immediate horizontal and vertical neighbors.
We thus have two different kind of neighborhood relations (clique potentials) in
our model. One two parameters (Gh and Gv) apply only to cliques of horizontal and
vertical neighbors in the lattice (Nh and Nv) respectively. Thus, P(D'IG) is defined
as:
P(DlG) = exp (- En (D 1 G)) (3.1)Z(G)
En(D1 IG)>=G, V )(D,Dj)+Gh Z $(D!,DJ)
(ij)EN, (ij)ENh
where the partition function:
Z(G) = Zexp (-E(D IG))
D1
normalizes the distribution. ?/(DI, DJ) is 1 if DI = D! and -1 otherwise. If G > 0
the distribution will favor displays where neighbors tend to be similar colors, and if
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G < 0 the distribution will favor displays where neighbors tend to be different colors.
The summary of the display is therefore represented by the parameters G of an
MRF defined over the display. Our definition of p(D'IG)) thus defines the probability
distribution p(displaylsummary). To complete the encoding model we also need to
define p(itemsIdisplay, summary) (p(SjD', G)). To do so, we define a probability
distribution that preferentially encodes outlier objects (objects that do not fit well
with the summary representation).
We choose whether to remember each object from the display by looking indepen-
dently at the conditional probability of that object under the summary representation,
assuming all of its neighbors are fixed p(D' IG, D>). S denotes the set of K specific
objects encoded: S = si, ... , sk. To choose S, we rank all possible sets of objects of size
0, 1, 2, ... to K objects based on how unlikely they are under the encoded summary
representation. Thus, the probability of encoding a set of objects (S) is:
p(SIG,Dl) = [1 - p(DjG, D)j)] ]I p(D|G, D),) (3.2)
j:sjES j:sjS
This defines p(SID1 , G), which provides the probability of encoding a particular
set of specific items in a given display, p(itemsIdisplay, summary), in our model.
To compute the model predictions we use exact inference. However, due to the
computational difficulty of inferring the entire posterior distribution on MRF param-
eters for a given display (e.g., the difficulty of computing Z(G)), and because we
do not wish to reduce our summary representation to a single point estimate, we
do not compute either the maximum posterior MRF parameters for a given display
or the full posterior on G. Instead, we store the posterior in a grid of values for
G in both horizontal and vertical directions (Gh = -1.5, -1, -. 5, 0, .5, 1, 1.5, G, =
-1.5, -1, -. 5, 0, .5,1,1.5). We compute the likelihood of the display under each of
these combinations of Gh and G, and then choose the items to store (S) by integrating
over the different choices of G (we store the full posterior over S)). We choose a uni-
form prior on the summary representation (e.g., a uniform prior on MRF parameters
G).
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In summary, to encode a display we first treat the display as an MRF. We then
calculate the posterior on possible summary representations by calculating a posterior
on G at various (pre-specified) values of G. We then use this G and the original display
to compute a posterior on which set of < K items to encode into item memory (S). At
the completion of encoding we have both a distribution on summary representations
(G) and a distribution on items to remember (S), and these are the values we maintain
in memory for the detection stage.
Detection
At the detection stage, we need to infer the probability of a change to the display.
To do so, we attempt to recover the first display using only the information we
have in memory and the information available in the second display. Thus, using
the probabilistic model, we work backwards through the encoding process, so that,
for example, all the possible first displays that don't match the specific items we
remembered are ruled out because we would not have encoded a dot as red if it were
in fact blue.
More generally, to do this inference we must specify P(DIS), P(DIl D2 ), P(D 1 |X),
P(SIG, D). Almost all of these probabilities are calculated by simply inverting the
model we use for encoding the display into memory initially with a uniform prior
on possible first displays. Thus, P(D'IG) and P(SIG, D) are given by the same
equations described in the Encoding section.
Those probabilities not specified in the forward model represent aspects of the
change detection task. Thus, P(D'IS) is a uniform distribution over first displays
that are consistent with the items in memory and 0 for displays where one of those
items differs. This represents our simplifying assumption (common to standard "slot"
models of visual working memory) that items in memory are stored without noise and
are never forgotten (it is possible to add noise to these memory representations by
making P(D 1 |S) a multinomial distribution over possible values of each item, but for
simplicity we do not model such noise here). P(D'ID2) is uniform distribution over
all displays D' such that either D1 = D2 or at most one dot differs between D1 and
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D2 . This represents the fact that the task instructions indicate at most one dot will
change color.
Together these distributions specify the probability of a particular first display
given the information we have about the second display and information we have in
memory, P(D' IG, S, D2 ). Given the one-to-one correspondence between first displays
and possible changes, we can convert this distribution over first displays to a distri-
bution over possible changes. Our prior on whether or not there is a change is 0.5,
such that 50% of the mass is assigned to the "no change" display and the other 50%
is split among all possible single changes. Thus:
P(CG, S, D 2 ) - 0.5P(D 1 = D2 IG, S, D2 )
P G D 0.5P(D1 = D2|G, S, D2) + 0.5 P(D1 # D2|G, S, D2 )
This fully specifies the model of change detection.
Model with no summary information at time of detection
Is remembering the summary representation helping us to accurately model human
performance, or can we predict human performance equally well by using the sum-
mary to choose outliers to encode into memory but then discarding the summary
representation itself? To examine this, we looked at the fit of a model that did
not have access to the summary representation at the time of change detection, and
detected changes solely based on the specific objects encoded.
Formally, this model was identical to the model described, but without condi-
tioning on G when doing change detection. Thus, detection was based only on the
probabilities P(D1IS) and P(D 1ID 2 ), which are once again calculated by using the
same equations as used in the encoding model.
Model with objects chosen at random
It is also possible to examine a model that encodes both a summary of the display
and specific items, but does not choose which items to specifically encode by selecting
outliers from the summary. Rather than preferentially encoding unlikely items, such
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a model chooses the items to encode at random.
Formally, we use S to denote the set of K specific objects encoded: S = s1 , ... , Sk.
In the full model, it is calculated by choosing objects that are outlier with respect to
G:
p(SIG, D') = f [1 - p(DijG,Djg)] J p(DjG,D)) (3.3)
j:sjES j:sj(S
To lesion the model and encode objects at random, we instead choose the set S of
objects to encode at random. Thus, to choose S, we no longer consider all possible
sets of objects up to size K based on how unlikely they are, but simply sample K of
the N objects in the display.
Model as applied to random dot displays
To apply the model to the displays from Exp. 2, we use the same model and treat
the items that are adjacent in the grid as neighbors. Blank spots on the display are
ignored, such that the MRF is calculated only over pair of items (cliques, N, and Nh)
that do not contain a blank location.
To do inference in this model, we can no longer use exact inference, since calcu-
lating the partition function Z(G) for these displays is computationally implausible.
Instead, to calculate the likelihood of a given display under a particular summary
representation, we use the pseudolikelihood, which is the product, for all of the items,
of the conditional probability of that item given its neighbors (Li, 1995; Besag, 1975,
1977). Thus, P(D 1IG) is calculated as:
p(D1 lG) = exp(-En(DIlG))
exp(-En (0|1G)) + exp(-Eni (1|G))
Eni(DIG)=G, E O(D',Dj)+Gh E V)(D',DJ) (3.5)
jENv(i) jENh(i)
Such an estimate of the likelihood is computationally straightforward, and in
MRFs has been shown to be a reasonable approximation to the true underlying like-
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lihood function (Besag, 1977). We can calculate how good an approximation it is for
our particular change detection model by examining how closely predictions using the
pseudolikelihood approximate the exact likelihood computations in Experiment 1. In
that model (with K=4), the change detection estimates (how likely each test display
is to be the same as the study display) correlate r=0.98 between the model that uses
exact inference and the model that relies on the pseudolikelihood to estimate the
likelihood. This suggests the pseudolikelihood provides a close approximation of the
true likelihood in our displays.
3.8.4 Chunking Model Details
To model chunk-based encoding, we add two components to our basic change detec-
tion model. First, rather than encoding K single objects, we encode up to K chunks
from a display (S now encodes chunks rather than individual items). Second, to select
these chunks we use two factors, corresponding to the Gestalt principles of proximity
and similarity: (1) a spatial smoothness term that encourages the model to put only
adjacent items into the same chunk; (2) a likelihood term that forces the model to
put only items of the same color into the same chunk.
We probabilistically segment the display into chunks, and then select which K of
these chunk to encode into our chunk memory, S, by preferentially encoding larger
chunks (where chance of encoding is proportional to chunk size; e.g., we are twice as
likely to encode a chunk of 4 dots as a chunk of 2 dots). This allows us to examine how
likely an observer that encoded a display in this way would be to detect particular
changes for different values of K (see Figure 5 in the main text for a sample of possible
chunk-segmentations for a particular display).
Our formalization of the chunk-based model has three stages. First, we compute
a distribution over all possible ways of segmenting the study display into chunks,
R. Then, for each value of R, we compute a distribution over all possible ways of
choosing K chunks from R to encode into our chunk memory, S. Finally, we calculate
how likely the display is to be the same for each possible value of R and each possible
value of S given this R. Due to the huge number of possible values of R, we use Gibbs
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sampling to sample possible segmentations rather than doing a full enumeration. For
any given segmentation R, however, we do a full enumeration of assignments of S
and thus likelihoods of the display being the same or different.
To compute a distribution over R, we treat the chunk-assignment of each item
DI as a random variable Ri. Thus, Ri corresponds to which region DI is considered
a part of, and each Ri can take on any value from 1 ...25 (the total number of items
present in the display, and thus the maximum number of separate regions).We then
compute a distribution over possible assignments of Ri using a prior that encourages
smoothness (such that items D' that are either horizontal or vertical neighbors are
likely to have the same region assignment), and using a likelihood function that is
all-or-none, simply assigning 0 likelihood to any value of R where two items assigned
the same chunk differ in color (e.g., likelihood zero to any R where Ri-=R, D' # D')
and uniform likelihood to all other assignments of R.
We sample from R using Gibbs Sampling. We thus start with a random assignment
of values for each Ri, and then sample each Ri repeatedly from the distribution
p(RiIR~j, D') to generate samples from the distribution
P(RjR~j) oc exp(-En(RJ|Sm)) (3.6)
En (Ri ISm) =Sm E 0 (Ri, Rj) (3.7)
i,jEN
Where, again, 0 (Ri, R3 ) = 1 if R, = R and -1 otherwise.
For values of Sm >>0, we prefer larger chunks to smaller chunks, since we more
strongly prefer neighboring items to have the same chunk-label. As discussed in the
main text, the model is relatively insensitive to the value of this parameter for values
>= 1.0. For all simulations, we set this value to 4.0 because this provided a model
that created different segmentations of the display fairly often, while still making
those segmentations consist of relatively larger chunks.
The likelihood function, P(RID'), is simply defined such that all chunks/regions
must have only a single color within them. Thus, if for any Ri = Rj, D' / Dj, then
P(RID1 ) = 0, otherwise P(RID') oc 1. Taken together, this likelihood and the MRF
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smoothness prior specify the distribution over R.
To compute a distribution over S for a given value of R, we enumerate how many
unique chunk assignments are present in R (total number of chunks, M), labeling each
of these chunks L = 1, 2...M. We then choose K chunks from this set of M possible
chunks for our chunk memory, S, by choosing without replacement and giving each
chunk label a chance of being chosen equal to the % of the items in the display that
belong to that chunk. Thus:
P(S|R, D') oc 1 Ej ...25 (R = Lj) - 25R = Lj)) (3.8)
i:siES 25 i:siS25
To calculate the chance of the display being the same given a value of R and S,
we use the following logic (similar to Pashler, 1988). The set of items encoded is all
the items assigned to any chunk that is encoded. Thus if D' f D2, and i is part of
a chunk encoded in S, we notice the change 100% of the time. If no such change is
detected, we get more and more likely to say 'same' in proportion to how many items
we have encoded from the total set of items: thus, probability of the display having
changed is:
P(CIR, S) = 1 - (0.5 + 0.5 * E ...25 A )) (3.9)25
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Chapter 4
Compression in visual working
memory: Using statistical
regularities to form more efficient
memory representations
The information we can hold in working memory is quite limited, but this capacity has
typically been studied using simple objects or letter strings with no associations be-
tween them. However, in the real world there are strong associations and regularities
in the input. In an information theoretic sense, regularities introduce redundancies
that make the input more compressible. In this chapter we show that observers can
take advantage of these redundancies, enabling them to remember more items in
working memory. In two experiments, we introduced covariance between colors in a
display so that over trials some color pairs were more likely than other color pairs.
Observers remembered more items from these displays than when the colors were
paired randomly. The improved memory performance cannot be explained by sim-
ply guessing the high probability color pair, suggesting that observers formed more
'Parts of this chapter were published as Brady, T.F, Konkle, T. & Alvarez, G.A. (2009). Com-
pression in visual working memory: Using statistical regularities to form more efficient memory
representations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
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efficient representations to remember more items. Further, as observers learned the
regularities their working memory performance improved in a way that is quanti-
tatively predicted by a Bayesian learning model and optimal encoding scheme. We
therefore suggest that the underlying capacity of their working memory is unchanged,
but the information they have to remember can be encoded in a more compressed
fashion.
4.1 Introduction
Every moment, a large amount of information from the world is transmitted to the
brain through the eyes, ears, and other sensory modalities. A great deal of research
has examined how the perceptual and cognitive system handles this overwhelming
influx of information (Neisser, 1967). Indeed, this information overload is the moti-
vating intuition for why we need selective attention: to actively filter out irrelevant
input to allow specific processing of the intended stimuli (Broadbent, 1958). However,
since the world is filled with regularities and structure, the information transmitted
to the brain is also filled with regularities (Barlow, 1989). In quantitative terms, there
is significant redundancy in the input (Huffman, 1952; Shannon, 1948). An intuitive
example of the redundancy in the visual input is to consider all the possible images
that could be made from an 8 x 8 grid where any pixel can be any color. Most of
the images will look like noise, and only a very tiny percentage of these images will
actually look like a picture of the real-world (Chandler & Field, 2007). This indicates
that real-world images are not randomly structured, and in fact share many struc-
tural similarities with each other (e.g., Burton and Moorehead, 1987; Field, 1987;
Frazor and Geisler, 2006). Interestingly, computationally efficient representations of
image-level redundancy produce basis sets that look remarkably like primary visual
cortex, providing evidence that our visual perceptual system takes advantage of this
redundancy by tuning neural response characteristics to the natural statistics of the
world (Olshausen & Field, 1996).
Being sensitive to the statistics of the input has direct consequences for memory
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as well as for perception (Anderson & Schooler, 2000). Recent work on the rational
analysis of memory, for example, suggests that the power laws of forgetting and
practice approximate an optimal Bayesian solution to the problem of memory retrieval
given the statistics of the environment (Anderson & Schooler, 1991; see also Shiffrin
& Steyvers, 1997; Shiffrin, & Steyvers, 1998). Here we apply similar principles of
rational analysis (Chater & Oaksford, 1999) to the capacity of the working memory
system. We focus on the abstract computational problem being solved by the working
memory system: the storage of as much information as possible in the limited space
available.
4.1.1 Working memory capacity and redundancy
According to information theory, in an optimal system more content can be stored if
there are redundancies in the input (Cover & Thomas, 1991). In other words, if the
input contains statistical structure and regularities, then each piece of information
we encode limits the likely possibilities for the remaining information (e.g. given a
'q', the next letter is likely to be 'u'). This makes it possible to encode more items in
less space. If the human working memory system approximates an optimal memory
system, it should be able to take advantage of statistical regularities in the input in
order to encode more items into working memory.
However, while the capacity of short-term and working memory has been exten-
sively studied (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Baddeley, 1986; Cowan, 2001, 2005;
Zhang & Luck, 2008), little formal modeling has been done to examine the effects
of redundancy on the system. Nearly all studies on visual working memory have
focused on memory for arbitrary pairings or novel stimuli. While some studies have
investigated the effects of associative learning on visual working memory capacity
(Olson & Jiang, 2004; Olson, Jiang & Moore, 2005), they have not provided clear
evidence for the use of redundancy to increase capacity. For example, one study found
evidence that learning did not increase the amount of information remembered, but
that it improved memory performance by redirecting attention to the items that were
subsequently tested (Olson, Jiang & Moore, 2005).
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4.1.2 Chunking
However, the effects of redundancy on working memory capacity have been well stud-
ied through the phenomenon of "chunking", particularly in verbal working memory
(Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956; Simon, 1974). Cowan (2001) defines a chunk as a group
of items where the intra-chunk associations are greater than the inter-chunk associ-
ations. In other words, in the sequence FBICIA the letters F, B, and I are highly
associated with each other and the letters C, I, and A are highly associated with each
other, but the letters have fewer associations across the chunk boundaries. Thus,
observers are able to recall the sequence using the chunks 'FBI' and 'CIA', effectively
taking up only 2 of the 4 'chunks' that people are able to store in memory (Cowan,
2001; Cowan, Chen, Rouder, 2004). By comparison, when the letters are random,
say HSGABJ, they are more difficult to remember, since it is more difficult to chunk
them into coherent, associated units.
Chunking is not usually framed as a form of compression analogous to informa-
tion theoretic views. In fact, in the seminal work of Miller (1956), chunking and
information theoretic views of memory were explicitly contrasted, and the most nave
information theoretic view was found lacking in its ability to explain the capacity of
working memory. However, at its root chunking approximates a form of compression:
it replaces highly correlated items (which are therefore highly redundant with each
other), with a single chunk that represents all of the items. Thus, it is possible to
frame the strategy of chunking as a psychological implementation of a broader com-
putational idea: removal of redundancy to form compressed representations and allow
more items to be stored in memory. At this level of description, chunking is compat-
ible with information theoretic analyses. In fact, information theory and Bayesian
probability theory may be able to explain exactly when human observers will form a
chunk in long-term memory (e.g., Orban, Fiser, Aslin & Lengyel, 2008), in addition
to how useful that chunk will be to subsequent working memory tasks. Thus, infor-
mation theory may be not only compatible with chunking, but in fact may provide
useful constraints on theories of chunking.
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In the present experiments we asked whether human observers learn and use regu-
larities in working memory in a way that is compatible with an information theoretic
compression analysis. In two experiments we present observers with displays of colors
that are either random or patterned. By presenting regularities in the display over
the course of the experiment, we examine if and how observers take advantage of
these regularities to form more efficient representations. We then present a quan-
titative model of how learning occurs and how the stimuli are encoded using the
learned regularities. We show that more items can be successfully stored in visual
working memory if there are redundancies (patterns) in the input. We also show
that this learning is compatible with the compressibility of the displays according to
information theory.
4.2 Experiment 1: Regularities Within Objects
In classic visual working memory experiments, the stimuli used are generally colored
oriented lines, shapes, and circles with colors, and the aim is to quantify how many
objects or features can be remembered. In one of the seminal papers in this field,
Luck and Vogel (1997) proposed that people can remember four objects no matter
how many features they contain. This view has since been tempered, with some
arguing for independent storage of different feature dimensions (Magnussen, Greenlee
& Thomas, 1996; Olson & Jiang, 2002; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002) and
others arguing for more graded representations, in which information load determines
how many objects can be stored (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008).
However, nearly all current work emphasizes that at best 3 or 4 features from a given
stimulus dimension can be encoded successfully.
Here we modify the standard paradigm by introducing regularities in the displays
for some observers. One group of participants was presented with colors drawn ran-
domly, as in classical visual working memory tasks, such that all possible pairs of
colors were equally likely to occur. A second group of participants were presented
with colors that occurred most often paired with another color. For example, a par-
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1000 ms -+ 1000 ms -+ Until Response
Figure 4-1: A sample trial from Experiment 1. Eight colors were presented within
four objects. The colors disappeared for one second and then either the inside or
outside of an object was cued by making it darker. Observers had to indicate what
color was at the cued location.
ticular observer might see red most often around yellow, white most often around
blue, while a smaller percentage of the time these colors appear with any other color.
Because this manipulation introduces redundancy into the displays, in information-
theoretic terms these displays contain less information. An information theoretic view
of memory therefore predicts that the observers presented with regularities should be
able to encode more items into memory.
4.2.1 Method
Observers
Twenty naive observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool (age range
18-35) and received 10 dollars for their participation. All observers gave informed
consent.
Procedure
Observers were presented with displays consisting of four objects around the fixation
point (see sample display in Figure 4-1). Each object was made up of two different
colored circles, with one circle inside the other. Observers were informed that their
task was to remember the locations of each of the eight colors. At the start of a trial,
the colors appeared and remained visible for 10OOms. Then the colors disappeared,
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with placeholder circles present for the next 1000ms (long enough to prevent observers
from relying on iconic memory; Sperling, 1960), and then either the inside or outside
circle on a random object was darkened.
The task was to indicate which of the eight colors had been presented at the
indicated location, by pressing one of eight color-coded keys. Observers completed
600 trials, presented in 10 blocks of 60 trials each. Afterward, they completed a
questionnaire, reporting the strategies they employed and whether they noticed the
presence of patterns in the displays.
The stimuli were presented using MATLAB with the Psychophysics toolbox ex-
tensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The eight colors used were red, green, blue,
magenta, cyan, yellow, black and white.
Manipulation
Observers were randomly assigned to two groups, patterned and uniform, which dif-
fered in how the colors for each trial were chosen. For observers in the uniform
condition, the locations of the colors in each trial were chosen randomly, with only
the constraint that each color had to appear exactly once in a display.
For observers in the patterned condition, the stimuli for each trial were not cho-
sen randomly. First, for each subject a joint probability matrix was constructed to
indicate how likely each color was to appear inside and outside of each other color.
This matrix was made by choosing four high probability pairs at random (probability
= 0.2151), and then assigning the rest of the probability mass uniformly (probability
= 0.0027). As in the uniform condition, all eight colors were present in each display.
In order to achieve this, the diagonal of the joint probability matrix was set to zero
in order to prevent the same color from appearing twice in the same display.
The pairs were constrained so that each color was assigned to exactly one high
probability pair. For example, if (Blue-outside, Red-inside) was a high probability
pair in this joint probability matrix, the observer would often see blue and red appear
together, in that configuration. However, blue and red each would also sometimes
appear with other colors, or in a different configuration. So, for example, (Blue-
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outside, Yellow inside) and (Red-outside, Blue-inside) could also appear with low
probability. High probability pairs accounted for approximately 80% of the pairs
shown during the experiment, and low probability pairs constituted the other 20%.
In the final block of the experiment in the patterned condition, the distribution
from which the displays were drawn was changed to a uniform distribution. This
eliminated the regularities in the display, and allowed us to assess whether observers
had used the regularities to improve their performance. Further, this manipulation
gives a quantitative measure of learning: the difference in performance between block
9 and block 10.
4.2.2 Results
We estimated the number of colors observers could successfully hold in memory using
the following formula for capacity given an eight-alternative forced choice (see the
Appendix for a derivation of this formula):
K = ((PC*8 *8) -8)/7
By correcting for chance we can examine exactly how many colors from each
display observers would have had to remember in order to achieve a given percent
correct (PC). It should be noted that K is a way of quantifying the number of colors
remembered that does not necessarily reflect what observers actually represent about
the displays. For instance, observers may have all 8 colors with uncertainty rather
than some subset of the colors with perfect certainty (see, for example, Wilken & Ma,
2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; however, see Rouder et al. 2008, Zhang & Luck, 2008,
for evidence of discrete fixed-resolution representations).
Performance Across Groups
Observers in the uniform condition remembered 2.7 colors on average throughout the
experiment (see Figure 4-2). This is consistent with previous results on the capacity
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Figure 4-2: Results of Experiment 1. Error bars correspond to +/ - 1 s.e.m.
of visual working memory for colors (e.g. Vogel & Awh, 2008, in which the K values
varied from less than 1 to more than 6 across 170 individuals, M = 2.9, SD = 1).
Critically, we found that observers in the patterned condition could successfully
remember K = 5.4 colors after learning the regularities in the displays (block 9).
This memory capacity is significantly higher than the K = 3.0 colors they were able
to remember when the displays were changed to be uniformly distributed in block 10
(See Figure 4-2; two-tailed t-test, t(9) = 4.90, p=0.0009; note that this is a within-
subjects test, and so the between-subject error bars on Figure 4-2 underestimate the
reliability of this effect). In addition, capacity for colors increased significantly across
the first nine blocks of the experiment: one-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(8,72)
= 12.28, p<0.0001. There was also a significant interaction between color capacity
in the uniform condition and color capacity in the patterned condition across blocks,
with observers in the patterned condition increasing their capacity more over time:
F(8,144) = 2.85, p=0.006.
Seven of ten observers in the patterned condition reported noticing regular pat-
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terns in the display. The magnitude of the decrease in memory performance from
block 9 to 10 was the same for observers who explicitly noticed the regularities
(M=26%) and those who did not (M=27%), and 9 of 10 observers showed such de-
creases (Mean decrease across all observers = 26%). In addition, one of ten observers
in the uniform condition reported noticing regular patterns in the configuration of
colors, although no such patterns existed.
Post-perceptual inference
One concern is that observers might simply have remembered one color from each
pair and then inferred what the other colors were after the display was gone. This
would suggest that observers were actually only remembering three or four colors and
were using a post-perceptual guessing strategy to achieve a higher performance in the
memory test. This makes two predictions. First, when a color from a low probability
pair is tested (20% of the time), observers should guess wrong and thus should show
worse performance on these pairs over time. Second, on these trials they should guess
wrong in a specific waythat is, they should guess the high-probability color of the item
in the adjacent location. For example, if an observer only remembers the outside of
color of an object was blue, and the inside color is tested, they should wrongly infer
and report the high probability color that is often paired with blue.
To test these two predictions, we separated out trials where the tested item was
from a high probability pair from those where the tested item was from a low proba-
bility pair. In other words, if blue often appeared inside red, we considered only the
20% of trials where blue appeared with another color or in another configuration. On
these trials, an explicit inference process would cause observers to report the wrong
color. However, we still find that performance improved over blocks (See Figure 4-3).
Capacity (K), the number of colors remembered, is significantly greater in block 9,
when the low-probability pairs are in the context of high probability pairs, than block
10, than when all the pairs are low-probability (t(9) = 4.08, p=0.003).
We next analyzed trials in the first 9 blocks where a color from a low probability
pair was tested and observers answered incorrectly (on average there were 35 such
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Figure 4-3: Results of Experiment 1 when only considering cases where the colors
appeared in low probability pairings. Error bars correspond to +/-1 s.e.m. The dark
squares represent data from observers in the patterned condition for the 20% of trials
where a low probability pair was tested; the gray circles represent the data from
observers in the uniform condition. The gray circle in block 10 corresponds to 100%
of trials, since all pairs were low-probability.
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trials per observer, for a total of 350 such trials across all 10 observers in the first
experiment). If observers do not know what color was present and are explicitly infer-
ring what was on the display using the high-probability pairings, then their responses
should more often reflect the high-probability color of the adjacent item. However,
on these trials, observers reported the high probability color of the adjacent item only
9% of the time (where chance is 1/7, or 14%). Further, observers wrongly report the
high probability color of the tested color only 2% of the time. In fact, the only sys-
tematic trend on these low-probability error trials is that observers tend to swap the
inner and outer colors much more often than chance: 41% of the time when observers
were incorrect, they mistakenly reported the adjacent color. Interestingly, the rate of
swaps with the adjacent color was lower in the high probability pairs: on trials where
a high probability pair was tested, only 27% of error trials were explained by observers
incorrectly reporting the adjacent color. This could be taken to suggest that the high
probability pairs tend to be encoded as a single perceptual unit or chunk.
This analysis strongly argues against a post-perceptual account of increased mem-
ory capacity, where unencoded items are inferred during the testing stage. Not only
do observers mostly get trials with the low probability pairs correct - suggesting they
are not performing post-perceptual inference - but even on the trials where they do
make mistakes, they do not tend to report the associated high probability colors, as
would be predicted by an inference account.
Instead we suggest that observers learned to encode the high probability pairs
using a more efficient representation. For example, suppose a display contains two
high probability pairs and two low probability pairs. Over time, the high probability
items are encoded more efficiently, leaving more memory resources for the low prob-
ability items. Such an account explains why even colors presented in low probability
pairs show improved memory performance relative to the uniform group, but only
when they are on the same displays as high probability pairs. In addition, an analy-
sis across trials demonstrates that, on trials with more high probability pairs in the
display, more items were successfully encoded (K = 3.2, 3.2, 3.6, 4.0, 4.7 for 0, 1, 2,
3, and 4 high probability pairs in the display, averaged across the entire experiment).
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This increase in capacity as a function of the number of high probability pairs was
significant, F(4,36) = 4.25, p=0.0065. Furthermore, the only difference between dis-
plays containing 3 or 4 high probability pairs is whether the remaining pair's colors
are presented in the proper inner-outer configuration. Nevertheless, there was a trend
for performance in these two conditions to differ, suggesting that learning may have
been specific to the spatial configuration (t(9) = 1.78; p = 0.11). Together with the
fact that observers did not often flip the inner and outer color of the high probability
pairs, this suggests that observers may have been encoding the inner and outer colors
as a single bound unit or chunk.
4.2.3 Discussion
The present results indicate that, if we consider working memory capacity in terms
of the number of colors remembered, observers were able to use the regularities in
the displays to increase their capacity past what has been assumed to be a fixed limit
of approximately three or four colors. When colors are redundant with each other
(i.e., are correlated with each other), then observers can successfully encode more
than simply 3 or 4 colors. This suggests that the information content of the stimuli is
incredibly important to determining how many can be successfully stored (see Alvarez
& Cavanagh, 2004 for converging evidence of fewer high-information-load items being
stored).
These data can also be interpreted with respect to current psychological constructs
for analyzing the capacity of visual working memory ('slots') and working memory
more broadly ('chunks'). In visual working memory, it has been argued that objects
with multiple features (e.g. color and orientation) can be stored in a single slot as
effectively as objects with only a single feature (Luck & Vogel, 1997, Vogel, Woodman,
& Luck, 2001). In these models, the unit of memory is thus considered an 'object', a
collection of features that are spatiotemporally contiguous (Luck & Vogel, 1997; see
Scholl, 2001, for evidence pertaining to the definition of objects in mid-level vision).
However, it has been found that memory for objects with two values along a single
feature dimension does not show the expected within-object advantage, suggesting
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that what can be stored in a slot is a single value along each feature dimension, rather
than an entire object (e.g. a single object with two colors on it, as in the present
experiment, is not represented in a single slot; see Olson & Jiang, 2002; Wheeler &
Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002 for further discussion). This is consistent with the present
data from the uniform group, where capacity was 3 colors rather than 3 multi-color
objects (6 colors).
The data from the patterned group represent a challenge to this view. The ability
of the patterned group to remember up to 6 colors represents a capacity of more than
a single color per object, suggesting that capacity cannot be fixed to 3-4 objects with
a single value along each feature dimension. Instead, the present data can be framed
in terms of a slot-model only if slots can hold not just one color, but multiple colors
from the same object as the objects are learned over time. In this sense, slots of
visual working memory become more like 'chunks' in the broader working memory
literature (Cowan, 2001). We return to this issue in Experiment 2, when we explore
whether these regularities can be used when they are present across objects.
We next performed an information theoretic analysis of the current data to ex-
amine if observers have a fixed working memory capacity when measured in bits. We
can estimate the amount of redundancy in the displays to test the hypothesis that
observers actually have the same amount of resources to allocate in both uniform and
patterned conditions. On this account, the difference in memory performance comes
from the fact that the patterned displays allow observers to allocate their memory
space more effectively. This allows us to make quantitative predictions about working
memory capacity given a specific amount of redundancy in the display.
4.3 Modeling
Modeling provides a formal framework for theories of compression, and allows us to
test the hypothesis that there is a limit of visual working memory capacity not in
terms of the number of colors that can be remembered, but in terms of the amount of
information required to encode those colors. The modeling has four stages. First, we
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model how observers might learn the color regularities based on the number of times
they saw each pair of colors. The probability of each color pair is estimated with a
Bayesian model that accounts for the frequency with which each color pair appeared,
plus a prior probability that the colors will be paired uniformly. Second, we assess
how these learned statistics translate into representations in bits, using Huffman
coding (Huffman, 1952). Huffman coding is a way of using the probabilities of a set
of symbols to create a binary code for representing those symbols in a compressed
format. This allowed us to estimate the number of bits required to encode each item
on the display. Third, we show that the information theoretic model successfully
predicts observers data, suggesting they perform near optimal compression. Finally,
we show that a discrete chunking model can also fit the data. Importantly, the best
fitting chunking model is one that closely approximates the information theoretic
optimal. MATLAB code implementing the model can be downloaded from the first
authors website.
4.3.1 Learning the color pairs
We used a Dirichlet-multinomial model (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003) to
infer the probability distribution that the stimuli were being drawn from, given the
color pairs that had been observed. We let d equal the observations of color pairs.
Thus, if the trial represented in Figure 4-1 is the first trial of the experiment, after this
trial d = 1 Yellow-Green, 1 Black-White, 1 Blue-Red, 1 Magenta-Cyan. We assume
that d is sampled from a multinomial distribution with parameter 0. In other words,
we assume that at any point in the experiment, the set of stimuli we have seen so
far is a result of repeated rolls of a weighted 64 sided die (one for each cell in the
joint probability matrix; i.e., one for each color pair), where the chance of landing
on the ith side of the 64 sided die is given by O6. Note that this is a simplification,
since the experiment included the additional constraint that no color could appear
multiple times in the same display. However, this constraint does not have a major
effect on the expected distribution of stimuli once a large number of samples has been
obtained, and was thus ignored in our formalization.
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We set our a priori expectations about 0 using a Dirichlet distribution with pa-
rameter a. The larger a is, the more strongly the model starts off assuming that the
true distribution of the stimuli is a uniform distribution. The alpha parameter can
be approximately interpreted as the number of trials the observers imagine having
seen from a uniform distribution before the start of the experiment. Using statistical
notation, the model can be written as:
.6 ~ Dirichlet(a)
d ~ Multinomial(6)
To fit the model to data we set a fixed a and assume that the counts of the
pairs that were shown, d, are observed for some time period of the experiment. Our
goal is to compute the posterior distribution p(O|d, a). The mean of this posterior
distribution is an observers best guess at the true probability distribution that the
stimuli are being drawn from, and the variance in the posterior indicates how certain
the observer is about their estimate. The posterior of this model reduces to a Dirichlet
posterior where the weight for each color pair is equal to the frequency with which
that color pair appears in d, plus the prior on that pair, a1 .
4.3.2 Encoding the color pairs
Any finite set of options can be uniquely encoded into a string of bits. For example, if
we wished to encode strings consisting of the four letters A, B, C, and D into strings
of bits, we could do so by assigning a unique two bit code to each letter and then
concatenating the codes. Imagine we had assigned the following codes to the letters:
A = 00, B = 01, C = 10, D = 11. The string ACAABAA could then be written as
00100000010000 (14 bits), and uniquely decoded to retrieve the original string.
Importantly, however, this nave method of generating a code performs quite badly
in the case where some letters are much more likely to appear than others. A better
method gives items that occur most frequently the shortest codes, while less frequent
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items are assigned longer codes. So, for example, if P(A) = 0.5, and P(B) = 0.2,
P(C) = 0.2, and P(D) = 0.1, then we can achieve a great deal of compression by
representing strings from this language using a different code: A = 0, B = 10, C
= 110, D = 111. Using this code, the string from above, ACAABAA, would be
represented as 0110001000 (10 bits), a significant savings even for such a short string
(29%). Note that it can still be uniquely decoded, because no items code is the same
as the beginning of a different items code.
Huffman coding (Huffman, 1952) is a way of using the probabilities of a set of sym-
bols to create a binary code for representing those symbols in a compressed format.
(as in the example of A, B, C, D above). Here, we used Huffman coding to estimate
how much savings observers should show as a result of the fact that the color pairs
in our experiment were drawn from a non-uniform distribution. In the Appendix, we
demonstrate that the same results also hold for another way of assessing compression
using self-information.
We used the probabilities of each color pair, as assessed by the Bayesian model
described above, to generate a unique bit string encoding the stimuli on each trial,
averaged for each block of the experiment. We supposed that if observers were us-
ing some form of compression to take advantage of the redundancies in the display,
the length of the code that our compression algorithm generates should be inversely
proportional to how many objects observers were able to successfully encode. In
other words, if there were many low frequency color pairs presented (as in block 10),
these items should have longer codes, and observers should be able to successfully
remember fewer of them. Alternatively, if there are many high frequency color pairs
presented, the better they should be able to compress the input, and the more colors
they remember.
4.3.3 Information theory
With these learning and coding models, we can compute a prediction about the
memory performance for each subject for each block. In order to assess the fit between
the model and the behavioral data, we used the following procedure. For each display
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Figure 4-4: The average length of the Huffman code for a single color, by block.
in a block, we calculated the number of bits required to encode that display based on
the probabilities from the learning model. Next, we correlated the average number of
bits per display from the model with the memory performance of the observers. We
expect that the fewer bits/display needed, the better observers memory performance,
and thus we expect a negative correlation.
This prediction holds quite well, with the maximum fit between this Huffman code
model and the human data at a = 34, where r, the correlation coefficient between
the human and model data, is -0.96 (See Figure 4-4; p<0.0001). This large negative
correlation means that when the model predicts there should be long bit strings
necessary to encode the stimuli, human visual working memory stores a low number of
items. This is exactly as you would expect if visual working memory took advantage of
a compression scheme to eliminate redundant information. In addition, this modeling
suggests that if observers encoded the displays completely optimally, they would be
able to remember approximately 6.1 colors. By block 9, observers are remembering
5.4 colors on average, significantly better than with no compression at all, but not
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Figure 4-5: The correlation between the information theoretic model and the human
behavioral data as a function of the value of the prior, a.
quite at the theoretically maximal compression.
The fit between the human data and the model is reasonably good across a broad
range of values for the prior probability of a uniform distribution (see Figure 4-5).
The fit is not as high where the prior is very low, since with no prior there is no
learning curve the model immediately decides that whatever stimuli it has seen are
completely representative of the distribution (as a non-Bayesian model would do).
The fit is also poor where the prior is very high, because it never learns anything
about the distribution of the stimuli, instead generating codes the entire time as
though the distribution was uniform. However, across much of the middle range, the
model provides a reasonable approximation to human performance.
Importantly, this model allows us to examine if there is a fixed information limit
on memory capacity. The Huffman codes provide a measure of the average number
of bits per object, and the memory performance gives a measure in number of colors
remembered. Thus, if we multiply the average bits / item specified by the Huffman
code times the number of items remembered, we get an estimate of the number
of bits of information a given set of observers recalled in a given block (Figure 4-
6). Notice first that both groups of observers in the uniform condition and the
patterned condition show roughly the same total capacity in bits, despite the overall
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Figure 4-6: The size of memory estimated in bits, rather than number of colors (using
the Huffman coding model). Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
difference in the number of items remembered between the groups. Second, the
total bit estimate remains remarkably constant between block 9 and block 10 in the
patterned group, even though the memory performance measured in number of colors
showed a significant cost when the statistical regularities were removed. Thus, while
the patterned group was able to remember more colors throughout the experiment,
this increase was completely explained in the model by the fact that the items to be
remembered were more redundant and presumably took less space in memory.
4.3.4 Chunking model
The information theoretic modeling gives a way of formally specifying how com-
pressible a set of input is given the accumulated statistics about the previous input.
Huffman coding and self-information are ways to formalize this, and are thus a form
of rational analysis or computational theory, specifying the optimal solution to the
computational problem facing the observer (Anderson, 1990; Marr, 1982). Interest-
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ingly, we find that observers closely approximate this optimum. However, Huffman
coding and self-information are not meant as serious candidates for the psychological
mechanism people use for implementing such compression. Indeed, it is a different
level of analysis to understand what psychological algorithms and representations are
actually responsible for allowing more items to be encoded in memory when those
items are redundant with each other. For instance, is the nature of the compression
graded over time, or all-or-none?
In the information theoretic models (Huffman coding, self-information), the 'cost'
of encoding each color pair is equal to the log of the chance of seeing that pair relative
to the chance of seeing any other pair. This is the optimal cost for encoding items if
they appear with a given probability, and provides for graded compression of a color
pair as the items probability of co-occurrence increases. However, the actual psycho-
logical mechanism that people use to remember more items could be either graded as
in the rational analysis, or could function as a discrete approximation to this optimum
by sometimes encoding highly associated items into a single representation. Chunking
models are one way of approaching this kind of discrete approximation (e.g., Cowan
et al. 2004). They show increased memory capacity for highly associated items, but
convert the compressibility to a discrete form: either a single chunk is encoded or the
two colors are separately encoded into two chunks. This distinction between graded
compression and all-or-none compression is important because it predicts what is ac-
tually encoded by an observer in a single trial. The current results do not address this
distinction directly, however, since we do not examine the representational format of
the color pairs on each trial. However, there is a broad literature with a preference for
viewing compression in working memory as based on discrete chunking (e.g., Cowan,
2005; Chase & Simon, 1973; Miller, 1956; however, see Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004;
Bays & Husain, 2008; and Wilken & Ma, 2004, for support for a graded view). Thus,
we sought to examine whether our data could be accurately modeled using this kind
of approximation to the information theoretic analysis presented above.
To implement a simple chunking model, one needs to determine a threshold at
which associated items become a chunk. The most naive chunking model is one in
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which observers reach some fixed threshold of learning that a pair of colors co-occur
and treat them as a chunk thereafter (perhaps after this new chunk enters long-term
memory). However, this simple model provides a poor fit to the current data. In such
a model, each subject will have a strong step-like function in their graph, and the
graded form of the group data will arise from averaging across observers. However, in
the present data, single observers showed a graded increase in performance by block,
suggesting this kind of model does not accurately represent the data.
A more sophisticated class of chunking models have a probabilistic threshold,
allowing for a single observer to treat each color pair as one chunk more often if they
strongly believe it is a chunk, and less often if they are unsure if it is a chunk. In the
case where the chance of chunking in such a model is logarithmically proportional
to the association between the items, this chunking model is exactly equivalent to
a thresholded version of the information theoretic compression model and therefore
makes the same predictions across large numbers of trials. However, a chunking
model could also assume that the possibility of chunking is linearly proportional to
the association between the items (Pchunk(ij) -- * Oi,j), in which case it would be
possible that the chunking models fit would differ significantly from that of the more
ideal compression algorithms. We do not find this to be the case for the current
experiment.
The graph from the best fit linear chunking model is shown in Figure 4-7. The
best fit constant of proportionality was 15, which provided a fit to the data of r=-
0.90 (e.g., for each pair, the chance of being chunked on any given trial was equal
to 15 * 2,5j, such that once the probability of seeing a given color pair was greater
than 1/15th, that color pair was always encoded as a single chunk). Interestingly,
this constant of proportionality, because it causes such a steep increase in the chance
of chunking even at very low associations and plateaus at a 100% chance of chunking
by the time the association reaches 1/15, or 0.067, approximates the shape of a
logarithmic curve. The correlation between the probability of chunking under this
linear model and the optimal cost function derived via information theory (using
self-information) is therefore approximately r=-0.73. This model thus provides an
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Figure 4-7: The size of memory (in chunks) for Experiment 1 estimated using the
probabilistic linear chunking model. Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
excellent approximation to the ideal compression algorithm as well.
Thus, we find that the best chunk-model matches the data well and generates a
flat estimate of the number of chunks needed across the entire experiment. Impor-
tantly, however, the expected probability of chunking in this model closely matches
the optimal information-theoretic cost function (higher cost = lower probability of
chunking). This is to be expected because the information theoretic model predicted
92 percent of the variance in the behavioral data. This suggests that chunking can
be usefully thought of as a discrete approximation to an ideal compression algorithm,
and therefore can be thought of as a possible psychological implementation of com-
pression.
It is important to note that, despite the assumptions we make in this modeling
section, it unlikely that the degree of association between items determines when they
form chunks in long-term memory. Instead, it may be that human chunk learning
depends on how useful a particular chunk would be in describing the world while
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avoiding suspicious coincidences (see, for example, Orban et al. 2008, which provides
an elegant Bayesian analysis of this problem). Our analysis of chunking here is meant
only as a proof of concept that chunking models in general implement a form of
compression that approximates the true information theoretic optimum.
4.3.5 Discussion
The modeling work we present illustrates two main conclusions: First, compression
of redundancies must be taken into account when quantifying human visual working
memory capacity; Second, this compression can be modeled either in a graded fashion,
or in an all-or-none fashion ('probabilistic chunking') which closely approximates ideal
compression algorithms.
The fact that the estimate of the amount of information observers are able to store
is constant across the entire experiment, whereas the estimate in terms of number of
colors varies a great deal, suggests that compression of redundancies must be taken
into account when quantifying human visual working memory capacity. In addition,
it is important to note that fitting our information theoretic model by minimizing
the correlation to the data is not guaranteed to provide a fit that results in a flat line
in terms of the total information remembered. In fact, in most instances a negative
correlation will not lead to a flat estimate across the experiment, since a flat line
additionally depends on the proportional amount of the decrease at each step. The
information theoretic modeling results provide significant evidence that the capacity
of working memory is a fixed amount of information. Because the chunking model
is the discrete version of an optimal compression scheme, this model leads to a fixed
capacity measured in discrete units ('chunks') just as the information theoretic model
let to a fixed capacity measured in continuous information ('bits').
While our model suggests a working memory capacity of 10 bits, this number
should not be taken as indicative of limits on human performance. The exact number
10 bits depends critically on assumptions about how the colors are encoded (3 bits/-
color in our model, given the 8 possible color choices). Importantly, however, the fact
that the estimate of memory size is constant across the experiment and across condi-
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tions does not depend on our choice of encoding scheme, but only on the redundancy
inherent in the associations between colors. If observers actually required 100 bits
to encode each color then our estimate of capacity in bits would change to be about
300 bits but the estimate would still remain consistent across the experiment, since
each color still provides the same proportional amount of information about each
other color. Thus, it is safe to conclude that our results are compatible with a fixed
amount of information limiting memory performance, but it is difficult to quantify
the exact number of bits without specifying the true coding model (see the General
Discussion for further discussion of the problem of specifying an encoding scheme).
4.4 Experiment 2: Regularities Between Objects
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine if compression can affect encoding across
objects as well as within objects. This experiment was very similar to Experiment 1,
with the only difference being how the colors were presented on the display. In Ex-
periment 2, colors were presented side-by-side as separate objects, in close proximity
but not spatially contiguous.
While there are many possible definitions of 'object', we use the term to refer
to a specific well-defined definition of what counts as an object for mid-level vision.
Specifically, an object is a spatiotemporally contiguous collection of visual features
(Scholl, 2001; Spelke, 1990). This definition is motivated by both neuropsychological
and behavioral evidence (Behrmann & Tipper, 1994; Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994;
Mattingley, Davis, & Driver, 1997; Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001; Watson &
Kramer, 1999). For example, simply connecting two circles with a line to form a
dumbbell can induce 'object-based neglect,' in which the left half of the dumbbell is
neglected regardless of the half of the visual field in which it is presented (Behrmann
& Tipper, 1994). If these two circles are not connected, neglect does not operate
in an object-based manner. Thus, on this definition of what counts as an object,
the displays of Experiment 1 contained 4 objects while the displays of Experiment 2
contained 8 objects (see Figure 4-8).
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Figure 4-8: A sample trial from Experiment 2. Eight colors were presented and then
disappeared, and after 1 second, one location was cued by making it darker. Observers
had to indicate what color was at the cued location.
In the present experiment, we examined whether or not working memory capac-
ity can take advantage of the statistics between objects. If visual working memory
capacity limits are 'object-based', i.e. if capacity is constrained by mid-level visual
objects, then observers will not be able to take advantage of regularities across ob-
jects. However, if multiple visual objects can be stored together, (akin to 'chunks' of
letters, as in FBI-CIA), then people will be able to remember more colors from the
display as they learn the statistics of the input.
4.4.1 Method
Observers
Twenty naive observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool (age range
18-35) and received 10 dollars for their participation. All gave informed consent.
Procedure
Observers were presented with displays consisting of eight objects arranged in four
pairs around the fixation point (see sample display in Figure 4-8). Each object was
made up of only one colored circle. Here the two associated colors appeared on
separate objects, but we provided a grouping cue in order to not significantly increase
the difficulty of the learning problem. All other aspects of the stimuli and procedure
were identical to those of Experiment 1.
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4.4.2 Results
Performance Across Groups
Observers in the uniform condition remembered K = 3.4 colors on average throughout
the experiment (see Figure 4-9), consistent with previous results on the capacity of
visual working memory for colors (Vogel & Awh, 2008), and the results of Experiment
1.
We found that observers in the patterned condition could successfully remember
K = 5.4 colors after learning the regularities in the displays (block 9). This memory
capacity is significantly higher than the K = 3.3 colors they were able to remember
when the displays were changed to be uniformly distributed in block 10 (See Figure
4-9; t(9) = 9.72, p<0.0001). In addition, capacity increased significantly across the
first nine blocks of the experiment: F(8,72) = 7.68, p<0.0001. There was a significant
interaction across blocks between capacity in the uniform condition and capacity in
the patterned condition, with observers in the patterned condition remembering more
colors over time: F(8,144) = 2.27, p=0.025.
Eight of ten observers reported noticing regular patterns in the display. The
magnitude of the decrease in memory performance from block 9 to 10 was the same
for observers who explicitly noticed the regularities (M=22%) and those who did not
(M=23%), and 9 of 10 observers showed such decreases (mean decrease across all
observers 23%). Three of ten observers in the uniform condition reported noticing
regular patterns in the configuration of colors, although no such patterns were present.
We once again separated out trials where the tested item was from a high proba-
bility pair from those where the tested item was from a low probability pair. When
we examine only the low probability trials, we still find that capacity in block 9 is
significantly higher than in block 10 (4.9 colors in block 9 and 3.4 colors in block
10; t(9)=4.84, p=0.0009). Thus, as with Experiment 1, we do not find evidence
that people are remembering more items from the display by using post-perceptual
inference.
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Figure 4-9: Results of Experiment 2. Error bars correspond to +/-1 s.e.m.
Performance Across Experiments
We compared the first 9 blocks in the patterned condition to the first 9 blocks in the
patterned condition of Experiment 1. There were no main effects or interactions, all F
< 1. Furthermore, we compared the drop in performance between block 9 and block
10 across the two experiments. The size of the drop was not significantly different,
t(9) = 0.58, p=0.58, suggesting that learning was of a comparable magnitude in both
experiments. Verbal Interference
One potential concern is that observers could have used some verbal memory
capacity to augment their visual working memory in either the current experiment or
Experiment 1. Many past studies have found that estimates of visual working memory
capacity are similar with and without verbal interference (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997;
Vogel et al. 2001). However, because of the added element of learning regularities in
our experiments, we decided to test the effects of verbal interference on our paradigm.
Because of the similarities between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we ran a control
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experiment using only the paradigm of Experiment 2.
This control experiment was conducted with 7 observers using an identical paradigm
to Experiment 2s patterned condition, but with the addition of a verbal interference
task (remembering 4 consonants throughout the duration of the trial, with a new set
of 4 consonants every 10 trials). Observers successfully performed both the verbal
interference task and the visual working memory task, with a capacity of 4.5 colors
in block 9 but only 3.2 colors in block 10 (t(6) = 2.1; p=0.08). Capacity in block 9
under verbal interference was not significantly different than that obtained in block
9 of Experiment 2 (t(9) = 1.07, p=0.3 1). These data show that observers are still
capable of learning the regularities to remember more colors, when subject to verbal
interference in a challenging dual-task setting.
Modeling
We once again modeled these results to see if they were compatible with a model in
which compression is explained via information theory. The maximum fit between the
Huffman code model and the human data occurred at a = 31 where r, the correlation
coefficient between the human and model data, is -0.96 (p < 0.0001). This large
negative correlation means that when the model predicts there should be long bit
strings necessary to encode the stimuli, observers memory capacity in terms of the
number of colors remembered is low. This is exactly what one would expect if visual
working memory had a fixed size in bits and took advantage of a compression scheme
to eliminate redundant information.
In addition, this model allows us to once again examine if there is a fixed-bit limit
on memory capacity. The Huffman codes gives a measure of average bits per object,
and the memory performance gives a measure in number of objects remembered. As
in Experiment 1, multiplying the average size of the Huffman code times the number
of items remembered gives us an estimate of the number of bits of information a given
set of observers recalled in a given block (Figure 4-10). Notice that once again both
the groups of observers in the uniform condition and the patterned condition show
the same total capacity in bits, despite the overall difference in the number of items
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Figure 4-10: The size of memory estimated in bits, rather than number of objects
(using the Huffman coding model). Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
remembered between the groups. Second, the total bit estimate remains remarkably
constant between block 9 and block 10 in the patterned group, even though the
memory performance measured in number of items showed a significant cost when
the statistical regularities were removed.
One interesting prediction of the model is that the patterned group should actually
be worse at block 10 than the uniform group, since the patterned group now has a set
of statistics in mind that are no longer optimal for the displays. Indeed, the pattern in
the behavioral data trends this way, but the difference between both groups in block
10 is not significant (See Figure 4-9; t(9) = 0.64; p=0.4 7 ). One possible explanation
for why performance for the patterned group does not fall completely below the
uniform group is that observers notice that their model has become inappropriate
after several trials in block 10, and begin using a relatively local estimate of the
probability distribution (e.g., across the last few trials), or revert to a uniform model.
This suggests a good deal of flexibility in the model observers use to encode the
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Figure 4-11:
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The size of memory (in chunks) for Experiment 2 estimated using the
linear chunking model. Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
display.
In addition, we modeled these results using a probabilistic chunking model where
the chance of chunking was linearly proportional to the probability of the color pair.
Using the same parameters as in Experiment 1, this model too provided a good fit
to the data (r=0.94; see Figure 4-11), and it produced an almost flat estimate of the
number of chunks over time in both groups.
4.4.3 Discussion
Observers in the patterned group were able to successfully take advantage of the re-
dundancy in the displays, as their capacity increased significantly over time. These
data, as well as the estimated capacity in bits from the modeling, reveal strikingly
similar patterns between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. This suggests that ob-
servers were equally able to take advantage of the redundancy in the displays when
the redundancies were present between adjacent mid-level visual objects rather than
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within such objects.
This experiment has some implications for the classic slot-model of visual working
memory (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008). Specifically, a strict interpre-
tation that one slot can hold only one mid-level visual object from the display does
not account for the present data. The patterned group was able to remember more
objects over time, so the capacity of working memory cannot be a fixed number of
mid-level visual objects. However, if multiple objects can fit into one slot, then the
present data can be accounted for. Indeed, this suggests that 'slots' in visual working
memory should be viewed similarly to 'chunks' in verbal working memory (Cowan,
2001). Thus, in the present experiment 'visual chunks' could be formed that consist of
pairs of colored objects (see also Orban et al., 2008 for evidence of statistical learning
of chunks of multiple objects). Of course, another possibility is that working memory
capacity should be thought of as graded, rather than based on chunks or slots at all
(e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays & Husain, 2009). This
would make it more closely approximate the information theoretic ideal and would
account for the present data directly.
An important factor in the present experiment is that we provided a grouping cue
for observers, by putting the two colors that will co-vary in closer proximity to each
other than to the other colors. We expect that learning would still be possible even if
the items were not specifically grouped, as others have demonstrated that statistical
learning can operate across objects, even in cases when the display is unparsed, and
that such learning results in the formation of visual chunks (Fiser & Aslin, 2001;
Fiser & Aslin, 2005; Orban et al., 2008; see also Baker et al., 2004). However, our
aim in this experiment was not to create a difficult learning situation; rather, our
aim was to demonstrate that visual working memory can take advantage of these
learned statistics to remember more of the display even when the statistics relate the
co-occurrence of different objects, as in the work of Fiser and Aslin (2001). It is an
avenue of future research to explore what kinds of statistics can be gleaned from the
input and where the statistical learning mechanisms fail. It will also be important to
discover if there exist situations in which observers can successfully learn statistical
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regularities but are unable to take advantage of those regularities to efficiently store
items in memory.
Finally, as in Experiment 1, the modeling showed that even though people are re-
membering more items, their working memory capacity is actually constant when
quantified by the amount of information remembered (or the number of chunks
stored). In general, this suggests that the tools of information theory combined with
Bayesian learning models enable us to take into account the compressibility of the in-
put information, and provide clear, testable predictions for how many items observers
can remember. This suggests that compression must be central to our understanding
of visual working memory capacity.
4.5 General Discussion
We presented two experiments contrasting memory capacity for displays where colors
were presented in random pairs with memory capacity for displays where colors were
presented in recurring patterns. In the first experiment, the colors which formed a
pattern were presented as part of the same object. In the second experiment, the
colors which formed a pattern were presented on two different but spatially adjacent
objects. For both experiments we found that observers were successfully able to
remember more colors on the displays in which regularities were present. The data
indicate that this is not due to post-perceptual inference but reflects an efficient
encoding. We proposed a quantitative model of how learning the statistics of the
input would allow observers to form more efficient representations of the displays,
and used a compression algorithm (Huffman coding) to demonstrate that observers
performance approaches what would be optimal if their memory had a fixed capacity
in bits. In addition, we illustrated that a discrete model of chunking also fits our
data. The degree of compression possible from the display was highly correlated with
behavior, suggesting that people optimally take advantage of statistical regularities
to remember more information in working memory.
We thus show that information theory can accurately describe observers working
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memory capacity for simple colors that are associated with each other, since such
a capacity depends on compression. By using a statistical learning paradigm, we
control the statistics of the input, allowing is to measure the possible compression in
this simple task. Since in the world almost all items we wish to remember are asso-
ciated with other objects in the environment (Bar, 2004), using information theory
to quantify the limits of working memory capacity is likely of more utility for natural
viewing conditions than measuring the number of independent items that people can
remember.
4.5.1 Resolution versus number
One interesting factor to consider is whether the increase in percent correct we observe
during training in the patterned group could be due to an increase in the resolution
at which observers store the colors, rather than an increase in the number of colors
remembered per se (similar to the claims of Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007).
We believe several factors speak against such an account. In particular, if a fixed
number of items are remembered and only the resolution of storage is increasing, then
the fixed number of items remembered would have to be at least 6 (the number of
colors remembered by the patterned group in the 9th block of trials). This seems
very unlikely, given that previous estimates of the fixed number are on the order of
3 or 4 (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001), even for studies that explicitly address
this issue of the resolution with which items are stored (Awh, Barton, & Vogel,
2007; Zhang and Luck, 2008). In addition, while Awh et al (2007) provide some
evidence that for complex objects there may be a difference of resolution between
different object classes, both Rouder et al. (2008) and Zhang and Luck (2008) have
recently argued for discrete fixed-resolution representations in the domain of color
(although see Bays & Husain, 2009, for a critique of this work). These papers provide
evidence that for simple features like color, the colors are either remembered or not
remembered, rather than varying in resolution. Finally, it is not clear why the co-
variance introduced in the colors would affect the resolution of a single color, and
what the proper relationship would be between the resolution and the association
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strength. For these reasons we believe it is unlikely that the current data reflect
changes in the resolution of the items rather than the quantity of items stored.
4.5.2 The relationship between slots and objects
Much of the work on visual working memory has emphasized the privileged role of
objects in memory capacity. For example, there is often an advantage to representing
two features from the same object as opposed to two of the same features from two
different objects (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Xu, 2002). In fact, visual working memory is
often conceptualized as containing 3-4 'slots', in which one object, and all its features,
can be stored into one slot (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008) with some
degree of fidelity. In this literature, 'objects' typically are assumed be the units of
mid-level vision, specifically a spatiotemporally contiguous collection of features.
Our data suggest that at least the simplest version of an object-based capacity
limit, in which one object in the world is stored in one slot in the mind, is not sufficient.
If observers have a fixed working memory capacity of 3-4 objects on average, then
both the uniform and patterned groups should show the same memory performance in
Experiment 2. Similarly, if observers can remember at most 3-4 values along a single
feature dimension (like color), then both the uniform and patterned groups should
show the same memory performance in Experiment 1. However, in both Experiment
1 and Experiment 2, the patterned groups were able to remember almost twice as
many objects by the end of the experiment. Thus, if there are slots in the mind,
they must be able to hold more than one mid-level visual object, much like 'chunks'
can contain multiple digits or words in the verbal working memory literature. The
critical point here is that visual working memory should not be said to hold only 3-4
mid-level visual objects or 3-4 values along a single feature dimension, but instead
needs to allow for 'visual chunking'. Alternatively, visual working memory capacity
may be characterized in a more graded fashion rather than using slots or chunks as
a unit of measure (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma,
2004).
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4.5.3 Chunking
The current behavioral data cannot directly address whether the proper way to char-
acterize the capacity of the system is in terms of a continuous measure of information
or in terms of a model in which items are stored discretely in chunks or slots (Cowan,
2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Miller, 1956; Simon, 1974). Our information theoretic
analysis puts a theoretical limit on how compressible this information should be to
a learner. However, exactly how this compression is implemented in psychological
constructs remains an open question. One possibility is that associated items become
more and more compressible over time (i.e., start to take up less space in memory).
Another possibility is that pairs of items take up either two chunks or one, depending
on a probabilistic chunking threshold. Importantly, a continuous model of compres-
sion can be closely approximated by a discrete model, as long as the threshold for
forming a chunk is related to the cost of the items in information theoretic terms. In
fact, any chunking model which will account for our data will need to form chunks
in a way that is compatible with our information theoretic analysis. In this sense,
information theory allows us to constrain chunking models significantly, and has the
potential to break us out of the circular dilemma of determining what ought to count
as a single chunk (Simon, 1974).
4.5.4 Coding model
It is important to emphasize that compression must be defined with respect to a
coding model. Naive information theoretic models (e.g., Kleinberg & Kaufman, 1971),
which simply assume that all items are coded with respect to the possible choices for
a particular task, are not adequate ways of characterizing the capacity of the memory
system. For example, using such a coding scheme it takes 1 bit to represent a binary
digit and 3.3 bits to represent a decimal digit. However, as described clearly in Miller
(1956), if observers can remember a fixed amount of information, then based on the
number of decimal digits they can remember, they ought to be able to remember
many more binary digits.
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Some hints at what the psychological coding model might be like in this case
comes from evidence that shows observers tend to store digits phonetically (Badde-
ley, 1986). Thus, perhaps a proper information theoretic model would encode both
binary and decimal digits with respect to the entire set of phonemes. Of course, even
the phoenetic coding scheme is not sufficient for capturing how much information is
in a string, as the conceptual content matters a great deal. For example, people can
remember many more words if they make a coherent sentence than if they are ran-
domly drawn from the lexicon (Simon, 1974). This is also true in memory for visual
information: sparse cartoon drawings are remembered better when given a meaning-
ful interpretation (Bower, Karlin, & Dueck, 1975; see also Wiseman & Neisser, 1974).
Presumably abstract line drawings have much longer 'coding strings' than when those
same line drawings can be encoded with respect to existing knowledge.
In the current experiment, we specifically avoided having to discover and specify
the true coding model. By exploring compression within the domain of associations
between elements (colors in the current study), we only need to specify the information
present in their covariance. Specifying how long the bit string is for a display of eight
colored circles would require a complete model of the visual system, and how it
encodes the dimensions of colored circles. Since the true coding model is likely based
in part on the natural statistics of the visual input, and given the frequency of gray
screen with eight colored circles on them in our everyday visual experience, the bit
strings for such a display are likely quite long. Instead we used a paradigm that
builds associations between elements over time, allowing us to control the coding
model that could be learned from the regularities in the displays. This method
avoids many of the pitfalls traditionally associated with information theoretic models
(e.g., those examined by Miller, 1956). Importantly, our results demonstrate that in
this simplified world of associated colors, visual working memory is sensitive to the
incoming statistics of the input. This approach opens the door for future work to
apply information theoretic models to human cognition without first solving for the
perceptual coding schemes used by the brain.
Moving beyond simple pairwise associations between colors, for more complex
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stimuli and in more real-world situations, observers can bring to bear rich conceptual
structures in long-term memory and thus achieve much greater memory performance
(e.g., Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980). These conceptual structures act as internal
models of the world, and therefore provide likelihoods of different items appearing
in the world together. For example, observers know that computer monitors tend
to appear on desks; that verbs follow subjects; that kitchens tend to be near dining
rooms. Importantly, our information theoretic framework can, at least in principle,
scale up to these more difficult problems, since it is embedded in a broader Bayesian
framework which can make use of structured knowledge representations (Kemp &
Tenenbaum, 2008; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006).
4.5.5 Relation to learning and long-term memory
Compressibility and chunking are rarely formalized outside the literature on expertise
(e.g., chunking models: Gobet et al., 2001), and thus the relation between visual
working memory capacity and the learning of relations between items has received
little attention in the literature (although see Cowan et al. 2004 for an analysis in
the verbal domain). However, there are several interesting data points about the role
of learned knowledge in working memory capacity more broadly: for example, adults
have a greater working memory capacity than children (Simon, 1974). In addition,
there is a large literature on expertise and chunking (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet et
al., 2001), where there is significant appreciation of the fact that long-term knowledge
is a significant factor in working memory capacity (see also Kurby, Glazek & Gauthier,
2009; Olsson & Poom, 2005; Scolari, Vogel & Awh, 2008).
By relating working memory capacity and chunking strongly to information the-
ory, our results suggest a broad purpose for a particular kind of long-term knowledge
acquisition: statistical learning. In particular, a great deal of recent work has focused
on a set of statistical learning mechanisms which are capable of extracting many
different regularities with only minutes of exposure and appear to be relatively ubiq-
uitous, occurring in the auditory, tactile and visual domains, and in infants, adults,
and monkeys (Brady & Oliva, 2008; Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Fiser & Aslin,
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2002; Kirkham, Slemmer & Johnson, 2002; Hauser, Newport & Aslin, 2001; Saffran,
Aslin & Newport, 1996; Turk-Browne, Junge & Scholl, 2005). The present results
suggest that one of the primary reasons for being sensitive to such regularities might
be that it allows us to remember more in working memory by eliminating redundancy
in our representations. They also emphasize how quickly such long-term memories
can be built and can start to influence capacity measures observers in the present
studies demonstrated significant improvements in working memory capacity by block
2, only a few minutes into the experiment. In addition, it is important to keep in
mind that statistical learning mechanisms need not be limited to learning simple as-
sociations between items. Both the learning process and the representations that are
learned can be, and likely are, much richer than simple associations (see, for example,
Orban et al. 2008 and Frank, Goldwater, Mansinghka, Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007).
4.5.6 Conclusion
The information we can hold in working memory is surprisingly limited. However, in
the real world there are strong associations and regularities in the input, and our brain
is tuned to these regularities in both perception and memory (Field, 1987; Anderson,
1990). In an information theoretic sense, such regularities introduce redundancies
that make the input more compressible.
We have shown that observers can take advantage of these redundancies, enabling
them to remember more colors in visual working memory. In addition, while we
showed this using simple associations between colors, the Bayesian modeling frame-
work we used has the potential to scale up to learning over more complex represen-
tations. Thus, we believe that the tools of probabilistic modeling and information
theory can help in understanding how observers form long-term memory representa-
tions and use them in working memory. More generally, our data support the view
that perceptual encoding rapidly takes advantage of redundancy to form efficient
codes.
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4.6 Chapter Appendix
4.6.1 Model Results using Self-Information
The self-information at seeing a given item, i, expressed in bits, is:
S = -log 2(pi)
More bits of information (S) are gained by seeing items that are of low probability
(small pi) than items that are of high probability (large pi). The number of bits of
self-information is the mathematical optimum for how many bits must be required to
encode particular stimuli from a given distribution (Shannon, 1948).
In practice, it is difficult or impossible to achieve codes that are exactly equal in
length to the self-information for an item, simply because codes must be discrete.
Hence, throughout the paper we focused on a particular coding scheme Huffman
coding that is both simple and approximates optimal compression. However, it is
worthwhile to ask whether we find similar results looking not at the length of the
Huffman codes for all the items in a given block, but instead looking at the number
of bits of surprise for those items. Thus, we modeled our experiment using surprise to
calculate the number of bits for each item rather than the length of the code generated
by Huffman coding.
We used the same values for the priors as the Huffman code results in the main
text: a = 34, and a = 31, respectively, for the two experiments. The number of bits
of self-information correlate r = -0.94 (Experiment 1) and r = -0.95 (Experiment 2)
with human memory performance. Figures 12 and 13 show the results of multiplying
the number of bits of surprise with the number of colors remembered by observers
for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The results once against support the idea
of compression as a major factor in visual working memory: observers are able to
remember an approximately fixed number of bits, remembering more colors when the
items are more redundant.
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Figure 4-12: The size of memory for Experiment 1 estimated using self-information.
Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
4.6.2 Derivation of K formula
In an eight-alternative forced-choice, observers may choose the correct answer for
one of two reasons: (1) they may know the correct answer, or, (2) they may guess
the correct answer by chance. In order to estimate capacity (the number of items
remembered out of the 8 items in the display), we need an estimate of the first kind of
correct answers (knowing the colors), discounting the second kind of correct answers
(guesses).
To begin deriving such a formula we write percent correct (PC) as a function of the
two different kinds of answer answers for those items that observers remember, which
they get right 100% of the time, and answers for those items that observers do not
remember, which they get right 1/8th of the time. If observers successfully remember
K items from a display of 8 items, percent correct (PC) may thus be formulated as:
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Figure 4-13: The size of memory for Experiment 2 estimated using self-information.
Error bars represent +/-1 s.e.m.
K 8 -K 1
PC = ( *1) + (8 K * -)8 8 8
Where the first term accounts for items correctly remembered and the second
term accounts for items on which the observer guesses. For example, if an observer
remembers 2 items (K=2), then for 2/8ths of the items they choose the right answer
100% of the time, whereas the other 6/8ths of the time, they guess and choose the
right answer 1/8th of the time. Simplifying and solving for K, we get:
(PC*8*8)=8*K+8-K
(PC * 8 * 8) - 8 = 8 * K - K
(PC * 8 * 8) - 8 = K * (8 - 1)
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K = ((PC * 8 * 8) - 8)/7
This equation then allows us to directly calculate the capacity of an observer (K)
as a function of percent correct (PC).
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
How much visual information can a person hold in mind at once? From William
James (1890) "primary memory" to current studies of visual working memory ca-
pacity, researchers have struggled to understand how much about the visual world
we can maintain in memory. The present thesis provides a novel perspective on this
question by proposing that observers form rich, structured memory representations,
and proposing a framework for modeling such representations.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that observers form hierarchical memory representations
in simple working memory displays. In the same way that observers looking at real
scenes encode both scene-based information (e.g., it is a blue kitchen) as well as spe-
cific items (e.g. that refrigerator), the experiments presented in Chapter 2 scaled up
traditional working memory displays to contain patterns, where items are perceptu-
ally related to one another. We found that even within a single display observers
do not encode items in isolation; instead, they encode both the individual items and
the summary statistics of the display, and use the summary statistics to adjust their
representation of each individual item. Thus the remembered size of each individual
item is biased toward both the mean size of the set of items in the same color, and
the mean size of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory
is constructive, encoding the display at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating
across these levels rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item
independently. Furthermore, this pattern of data is compatible with a simple hier-
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archical Bayesian model where memory representations are stored at multiple levels
of abstraction, suggesting that even such structured memory representations can be
usefully formalized despite the fact that observers representations are more complex
than a simple list of independent items.
Chapter 3 showed that, in addition to using simple summary information like
the mean size to help encode specific items, observers may also encode spatial pat-
terns from a display. This kind of higher-order summary information is incompatible
with traditional formal models of change detection, like those used to estimate vi-
sual working memory capacity (e.g., Cowan, 2001), which assume observers encode
only a simple memory representation which includes no higher-order structure and
treats items independently from each other. Thus, Chapter 3 presented a proba-
bilistic model of change detection that attempted to bridge this gap by formalizing
the role of perceptual organization and allowing for richer, more structured memory
representations. Using either standard visual working memory displays or displays in
which the dots are purposefully arranged in patterns, we showed that models which
take into account perceptual grouping between items and the encoding of higher-
order summary information are necessary to account for human change detection
performance. Such models can account for observers' performance even on individual
displays, whereas models which assume independence between items fail to capture
performance even in the simplest displays of colored dots. This demonstrates that
items are not encoded independently of each other, and provides a formal framework
for understanding this integrative encoding and retrieval.
Chapter 4 examined the influence of learned regularities on visual working mem-
ory performance. In the standard visual working memory paradigm, observers are
asked to remember a set of arbitrary colored objects, and it is usually found that they
can remember only 3 or 4 of the colors (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997). This is surprisingly
impoverished, and raises the question of how we are able to successfully function in ev-
eryday memory tasks. One of the major distinctions between this standard paradigm
and real-world tasks is that in the real-world we often have prior knowledge that in-
forms what features we expect to see where in a given scene. Chapter 4 showed that
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if we introduce regularities into standard visual working memory stimuli, observers
not only learn these regularities, but are able to encode the learned items more effi-
ciently in working memory, representing twice as many colors. Furthermore, using an
information-theoretic model, we that observers' memory for colors is compatible with
having a fixed capacity in terms of information (bits). This provides a theoretical
explanation for memory capacity in terms of how compressible the information is in
a given display, rather than how many objects can be remembered.
Ultimately, working memory representations in the real-world contain information
about scenes that is not purely in the form of a list of independent items contained
in those scenes: we make use of our prior knowledge about what items go together,
we encode texture, surfaces and other ensemble statistics from scenes, and we make
use of the relationships between items to provide information on items we did not
specifically encode. Models of working memory need to be capable of dealing with
these phenomena in order to provide true insight into the structure of the working
memory system and its capacities. In this thesis we have proposed that information
is represented at the individual item level as hierarchical feature bundles (Chapter
1), across individual items in terms of ensemble or scene context (Chapter 2; Chapter
3), and that our prior knowledge about regularities between items is crucial to de-
termining the structure of our memory representations (Chapter 4). This thesis thus
provides empirical evidence that observers use structured knowledge to represent dis-
plays in working memory, and, in addition, provides a set of computational models
to formalize these structured memory representations.
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